Shared past
common future:

Antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger in the context of historical colonial conflicts

Ana Cristina Mateus Figueiredo

Faculdade de Psicologia e Ciências da Educação

Universidade de Coimbra

Shared past common future: Antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger in the context of historical colonial conflicts

Ana Cristina Mateus Figueiredo

Doctoral Dissertation in Social Psychology presented to the Faculdade de Psicologia e Ciências da Educação - Universidade de Coimbra

Coimbra 2012

Supervisor: Professor Doctor Joaquim Pires Valentim

(Universidade de Coimbra)

Co-supervisor: Professor Doctor Bertjan Doosje

(Universiteit van Amsterdam)

Acknowledgments / Agradecimentos

Agradeço profundamente ao Professor Doutor Joaquim Pires Valentim por todo o apoio que me deu ao longo deste projecto. É para mim uma honra ter tido a oportunidade de desenvolver este projecto consigo e de aprender e poder desenvolver as minhas competências ao seu lado. Espero que este trabalho esteja à altura daquilo que sempre me ensinou e mostrou. Quero ainda agradecer pela força que sempre me deu neste projecto e noutros que fomos desenvolvendo ao longo dos últimos quatro anos.

Ik ben Prof. dr. Bertjan Doosje heel erg dankbaar dat hij me de mogelijkheid heeft gegeven om naar Amsterdam te komen om mijn project daar te ontwikkelen. Ik ben er absoluut zeker van dat mijn ervaring in het buitenland en de tijd die ik heb doorgebracht aan de afdeling Sociale Psychologie aan de UvA enorm heeft bijgedragen aan dit werk. Ik wil jou ook bedanken voor de geweldige begeleiding en voor alles wat je mij geleerd hebt gedurende de tijd dat ik daar was, maar ook voor je toewijding aan dit project toen ik in Portugal was. Ik hoop dat deze dissertatie een goede representatie is voor alles wat je mij geleerd hebt en voor de inspiratie die je mij hebt gegeven.

To both my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Joaquim Pires Valentim and Prof. Dr. Bertjan Doosje I also have some common words: I am extremely fortunate to have seen and witnessed the humanity with which you carry out your work. It has been a lesson for me and I hope I can only make you justice in what you have taught me in carrying out my own work. I sincerely value your permanent ethics and way of motivating me – I am sure I will benefit from these throughout my career and life. Both of you have been pillars of this work and I could not desire for better supervision and support throughout these years. I also thank you very much for your kindness and friendship, hoping they will last much longer than the echoes of this work.

À Faculdade de Psicologia e Ciências da Educação da Universidade de Coimbra pelo apoio dado durante todo este projecto e em particular ao Instituto de Psicologia Cognitiva, Desenvolvimento Vocacional e Social pelo contributo proporcionado no meu crescimento profissional ao longo destes quatro anos.

I sincerely thank to the Department of Social Psychology of the Universiteit van Amsterdam and all my colleagues there. The present work has benefited extremely from the periods spent in this Department. My time in Amsterdam has been incredibly marked by all the colleagues and friends I gained throughout my stays at the Department - I will surely miss the ping-pong table, but mostly the lab meetings, brown-bag lunches and Kriterion borrels when we were all together.

Os estudos que contam na presente dissertação foram financiados pela Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (SFRH/BD/36056/2007), à qual devo a possibilidade de realizar na íntegra o presente trabalho.

A todos os amigos que, de perto ou a maior distância, estiveram e continuam a estar presentes na minha vida. Nenhuma realização profissional tem significado sem a partilha intensa e sincera com os nossos amigos. E por isso, vocês fizeram e continuarão sempre a fazer a diferença. Cris, Joana (a mestre dos índices!), Gina, Sofia, Chica, Lara, Sara, Fie, Mafi, Adílio, Pachou, Maria, Dani, Jorge, Margô, Sónia, Andrea, Rita, BA, Sérgio, Sónia C., Teresa, Russo – a todos devo extremo carinho e amor. E se por acaso houver algum de vós que não esteja aqui mencionado, mea culpa! Podem crer, no entanto, que um cantinho em mim nunca deixarão de ter. Ao Afonso por, estranhamente e ainda que muitas vezes virtualmente, ter sido aquele que mais de perto e por mais tempo acompanhou este trabalho.

À minha *I love you all crew* agradeço por me fazerem descobrir uma família longe de casa e por me ensinarem a força da amizade, independentemente das distâncias e circunstâncias! Amsterdam without you would never be Amsterdam! Indeed, I love you all!

À Fina e ao Dome por tornarem esta dissertação bonita!

A todos os combatentes que entrevistei, o meu profundo agradecimento. Embora as entrevistas realizadas não constem do presente trabalho, a todos vós devo a constante lembrança do lado humano que qualquer projecto desta índole tem e deverá sempre ter. Porque todos os envolvidos em conflitos e guerras não poderão nunca deixar de ser considerados pessoas e vítimas.

A todos os participantes nos estudos apresentados nesta dissertação agradeço a disponibilidade e a seriedade com que encararam este trabalho e as respectivas recolhas de dados.

Aos meus pais, Mariana e Eduardo agradeço por tudo! Sem a vossa constante presença e encorajamento na minha vida, nunca aqui poderia ter chegado. Muito, muito obrigada por me ajudarem a crescer e por também continuarem a crescer comigo ao longo de todos estes anos! Este trabalho é também vosso e é a vós que tudo devo!

A toda a minha família, por estarem sempre presentes.

Contents

8

10

12

List of Tables

List of Figures

Abstract

Introduction. Intergroup relations have interested researchers throughout the history of social psychology. The implications of phenomena such as prejudice, discrimination and conflict are some of the main reasons of such an interest. Recent developments within the field have highlighted the role of emotions in understanding how individuals assess events on behalf of their ingroup *vis a vis* outgroups and how these appraisals lead to distinct emotional experiences. In turn, the consequences of such emotions have been conceptualized. In the present dissertation we investigate the antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger from the perpetrator group's perspective within two contexts of historical colonial conflicts: the Portuguese colonial war in Africa and the Indonesian war of independence with the Netherlands.

Objectives. The present dissertation aims to unveil the antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger regarding a perpetrator group's role on past colonial conflicts. By choosing two distinct contexts of colonial conflicts (Portugal and the Netherlands) we propose to understand the commonalities and specificities of each context in shaping individuals' appraisals, emotional experiences and action tendencies regarding their ingroup's role in the events analyzed. Furthermore, we aim to contribute to the field of intergroup relations and emotions by underlying distinct antecedents of group-based emotions, such as ingroup-focused variables and outgroup-focused and relational variables. Finally, we aim to discover the potential distinct consequences of such emotional experiences for the ingroup's desire to compensate and improve the outgroup's situation in the present day.

Method and results. By means of surveys, we collected empirical data in Portugal and the Netherlands assessing our theoretical assumptions and hypotheses.
In our first study, we found evidence for the role of distinct modes of ingroup identification in shaping the way individuals perceive the violent colonial past of the Portuguese nation. Furthermore, we shed light into the role of exonerating cognitions in exculpating the ingroup's actions and we measured the degree to which the ingroup identifies with the victimized group and is willing to compensate its members.
Chapters 4 to 7 present data comparing Portuguese and Dutch individuals perceptions of their ingroup's violent past and several antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger. Our results provide evidence for the relevance of different ingroup-focused antecedents of such emotions, such as the distal effects of different modes of ingroup identification and more proximal antecedents, such as exonerating cognitions and collectivism in the experience of the above mentioned emotions. Furthermore, we find support for our conceptualization of outgroup-focused antecedents of these emotional experiences. In this line, we have examined variables such as outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions, meta-perceptions (i.e., how we think they perceive our group) and perceptions of past compensation. Finally, we assessed distinct action tendencies and their differential association with group-based guilt, compunction and anger. We found evidence that group-based guilt and compunction are related to compensatory behavioral intentions, whilst group-based anger is more associated with the subejctive importance of discussing the negative past. We also analyzed how these emotions may predict the desire of the ingroup to be forgiven by the outgroup.

Conclusions. Our results add to the state-of-the-art of the field by providing innovative evidence regarding the role of three negative group-based emotions in shaping present day intergroup relations marked by a negative past.
Most of our theoretical assumptions and hypotheses have been confirmed and we propose several corollaries provided by our results. First, we argue for the integration of several

theories into a coherent theoretical body within which to analyze intergroup relations. In this line, we also attest to the need of considering the contexts in which we carry out our research as potentially having certain specificities that influence our findings. Second, we propose a more refined analysis of ingroup-focused, outgroup-focused and relational variables in influencing the experience of group-based guilt, compunction and anger. Finally, we argue for a distinction between these emotions and their differential consequences for intergroup relations.

Resumo

Introdução. As relações intergrupais sempre interessaram investigadores, ao longo da história da psicologia social. As implicações de fenómenos como o preconceito, a discriminação e conflitos, são algumas das principais razões de tal interesse. Os recentes desenvolvimentos na área têm destacado o papel das emoções na forma como os indivíduos percepcionam determinados eventos em função da sua pertença grupal a um endogrupo face a face diversos exogrupos, e a forma como estas percepções podem causar diferentes reacções emocionais. Por sua vez, as consequências destas emoções têm sido analisadas. Na presente dissertação, investigamos os antecedentes e consequências da culpa, compunção e raiva derivadas da pertença grupal a um endogrupo perpetrador, usando dois contextos de conflitos coloniais históricos: a guerra colonial portuguesa e a guerra de independência da Indonésia com os Países Baixos.

Objectivos. A presente dissertação tem como objectivo analisar os antecedentes e consequências da culpa, compunção e raiva baseadas no endogrupo, em relação a conflitos coloniais passados, em que este mesmo endogrupo perpetrou actos imorais contra um exogrupo. Ao escolher dois contextos de conflitos coloniais (Portugal e Países Baixos), propomo-nos a melhor compreender as semelhanças e especificidades de cada contexto na formação de avaliações individuais, experiências emocionais e tendências para a acção, relativamente ao papel do endogrupo nos contextos analisados. Além, disso, pretendemos contribuir para o campo das relações intergrupais e das emoções ao salientar diferentes antecedentes das experiências emocionais, tais como antecedentes focados no endogrupo e antecedentes relacionais e focados no exogrupo. Por último, pretendemos descobrir as potenciais consequências de cada uma das emoções analisadas relativamente ao desejo de compensar o exogrupo e de melhorar a sua situação no presente.

Método e resultados. Através de questionários, foram recolhidos dados empíricos em Portugal e nos Países Baixos para analisar os nossos pressupostos teóricos e hipóteses.
No primeiro estudo, encontrámos suporte para o papel que diferentes modos de identificação com o endogrupo têm na forma como os indivíduos avaliam o passado colonial violento da nação portuguesa. Além disso, os resultados evidenciam o papel das cognições exoneras em desculpar as acções do endogrupo. Medimos ainda até que ponto os indivíduos se identificam com o exogrupo e estão disposto a compensá-lo.
Nos Capítulos 4 a 7 são apresentados dados referentes às percepções de indivíduos portugueses e holandeses, sobre o passado violento do seu endogrupo, bem como vários antecedentes e consequências da culpa, compunção e raiva baseadas no endogrupo. Os resultados mostram que é importante considerar diferentes antecedentes focados no endogrupo relativamente a estas emoções, tal como é o caso do efeito distal de diferentes modos de identificação e outros antecedentes mais proximais, como são as cognições exoneras e o colectivismo, na experiência das emoções acima referidas. Mais ainda, encontrámos suporte para a nossa conceptualização de antecedentes relacionais e focados no exogrupo das diferentes emoções analisadas. Assim, foram examinadas variáveis como a identificação com o exogrupo, percepções do exogrupo, meta-percepções (i.e. crenças sobre a forma como o exogrupo vê o endogrupo) e percepções de compensação passada. Por último, medimos diversas tendências para a acção e a sua associação diferencial com a culpa, compunção e raiva baseadas no endogrupo. Os resultados comprovam que a culpa e a compunção baseadas no endogrupo se relacionam com a intenção de compensar o exogrupo, enquanto que a raiva baseada no endogrupo está associada com o desejo de discutir o passado negativo. Também foi analisada a forma como estas emoções poderão predizer o desejo, por parte do endogrupo, de ser perdoado pelas acções cometidas no passado.

Conclusões. Os resultados apresentados contribuem para o estado da arte da área, ao fornecer dados sobre o papel de três emoções baseadas no endogrupo nas relações intergrupais actuais entre dois grupos envolvidos em conflitos coloniais históricos.

A maioria dos nossos pressupostos teóricos e hipóteses foram confirmadas e, na presente dissertação, apresentamos vários corolários dos nossos resultados. Primeiro, acreditamos ser importante a integração de diferentes teorias num corpo teórico coerente, através do qual poderão analisar-se as relações intergrupais. Assim, ressalvamos ainda a necessidade de considerar que diferentes contextos e as suas especificidades poderão influenciar os resultados obtidos em diferentes situações. Em segundo, é proposta uma análise mais refinada dos antecedentes focados no endogrupo, focados no exogrupo e relacionais. Por último, consideramos pertinente a distinção entre diferentes emoções e as suas consequências diferenciais para o campo das relações entre grupos.

Foreword

_____

True forgiveness deals with the past,
all of the past,
to make the future possible.
(Desmond Tutu)

"In the last 3,421 years of recorded history only 268 have seen no war" (Durant & Durant, 1997, p. 81).

This calculation, albeit shocking, does not come entirely as a surprise for most historians, political scientists and social sciences' researchers.

As any history book will tell us, world's history, since its beginning, is marked by instances of conflict, prejudice, discrimination, xenophobia, racism, stigmatization, intractable conflict and collective violence.

In the light of such fatalistic and sad evidence of the aggressive nature of human beings, one may ask what is wrong with us. On the other hand, one may also ask what can be done to alleviate intergroup suffering and change the current state of affairs in way to achieve a more just and equalitarian world social order.

Given the pervasive nature of intergroup conflict across contexts and geographical settings it is not surprising that many different researchers and field workers have devoted much attention to such instances of negative intergroup behavior.

We do not agree with a defeating vision of human beings as inherently evil or horrific creatures. We believe humans are rational and emotional beings which, at times, may be so intertwined and entangled in situations provoking them to become violent and vindictive against others, that they may forget their rational and

compassionate side, elevating themselves above other humans and thus fostering conflict.

We do argue that many instances of violent conflict could have and should have been avoided throughout history. Unfortunately, these have been not prevented and we can only hope that history's lessons remain and warn us against the possibility of such atrocities to ever occur again.

Furthermore, understanding the mechanisms which have lead to violent conflicts in the past may enlighten us regarding the strategies and possible paths for creating better intergroup relations in the present and for the future.

This work is one more attempt at comprehending and analyzing instances of intergroup conflict that have occurred in the past and which may still have repercussions in the present day. Namely, in the present work we focus on colonial conflicts, historical negative events involving colonizer and colonized groups in their struggle for controlling natural resources, wealth and symbolic power.

We further argue that the negative consequences of intergroup violence do not end when a conflict has officially ended. In this line, we propose an integrative approach for understanding present day interpretations and consequences of historical colonial conflicts.

> The collective memories that members of formerly colonized and formerly colonizing countries hold about the colonial times, and particularly about colonial violence, still permeate their current relationships. (…) The way this violent past is collectively remembered today is therefore a crucial factor for understanding contemporary instances of intergroup conflict, prejudice, stigmatization, and racism. Conversely, collective memories of the colonial times could also be instrumental in promoting intergroup reconciliation, mutual respect, and mutual recognition in and between contemporary societies. (Volpato & Licata, 2010, p. 5)

For a better understanding of our work, we will dedicate the first Chapter of this dissertation to a short historical contextualization of the events under analysis. The Portuguese colonial war, involving the Portuguese Armed Forces and the populations of the former African colonies, and the Indonesian war of independence,

involving the Dutch and the Indonesians, are thus introduced to the reader and the international context in which they took place is highlighted.

Within the social identity framework (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it is proposed that identification processes developing from early socialization onwards, will determine individuals' perceptions, feelings and resolution of situations in which they are confronted with the negative past actions of their national group against other groups.

In Chapter 2, we thus review several theories on intergroup relations and conflict developed within the discipline of social psychology. The rationale for our exposition of such theories pertains to the developments and improvements of the different approaches in explaining intergroup relations, especially the ones which are marked by collective violence and conflict. By the end of this Chapter it should then be evident that our approach to analyze the aforementioned colonial conflicts integrates different theoretical approaches into a unified framework from which to envision intergroup relations following violent conflicts, the emotional processes associated with these and the effects of such emotional experiences for the intergroup relations under study.

Rather than assuming a simplified *modus operandi* for explaining intergroup relations focused solely on cognitive explanations of the phenomena under scrutiny, we suggest a more inclusive approach to the study of such relations. Through the inclusion of theoretical perspectives which encompass emotional experiences, their antecedents and consequences within the intergroup relations domain, we anticipate to create a more complete picture of this prolific area of research, developed over the last decades. Therefore, in Chapter 3 we provide the theoretical assumptions and concepts relevant for an understanding of intergroup relations as being subjected to dynamics of intergroup emotions, and more specifically group-based emotions.

The second part of the present work will be entirely dedicated to the empirical studies developed, following the general guidelines and theoretical framework previously presented. Through a series of quantitative studies, we are determined to provide empirical evidence for the proposed theoretical hypotheses.

Chapter 4 presents data regarding the experience of group-based guilt and its associated antecedents and consequences in the context of the Portuguese colonial war.

The remaining empirical chapters (5, 6 and 7) present a comparative perspective of the emotional processing of Portuguese and Dutch individuals regarding the negative actions of their ingroup perpetrated against other groups, during each of their colonial conflicts, respectively.

By introducing two distinct instances of past colonial conflicts, we aim to elucidate the current state of the art within the domain of intergroup relations and emotions by searching for the commonalities and specificities of each context in causing different negative group-based emotions, namely guilt, compunction and anger. Furthermore, we argue that an analysis of their antecedents and consequences as an intertwined mechanism by which intergroup relations are influenced will improve our current understanding of such phenomena.

In the final part of this dissertation, we present a general summary of the main findings of our studies. We further introduce a general overview of the potential theoretical and practical implications of our work and conclude by suggesting directions for further research that may increase our understanding of the role of emotions in intergroup relations.

In sum, the driving force of our work focuses on aspects of intergroup relations that relate to the emotional processing of a historical violent past from the perpetrator's point of view and the dynamics involved in such emotional experiences, mainly, their antecedents and consequences.

Part I. Theoretical Conceptualization and Literature Review

Chapter 1. Intergroup Relations: An Historical Background into the Colonization and Decolonization of Portugal and the Netherlands

_____

Intergroup relations do not occur in a vacuum. As Nafstad, Carlisq and Blakar (2012) argue, social psychology is a discipline which focuses its analysis on the individual in relation to the social world (be it communities, societies or social groups) and, as they state "if social psychology is to contribute in resolving pressing problems of our time, social psychology must conceptualize and understand individual behavior in societal, cultural and historical contexts" (Nafstad et al., 2012, p. 62). Nevertheless, as the same authors refer, many times, these contexts have been under-examined in mainstream psychology, since there has been, throughout the history of the discipline, a focus on experimental studies conducted in the laboratory. Although we believe this is an important focus of study and the different experimental research lines have contributed enormously to the definition and development of social psychology, there is, nevertheless, a need to bring into focus the analysis of cultural and societal contexts in which social psychology must develop and find its applicability (Tajfel, 1972a; Valentin & Doise, 2008).

Consequently, and given the widely acknowledged role of societal and cultural processes in nearly all phenomena studied by social psychology, we believe that any analysis of intergroup relations must consider the societal background in which they have occurred and developed. Moreover, the analysis of socio-psychological processes within the context in which they have happened and currently exist, may also shed light into the role of collective memory and social

identity processes which develop over time, and may be shaped by shifts in the representations of such events.

Therefore, although the present chapter does not intend to be a historian's perspective regarding the historical events which set the background for the research presented, we argue that a review of the major events regarding the colonial conflicts setting the basis for our analysis of intergroup relations is thus needed.

The Rise and Fall of Colonization

Since the beginning of the 15th century, the Portuguese carried out what is nationally known as the "Discovery movement", in an attempt to discover maritime roots which would facilitate commerce and trade with the West. From the early stages of the colonization period, many European countries (namely Portugal, Spain, France, England, the Netherlands and Belgium) tried to assert their power in different territories throughout the world and, during the next centuries, these countries would become strong economic and colonial powers. Colonization was, however, not peaceful. The richness of many territories scattered all around the world and the economic benefits of their conquer and colonization, gave way to many struggles regarding which territories belonged to which colonial powers.

But, through the establishment of many treaties and agreements between the different European colonial powers, these struggles were controlled and the world became divided and ruled in an imperialistic way, which allowed for the exploitation of much territory, natural resources and human labor. It is important to notice here the belief, at the time, in the superiority of the European civilization in comparison with the native populations of the colonized territories. The legitimization of such a belief, supported by the fact that many of these populations still lived in what was considered a tribal lifestyle, led to the rise and implementation of slavery in most of these territories and to the harsh treatment of the native populations.

Although each European colonial power had its own policies and goals in the way they carried out the conquest and colonization of different territories, we can state that all of them were based on the exploitation of human and natural resources to the benefit of the economies of all colonial powers.

In the 18th century, during the Enlightenment period, and following the liberal ideas of the time, a political movement demanding the abolition of slavery emerged,

and Portugal, in 1761, was officially the first country to abolish slavery in mainland and the Indian colonized territories. Nevertheless, it was not until 1869 that Portugal abolished slavery completely from all its colonies. In its turn, the Netherlands abolished slavery in 1863. Although slavery had been abolished, forced labor was still a reality in the colonies of the different European colonial powers and it is argued that exploitation of the native populations of the colonized territories did not stop until decolonization occurred.

It was not until the end of Second World War that colonization, at the institutional and governmental level, was morally discussed and condemned.

In the aftermath of Second World War, in 1945, the United Nations organization was created with the goal of maintaining and promoting international peace and cooperation. Already at that time, the Charter of the United Nations included a Chapter on the "Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories" (United Nations, 1945). Furthermore, on December 2nd 1949, Resolution 317(IV) was created under the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others and, in 1960, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1514 (XV) (Declaration on the Granting of Independence to colonial countries and peoples), which earnestly asserted the need to promptly and unconditionally put an end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

It is in this period that much of the decolonization movements occur throughout the world. While some countries peacefully accepted to fully recognize their colonies the right to self-determination, other countries were involved in independence conflicts with their colonies.

This was the case for the territories of Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, at the time colonized by the Portuguese and the archipelago of Indonesia, which the Dutch tried to regain control of after Second World War.

Thus, the conflictual decolonization carried out by the Portuguese and the Dutch in the territories mentioned above, set the context in which we will analyze intergroup relations marked by a negative history.

Bellow follows a synopsis of the main events which marked the Portuguese colonial war and the Indonesian war of independence.

The Portuguese Colonial war

Portugal is widely known for having been a strong colonial world power since the XV century, a status which disappeared in 1975, with the full recognition of the right of its last colonies to achieve self-determination rights.

From 1926 to 1974, Portugal lived under the New State dictatorship which was rulled by António de Oliveira Salazar. After the Second World War and given the significant changes in the status of colonial relations and powers, many countries recognized their colonies as independent states and, though following different procedures, many countries in Africa were fully recognized as states of right. But Portugal was not one of the countries which accepted to withdraw its power from the colonies and was able to maintain its sovereignty over several territories throughout the world, namely the Indian regions of Goa, Daman and Diu, Timor, Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Furthermore, in 1951, there was a revision of the Portuguese constitution by the New State regime, changing the status of these territories from "colonies" to "overseas territories", thus defining Portugal as an intercontinental and multiracial nation (Ramos, Vasconcelos e Sousa, & Monteiro, 2010). With this change of status of the colonial territories, Portugal, which joined the United Nations in 1955, expected not to fall under Resolution 1514 created in 1960 by the United Nations, illegalizing all colonial practices.

Furthermore, the selective appropriation of the *Luso-tropicalist* discourse by representatives of the New State regime also gave support to the idea that Portugal had the right to maintain its sovereignity over the colonial territories. *Luso-tropicalism* was a theory created by Gilberto Freyre, a Brazilian anthropologist, which claimed that the Portuguese had a special positive character for multiracial relations, given that the Portuguese would have the unique capacity to miscigenize with the local populations (i.e. mix with the native populations through means of blood – marriage – and culture) and thus create positive relations between the natives of the colonies and the colonizers (Vala, Lopes, & Lima, 2008; Valentim, 2003, 2011).

Despite all the United Nations and international pressure, Portugal did not concede its colonies the right to self-determination and, in 1961, what would be known as the Portuguese colonial war, emerged, following a massacre of local

populations in the North of Angola, carried by independentist movements. Throughout the 13 years that the colonial war lasted, Portugal was consecutively condemned by the United Nations and only after the Carnation Revolution, did Portugal recognize the independence of all its colonial territories.

The Portuguese colonial war, also known as the overseas war (denomination given due to the change of status of the colonies in 1951 from colonies to overseas territories by the New State regime) or the liberation war (on the side of the African independence movements) was a conflict which emerged in 1961 in Angola. Later, in 1963, in Guinea-Bissau, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), carried out its first attack against the Portuguese headquarters in south of Bissau, nowadays the capital of the country. Interestingly, there was never an armed conflict in the colony of Cape Verde, although there were Cape Verdean fighters in the territories of Guinea-Bissau. Finally, in 1964, in Mozambique, the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) also attacked Portuguese targets in the Cabo Delgado Province.

For some time, the New State regime did not recognize the war was happening and, in continental Portugal, the mainstream media (controlled and censored by the regime) reported that there were only a few uprisings caused by terrorist groups coming from outside the Portuguese colonies. With the advance of the war and the military resources needed, the state representatives could not hide the real severity of the conflict but, nevertheless, kept their policy of maintaining the colonies under the ruling of the Portuguese nation.

Until 1974, the war destroyed the countries of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and caused many casualties on both sides of the conflict. Finally, in April 25th 1974, the peaceful Carnation Revolution, led by military officials who wanted the war to terminate, overthrew the New State Regime and, finally, in 1975 all the former colonies were recognized as states of own right by Portugal.

In the newly recognized nation-states of Angola and Mozambique, after the declaration of independence, a civil war emerged in both countries[1]. It was not until

---

[1] Interestingly, another Portuguese colony, East Timor, was not involved in the colonial war and was considered a Portuguese "overseas territory" until 1975. On November 28th 1975, after a short civil war, the independence of the country was declared. However, in December 1975, the island was invaded by Indonesia, which maintained control of the territory until 1999. At this time, after a referendum initiated by the United Nations, pro-Indonesian forces attacked the local populations and a

2002, in Angola and, 1992, in Mozambique, that these conflicts were resolved. The lack of political democracy and union following the independence significantly marked these periods and influenced the slow evolution of democracy within both countries.

Since the recognition of independence of the former colonies, no official apology regarding the war has been made and no official efforts of compensation for the war have been carried out by Portugal and its political leaders. Nonetheless, Portugal presents itself as a country which has positive associations with its former colonies, investing in the political and economical relations between itself and all countries of Portuguese official language, namely through the joint creation of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) in 1996. In the present day, it is estimated that immigrants coming from the former colonies represent approximately 5% of the total population in Portugal (Vala et al., 2008).

Indonesian War of Independence

Since the seventeenth century, the Netherlands colonized several territories throughout the world. During the next centuries, the Dutch established trade roots and the Netherlands maintained a colonial policy marked by its interest in trade and maritime roots. Through the nationalization of the colonies of the Dutch East India Company in 1800, the Netherlands asserted its power in the Dutch East Indies archipelago, which would be later named Indonesia.

Until the Second World War, the Dutch were able to rule the Dutch East Indies archipelago, but since the occupation of the Netherlands by Nazi Germany, the Dutch could not sustain their supremacy over these territories. In 1942, Japan was able to dominate the Indonesian territories and overrun the Dutch ruling.

For the following three years, the archipelago of Indonesia was under the occupation of Japan and in 1944, with the war almost lost on the Japanese side, Indonesia was promised independence by the Japanese Prime-minister at the time. After the surrender of the Japanese, on August 17th 1945, Sukarto and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia and created the Central Indonesian National Committee.

---

wave of violence emerged. It was not until 2002 that the independence of East Timor was restored and the first Constitutional Government of East Timor was implemented.

Nevertheless, the Dutch tried to reassert their power over the country by stating that Sukarto and Harna had aligned with the Japanese and that the declaration of independence had been a creation of Japanese fascism. Given its weakened capability of exerting power in Indonesia due to the occupation, the Netherlands had to recur to the Japanese troops still stationed in Indonesia, which were asked to maintain law and order in the country, until they were able to send reinforcements in cooperation with the Allies (Bidien, 1945). The Indonesians saw the positioning of the Allies with the Dutch as a way of permitting the latter to assume control once again and dominate the country. Given this political turmoil, on October 28th 1945, in East Java, the first violent clashes happened between British troops and Indonesian nationalist groups.

Between November 10th to 24th of the same year, the Battle of Surubaya caused many deaths and it has been considered the bloodiest fight of the independence war. The weak position of the Dutch in relation to the nationalist movements, made them move forward in diplomatic efforts and attempt to negotiate a commonwealth relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Hence, and through the mediation of the British, on May 25th 1947, the Linggajati Agreement was signed between the two parties of the conflict, although both sides were discontent with its terms. Two months later, the Dutch troops initiated several attacks against Indonesian republicans forcing them to leave major urban centers, claiming that there had been violations of the Linggajati Agreement. These attacks were, however, condemned in the international political arena and soon after, the United Nations Security Council established a Good Offices Committee to support further negations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. These efforts resulted in the Renville Agreement, ratified on January 17th 1948, in which was recognized temporary Dutch control of areas taken by the Dutch, but it was also stated that referenda would follow in the occupied areas to decide their political future.

The conflict continued until 1949 but the Netherlands position regarding its wish to control Indonesia was continuously received negatively in the international arena. In January 1949, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution demanding the restoration of the republican government and the Dutch were pressured to recognize Indonesia as an independent country. Finally, on December

27th 1949, sovereignty was formally transferred to the republican government of Indonesia, and Sukarto sustained its position as the Indonesian president.

Until the present day, the Netherlands have never officially apologized or compensated Indonesia for the conflict (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2004). Nevertheless, the diplomatic relations between both countries are positive and the Indonesian community living in the Netherlands is considered the biggest minority group in the country (Multicultural Netherlands, 2010).

Why Analyze Intergroup Relations Through the Lenses of Two Colonial Conflicts?

The recent launching statement of the introduction to a special issue on "Collective memories of colonial violence", from the International Journal of Conflict and Violence, could not explain better our reasons to choose to analyze intergroup relations from the perspective of colonial conflicts:

> Colonialism, that Loomba calls "the most complex and traumatic relationship in human history" (2005, 8), has left its mark on international relations, social relationships within nations, and the ideologies and imaginaries of virtually all the peoples of the world. Understanding colonialism and its consequences is therefore essential to comprehending the dynamics and conflicts of the contemporary world (Volpato & Licata, 2010, p. 5).

As mentioned before, intergroup relations do not exist in a vacuum and most socio-psychological phenomena are shaped by the context in which they occur. Nevertheless, social psychology, as a discipline, has proved the applicability and generalizability of many processes, theories, concepts and models, independently of the context in which they occur. Hence, we can conclude that social psychology has provided many insights on the way some socio-psychological events may be (almost) universal.

On the other hand, certain specificities of a given intergroup context may shape the way these processes happen or reveal themselves in empirical research. Much research conducted in the field of collective memory points exactly to this issue: the need for collective memory and, thus, intergroup relations to be studied

within the context in which they arise, evolve and are remembered and construed (Wang, 2008).

Furthermore, within the field of collective memory, researchers have stressed the importance of time in the development of intergroup relations. It is argued that the construction of different narratives of the past will always depend on the nature of these relations, of the present day interpretations of their shared history and the way these two aspects may influence the possible future courses of action uniting or pushing apart the groups in them involved (Halas, 2010).

Importantly, historical conflicts influence present day dynamics of discrimination, racism, conflict and stigmatization, by perpetuating power relations in which disadvantaged groups still suffer from their past victimization and mistreatment, at the hands of more powerful and resourceful groups (Volpato & Licata, 2010).

Furthermore, Volpato and Licata (2010) propose that collective memories provide social identities with content. The content of social identities can thus be assumed to allow for the creation of sophisticated knowledge structures about intergroup relations and the evaluation of ingroups and outgroups *vis a vis* each other, while facilitating the interpretation of events in the light of their content.

Therefore, we argue that, through the study of two contexts of colonial conflicts, we may tap into the dynamics of group-based emotions and social identity processes by which groups form, maintain and even change their identities. Furthermore, by proposing an analysis of the intergroup relations from the perspective of the perpetrator group we aim to shed light into the dynamics of the reconstruction of positive social identities marked by a past in which the ingroup is to blame for misdeeds against other groups.

Within our analysis, we thus assume we will come across some aspects of intergroup relations that are analogous across intergroup contexts. However, we also theorize that certain features of the specific intergroup context under analysis may influence differentially the way the intergroup relations are perceived, emotionally processed and dealt with.

Given this rationale, it is important to recognize that, although we use similar events as the background in which we conduct our research – colonial conflicts – the fact that there were several differences in the way Portugal and the Netherlands

conducted their colonization and decolonization may have consequences for some of the differentiated results most likely found.

There are several differences between Portugal and the Netherlands at different levels, such as culture, history and the economical and political context, just to name a few. We expect these differences to contribute to the specificities found in each context, but given the scope of the present dissertation, we can only focus on a small number of these and theorize their potential contribution to the differences found between Portugal and the Netherlands regarding our results.

Portugal had a policy of miscegenation with the local populations and colonization was also based on the idea of evangelizing and spreading Catholicism in its colonies. Consequently, since the beginning, the Portuguese tried to "win over" the natives of its colonies through the mixing between colonizer and colonized populations, and the assimilation of Portuguese customs and religion by the natives (Labourdette, 2003). Of course, there were also commercial interests on the side of Portugal and the exploitation of natural resources and trading marked significantly the Portuguese economy and its colonizing policy.

Within this line, the *luso-tropicalist* ideas become relevant for our analysis. According to *luso-tropicalism*, the Portuguese would have an intrinsic aptitude for the biological and cultural miscigenization with the populations from their former colonies (Valentim, 2011). This general tendency would also be reflected by a supposed lack of racism in Portuguese people and their distinct characteristics, allowing them to maintain positive relations with the natives of their colonies (Vala et al., 2008). Nevertheless, research has shown that the Portuguese discriminate against Africans from the former colonies and hold racial stereotypes that reveal the persistence of paternalistic prejudices (Cabecinhas, 2007).

In the Dutch case, however, the colonization did not reflect a strong ideological desire to control or evangelize the native populations of the colonial territories. The most important goal of Dutch colonization was the creation of trade roots and the Dutch had little interest in investing in the local population. In Indonesia, the Dutch made little effort to introduce their national language and their religion and, as Oostindie (2008) refers

> In Asia, the Dutch colonial period can be thought of as transitory, leaving only
> minor demographic or cultural traces. This even applies to Indonesia, the

Dutch prize 'possession' for 350 years. Perhaps only the memory of the episode of decolonization arouses strong feelings in Indonesia. (p. 19-21)

After the Portuguese colonial war, many Africans from the former colonies immigrated to Portugal. In a recent study (OECD, 2007), it was reported that most of the immigrants coming from the former African colonies have a very fragile position in the Portuguese labor force and are very prone to unemployment and discrimination regarding salaries. These statistics should be read as an alarming indication of the lack of integration of this population and the discrimination found in terms of job opportunities.

On the other side, after the decolonization of Indonesia by the Dutch, many Indonesians immigrated to the Netherlands and, at first, this population struggled with their integration in the new country. Nevertheless, nowadays the Indonesian community in the Netherlands is considered to be one of the best integrated minorities, having irrelevant differences on their social status when in comparison with the Dutch majority group (Multicultural Netherlands, 2010).

These statistics thus show that there are, in the present day, many structural differences in the way immigrants coming from the former colonies were integrated in Portugal and the Netherlands. Thus, when making any comparisons between both contexts, we must bear in mind these differences (and others) and how they can affect perceptions of the past and the way colonial conflicts are perceived by nowadays individuals, who did not live through these events.

Furthermore, there are many more events marking the history of Portugal and the Netherlands and the collective memory of both countries. For example, some more recent events in the history of both countries may shape the way national identities are thought, reflected upon, shared and felt. However, given the status both countries had, for several centuries, as strong colonial powers, we believe the conflicts over the independence of some of the former colonies of Portugal and the Netherlands are significant events in the national history of both countries and thus, can influence the way people perceive and feel their past as part of a national group. Also, given that Portugal and the Netherlands have opened their borders to waves of immigration coming from the former colonies, the fact that their shared history is

marked by conflict may have consequences for present day intergroup relations between the aforementioned groups.

In this line, the present research focuses on the way colonial conflicts can affect present day perceptions and emotions of Portuguese and Dutch individuals in regards to actions that their ingroups have committed in the past and how these perceptions and emotions affect intergroup relations.

We further propose that our work's embeddedness in real historical past conflicts will improve our understanding of present day intergroup relations, and provide a valuable setting in which to test several theories and hypotheses. In the following Chapter, we address several theories of intergroup relations and emotions which set the theoretical basis for the empirical studies presented.

Chapter 2. Theories on Intergroup Relations and Emotions

_____

The social psychology of intergroup relations has a very long and rich history. Given its special attention, since the beginning, to phenomena such as racism, prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination and conflict it is thus understandable how it became such a prolific area of research and theorizing.

Independently of the focus on societal groups, such as racial or ethnic groups, national groups, religious groups, work groups, or even, artificial groups, just to name a few, the focus on the interactions of people belonging to groups and perceiving, thinking about and acting towards other individuals who are also part of groups (be them ingroups or outgroups) presently sets the framework of analysis in intergroup relations.

One of the most widely known definitions of intergroup relations was provided by Sherif (1962) and states that

> Intergroup relations refer to relations between two or more groups and their respective members. Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group identifications we have an instance of intergroup behavior. (p. 5)

Although this definition highlights the need to look at individuals as belonging (or not) to different groups in way to comprehend their behavior towards other individuals who belong (or not) to the same groups, a long time of research and advances was necessary until we came to this understanding of intergroup relations.

The first theories analyzing prejudice and discrimination focused mostly on the individual level of analysis and tried to explain discriminatory behavior from the perspective of individual differences and personality traits.

For example, in the 1930s and 1940s, the predominant explanations of prejudice were based on psychodynamic explanations of individual behavior, which focused on concepts such as projection, scapegoating, frustration and hostility displacement to explain the tendency of (some) individuals to be prejudiced towards others (Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

Later, in the 1950s, the authoritarian personality theory (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) became famous in an attempt to explain the success of Nazi ideology in Germany.

The main assumption of most of these theories was that, for people to behave in such a negative and condemning manner there had to be something wrong with them as persons. Hence, the focus of analysis of these theories was on the individual, its behavior and the personality traits which could potentially cause him or her to discriminate and be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, this personality and individual differences approach to prejudice and discrimination could not account for many instances of negative behavior occurring in many societies throughout the world. Furthermore, the widely spread occurrence of prejudice and discrimination could not be explained by individuals' personal tendencies to become mean or evil. Hence, as Pennekamp (2008) adequately declares, "given the fact that prejudice and discrimination mainly arise when a group's identity is salient, there has to be something about groups that causes (large parts of) its members to engage in discrimination" (p. 7).

Summarizing, given the defaults of this approach and the lack of potential explanatory power for certain societal phenomena, new approaches and theories were developed, with the aim of explaining intergroup relations marked by prejudice, discrimination or even conflict. Consequently, since the beginning of the 1960s and 1970s, sociocultural explanations gained relevance in the field of intergroup relations. Still, it is important to note that individual level and sociocultural level explanations are not mutually exclusive. We must bear in mind that individual and societal forms of prejudice may reinforce each other and go hand in hand when individuals find justifications for the existence of prejudice and discrimination (Stephan & Stephan, 1996). One obvious example of this interplay between both approaches is the belief in a just world hypothesis (Lerner, 1980). Its main assumption is that victims of discrimination or even mass violence must have done

something bad and, hence, deserve the consequences brought upon them. Clearly, these self-fulfilling biases serve as a way to disregard societal responsibility for collective violence and conflict and may influence negatively intergroup relations and cooperation.

Given this general introduction, the following sections of this chapter aim to present and reflect upon some of the most influential theories in the field of intergroup relations, which have a sociocultural focus, when explaining prejudice and discrimination.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

The first systematic attempt of going beyond the individual level approach to explain prejudice and discrimination, came to us in the 1960s, by the hand of Muzafer Sherif (1966). In his theorizing of intergroup conflict, he claimed that social groups relate to each other in terms of functional relations and thus, are interdependent. Furthermore, the author assumes that groups set up goals for themselves and strive to achieve them. When two or more groups are interdependent and their goals do not interfere with the other groups' goals, relations can be cooperative and positive. However, when different groups set the same goals for themselves, their interdependence becomes incompatible and competition rises. This competition over scarce resources (be them natural, territorial, wealth or power related) can create antagonist relations and thus impel divergence amongst the groups, which could lead to violence and conflict (Sherif, 1966).

This theory has received much empirical support and the famous Robbers Cave experiments are the primordial example of applicability of the theory. In these experiments (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961), they use a summer camp setting, in which they divided 22 boys into two groups and created a context in which the goals of both groups would be conflicting. This lead, as expected, to hostility and conflict between both groups. Later on, however, they were given goals that, to be fulfilled, required the cooperation between the two groups. This superordinate goal was then able to unite both groups and create positive and cooperative intergroup relations.

Hence, we can conclude that, groups with conflicting interests will become antagonistic in relation to each other when they cannot fulfill their goals and desires

in interdependence. This theory thus claims that instrumental reasons lie at the heart of intergroup conflict and, once these instrumental factors disappear, intergroup relations will become peaceful.

Although this theory has contributed enormously to the field of intergroup relations, some downfalls of this conceptualization must be made explicit.

First, history has given us many examples of intergroup conflict happening worldwide that do not occur due to realistic or instrumental reasons. As it will be discussed later in this chapter, Tajfel (1970), using the minimal group paradigm, was able to prove that the mere categorization of individuals as members of a group will create intergroup discrimination, in conditions of low ingroup affiliation and absence of conflicts of interest or previous intergroup hostility.

As Tajfel and Turner (2001) state

An institutionalized or explicit conflict of 'objective' interests between groups, however, does not provide a fully adequate basis, either theoretically or empirically, to account for many situations in which the social behavior of individuals belonging to distinct groups can be observed to approach the 'group' extreme of our continuum. The conflict in Sherif's studies was 'institutionalized', in that it was officially arranged by the holiday camp authorities; it was 'explicit' in that it dominated the life of the groups; and it was 'objective' in the sense that, by terms of competition, one of the groups had to be the winner and the other the loser. And yet, there is evidence from Sherif's own studies and from other research (…) that institutionalization, explicitness and 'objectivity' of an intergroup conflict are not necessary conditions for behavior in terms of the 'group' extreme, although they will prove to be sufficient conditions." (p. 95)

Secondly, Sherif's conceptualization never addresses the role of group membership and identification in the formation, maintenance and resolution of intergroup conflict. The main focus of the theory in realistic and objective conflicts relegates the dynamics of social identity and intragroup processes to a secondary level and, therefore, the processes underlying the structure, development and change of social identities over time are never taken into consideration.

In this line, we can only assume a very fatalistic idea of the impossibility of conflict resolution. According to this theory, the only possible ways of resolving

conflict would be through the objective and fair partition of the scarce resources creating the conflict or through the creation of superordinate goals. While the first proposition may be a very hard venue of intervention given the world's present day conjecture, the latter has proved to improve intergroup relations (Sherif, 1966).

Relative Deprivation Theory

In contrast with the realistic group conflict theory, relative deprivation theory assumes that feelings of deprivation stem not from real objective lack of resources, but more from the comparison made by individuals or groups with other individuals or groups, who might be advantaged in relevant dimensions of the comparison terms.

Relative deprivation theory thus argues that the subjective differences between individuals or groups may lead to perceptions of disadvantage, and this analysis of the inter-individual or intergroup relations may cause attrition or even conflict.

The first time the concept of relative deprivation was used came by the hands of Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1949) to describe, at *post hoc*, differences in satisfaction between elements of the United States Army during the Second World War. In this study, the authors found that, sometimes, there was no need for objective inequities to exist for individuals to feel deprived. However, over the years, the notion of relative deprivation lost support and value as an explanatory social psychological concept and it was only in the 1990s that it was brought up again in an attempt to understand social movement participation (for a detailed overview see Walker & Smith, 2002).

In the development of the relative deprivation literature, a theoretical distinction has been made between deprivation at the individual level and deprivation at the group level. Regarding deprivation at the group level, relative deprivation theory benefits from the conceptualizations of social identity theory and self-categorization theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), when it assumes that feelings of relative deprivation will have different characteristics and consequences if they are felt on behalf of personal identities (egoistic deprivation) or social identities (fraternal deprivation).

In terms of intergroup relations, relative deprivation is felt when one's ingroup is compared to a relevant outgroup and it feels disadvantaged in this

comparison. Especially when groups make upward comparisons, meaning that the selected outgroup has more power, status or wealth, there is a higher chance that deprivation will be felt.

Furthermore, there is also the possibility of distinction between people who experience only personal deprivation, people who report both personal and group deprivation (which was coined as double deprivation by Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972) and people who report group deprivation but no personal deprivation. This differentiation, of course, presents consequences for the strategies used by individuals who want to change the status quo in dimensions or contexts in which they feel deprived.

As Smith, Spears and Hamstra (1999) affirm, "different levels of identity salience primed in the social context (personal versus group identity) are expected to evoke different levels of social comparison (interpersonal versus intergroup), which then help to explain feelings of deprivation and associated behavioral outcomes" (p.209).

More specifically, in an attempt to describe the several strategies used by individuals to diminish their feelings of group deprivation, Smith and colleagues (1999) refer that

> The chances of people responding collectively to their group's fate will be maximized when their group identity is salient (context), when they identify strongly with the group (commitment) and when collective group behavior is ideologically consistent with group norms (content). (p. 229)

Although we have now described, briefly, some of the preconditions for relative deprivation to occur, we must still describe how these subjective feelings of dissatisfaction may shape intergroup relations and conflict. In this line, we consider relative deprivation theory as a complementary analysis of intergroup relations within the framework of the social identity perspective and, therefore, we will now try to describe in more detail the conceptualizations of social identity and intergroup relations.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity theory, before coming into existence, drew its principles from the "gestaltic" tradition of research, which had shown that individuals overestimate the perception of objects or physical stimuli with attached value to them, due to a basic process of categorization of these same objects or stimuli into meaningful categories (for a detailed revision see Amâncio, 2002 and Valentim, 2003).

Within the tradition of the metatheory of social psychological interactionism, it is assumed that certain psychological processes are socially constructed, structured, and transformed through the interaction with social life and processes (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). In this line, the application of the "gestaltic" principles mentioned above was introduced and developed in relation to the dynamics of social life by Tajfel and Turner (1979).

The first studies using the minimal group paradigm, thus mark the initial conceptualizations of the social identity approach. In these studies, it was shown that the mere categorization in terms of an ingroup and an outgroup created instances of discrimination between the members of the different groups (Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971).

As Turner (1999) states, "the mere social categorization of subjects in the minimal group paradigm created a social identity for them. The subjects accepted the assigned social category membership as a relevant self-definition in the situation." (p. 8)

Within the social identity theory, after defining social identity as those aspects of a person's self-concept or image that derive from the social categories to which they belong to, Tajfel and Turner (1979) developed three general assumptions of the theory.

The first of these assumptions relates to the distinction between personal identity and social identities. In this line, Tajfel and Turner (1979) propose that every individual's self is structured within a continuum having two extremes by which behavior can be defined. At one extreme, more personal and idiosyncratic aspects of individual identity will be more salient and any interaction with other individuals will be based on individual characteristics and motivations. At the other extreme, the interactions between two or more individuals will be based on aspects referring to their social identities as members of different (or the same) groups. At this extreme

position of the continuum, the self-definition of individuals will carry with it the associated value connotations of social group memberships. Therefore, the content of specific group behaviors lies on the basis of the salient social identity underlying them. As the authors also refer, it will be extremely rare to find situations in which interactions between individuals only occur at one extreme or the other of the continuum.

> Tajfel used the interpersonal-intergroup continuum to explain when social identity processes are likely to come into operation and how social interaction differs qualitatively between the extremes. He argued that, as behavior became more intergroup, attitudes to the outgroup within the ingroup tend to become more uniform and consensual and outgroup members tend to be seen more as homogenous and undifferentiated members of their social category. (Turner, 1999, p. 9-10)

An important aspect of their theorizing relates to the motivational aspects of social identities, by which individuals strive to maintain or enhance their self-esteem through their social identities. In this line, the second principle does become clear: to maintain or enhance their self-esteem, members of social groups will base their comparisons with relevant outgroups with which they can make a favorable comparison on behalf of the ingroup.

The basic premise, then, is that, through a process of social categorization leading to social identity and social comparison with relevant outgroups, members of the ingroup would achieve positive intergroup distinctiveness, and a positive self-evaluation in terms of that social identity.

Therefore, stemming from this principle, it is important to bear in mind the conditions in which intergroup differentiation will occur. First, individuals must feel subjectively identified with their ingroup. The mere categorization of the individual made by others may not be relevant for this internalized identity and, hence, if the individual does not want to be or feel part of the group, this distinction will not occur. Secondly, the differentiation must occur only when attributes which distinguish the groups are relevant and have evaluative significance. Third, group members do not compare themselves with every available outgroup. Instead, they choose relevant outgroups with whom to compare and differentiate positively.

Finally, the third principle of social identity theory relates to the possibility that groups to which one belongs may not satisfy the motivational principle of maintaining a positive self-esteem and intergroup differentiation. Therefore, when social identity is unsatisfactory, members of the group may act in terms of different strategies to avoid this negatively evaluated social identity.

> For Tajfel and Turner (1979) the character of intergroup attitudes and action is predicted by an interaction between the need for positive social identity and group members' collective definition, perception and understanding of the social structure of intergroup relationships. (…) Groups would adopt quite different strategies to achieve positive social identity (and ingroup bias or 'social competition' is only one of these strategies) as a function of an interaction between their status position (high or low), their beliefs about the nature of group boundaries, the intensity of ingroup identification and their collective ideologies of status, power and wealth. (Turner, 1999, p. 9)

Following this reasoning, social identity theory assumes that group members may use different strategies when a negative comparison with a relevant outgroup is inevitable. In this line, a typology of the different strategies individuals might use when confronted with a negative social identity was created, and rests its bases on three socio-structural factors: perceptions of the permeability of group boundaries (i.e. to what extent can one leave the group and enter another group), the groups' status legitimacy and their status stability (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel, 1978).

The first strategy that individuals can use to address their negatively evaluated social identity is named "individual mobility", which is more focused on individual behavior aimed at achieving a more positive situation for the individual, but not for the entire group. This strategy can only happen when the group boundaries are perceived to be permeable and when there is the possibility for an upward change in the social status of the individual (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Secondly, individuals can recur to what is called "social creativity", by redefining or changing the elements which are causing the negative comparative situation. In this line, it is not necessary that the intergroup conditions are changed, but that the differentiation is made differently. Hence, this is a group strategy which can take three different forms. When possible and legitimate, groups may change the relevant dimensions in which they are compared negatively to relevant outgroups.

Otherwise, groups may change the value assigned to the dimensions which, in first place, set the group in a downward comparison, thus creating a new positive definition of the attributes or dimensions at stake. Another possibility is that devalued groups change the outgroup with which they compare themselves and select a new outgroup for the comparison to bring about positive differentiation (Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2007).

Finally, the third strategy is "social conflict" instigated by the ingroup via direct competition with the relevant outgroup. This strategy can only happen when the status differences between the groups are seen as unstable and illegitimate and the group boundaries are impermeable. It may bring about more tension in the intergroup relations, but it may also create an environment of social change, by which the ingroup is finally acknowledged its positive differentiation and change in status.

Summarizing, for social identity theory, the key factors influencing behavioral shifts along the individual-social identity continuum towards the more collectivist pole were the group's impermeable boundaries and the social change belief-system, and these conditions would be the determinant of collective reactions of ingroup members in a disadvantaged position (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Although the authors assume there is a qualitative psychological difference between individual and group behavior, they do not specify the process by which this differentiation occurs and, in an attempt to overcome this lack of explanation, Turner (1981) moves on to create the self-categorization theory.

Self-Categorization Theory

In self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), although some of the principles of social identity theory remain untouched, there is a greater emphasis on the cognitive aspects and functions of self-categorization in social identity processes. Therefore, it is proposed that self-categorization, leading to self-stereotyping, is the process by which group behaviors come to existence.

When people categorize themselves in terms of a shared social membership, there is a tendency to accentuate intragroup similarities and intergroup differences in relevant dimensions of comparison with other groups. Furthermore, in self-categorization theory, the relative salience of a given social identity in a specific

social context is given prominence. In this line, the most relevant aspect of social identity in a given context is the extent to which a social category becomes salient, as a result of its relative accessibility and accurate application in the situation (Turner, 1999).

This salient categorization leads people to stereotype themselves and others, creating an enhanced perceptual contrast between ingroup members and outgroup members. Whenever this relevant social identity becomes salient, then, individuals will perceive themselves less as distinct and unique persons and more as prototypical representatives of their ingroup.

> The distinction between individual and group behavior can be explained by a parallel and underlying distinction between personal and social identity (…). Hence, individual identity is matched with interpersonal behavior and social identity with intergroup behavior and "social identity was reconceptualised as the process which transforms interpersonal into intergroup behavior. (Turner, 1999, p. 9-11)

Following the rationale presented above, Turner (1999) thus assumes that there is a depersonalization effect of the self when self-categorization in terms of a salient social identity occurs. Social identity thus become the social categorical self and, when a given social identity is made salient, self-perception becomes depersonalized, leading individuals to see themselves as interchangeable representatives of the relevant social category at stake.

At this point, Turner and colleagues (1987) introduce an important redefinition of the link between personal identity and social identities present in social identity theory. In opposition to the conceptualization in social identity theory of a continuum in which there are two extreme poles (individual and social) of categorization, self-categorization theory postulates these different self-conceptions as distinct levels of self-categorization, which function antagonistically in relation to each other. In other words, the different levels of self-categorization function oppositely in relation to each other and the salience of one level of self-categorization undermines the effects of other levels of inclusion, by which intra-class similarities and inter-class differences come to existence. Thus, the functional antagonism between the different levels of inclusion implies that, when a social

category is made salient, the perception of intragroup differences and intergroup similarities will be suppressed.

Furthermore, given the new conceptualization of self-categorization in terms of salience of different levels of self-definition, Turner and colleagues (1987) introduce a hierarchical self-categorization system.

This system presents three major categories, by which individuals can self-categorize: the less inclusive, more subordinate level of self-categorization is the one in which individuals categorize themselves as distinct persons. The intermediate level of inclusiveness refers to ingroup-outgroup comparisons in which accentuation of ingroup similarities and outgroup differences occur. Finally, the human being category is the superordinate, most inclusive level of self-categorization by which the communalities of the human species is contrasted with other forms of life (Turner et al., 1987).

Moreover, Turner and colleagues (1987) postulate that the variation in the salience of the different levels of self-categorization results from an interaction between the relative accessibility of a particular category in a given context (i.e., comparative fit) and the fit between the category specificities and the social reality existent (i.e., normative fit). The relative accessibility of a given categorization will be dependent on the relevance and active selection of the different potential categories which are present in a given context. It has been postulated that this accessibility is affected by the degree to which individuals identity (or not) with the relevant category or group. In turn, the fit or match between the specific category and the social context in which a given self-categorization will be salient, is dependent on two aspects of fit, namely comparative fit and normative fit (Oakes, 1987; for a detailed description see Turner, 1999).

To summarize, self-categorization can be "seen as a dynamic, context-dependent process, determined by comparative relations within a given context" (Turner, 1999, p. 13).

The main ideas of the theory postulate that: 1) individuals will represent themselves and others using different levels of self-categorization, based on their prior experiences, motives and the social context in which comparisons occurs; 2) self-perception in terms of a salient social identity leads to depersonalization; and 3) it is depersonalization that causes intergroup behavior.

Although the social identity framework, in which the social identity and self-categorization theories fall under, is undoubtedly a very prolific and rich approach to the conceptualization of intergroup relations, it does not come without certain limitations and even contradictions.

For many years, after the conceptualization of social identity theory and self-categorization theory, it was assumed that intergroup relations were marked by intergroup differentiation and intragroup similarity effects. As such, individuals would conform to their ingroup's norms and beliefs and search for a positive distinction between their group and other relevant outgroups. However, since the 1970s (for example Doise, 1976), some "bizarre" results raised the possibility that differentiation and similarity could co-occur simultaneously.

The self-categorization theory assumed that through a process of self-categorization and self-stereotyping, individuals would depersonalize and become interchangeable members of their ingroup. Nonetheless, the research conducted by Deschamps (1984) about the possibility of co-variation between individual and collective differentiation, marks an important step in redefining certain aspects of the social identity approach, by assuming that inter-individual differentiation and intergroup differentiation can co-exist.

In his studies, Deschamps (1984) found that individuals who identify strongly with a group may also assume inter-individual differences within the group. Furthermore, studies on the *Primus Inter Pares* effect (Codol, 1975) and the Black sheep effect (Marques, 1990; Marques & Paez, 1994) also showed that, along with outgroup homogenization, intragroup differentiation occurs in many social contexts (for a detailed revision see Valentim, 2003).

Turner (1999) answers to these criticisms by stating that, in these cases, there is a redefinition of the ingroup in terms of subgroups. Hence, depending on the relevant social context, members of the ingroup could then be re-categorized as outgroup members, who are deviant of the normative beliefs of the ingroup. Their posterior inclusion in the ingroup, would depend on the existence of a more relevant outgroup, which would cause the similarities between the subgroups to be again accentuated, and creating the possibility of a new higher level self-categorization encompassing the deviant subgroup and the ingroup.

Although this explanation by Turner (1999) may seem valid at face value, it is important to refer that self-categorization theory always defines a functional antagonism, by which an individual self-definition cannot emerge when a collective self-definition is salient. Therefore, we must see these new lines of research not as opposite or contradictory to the social identity framework, but rather as complimentary efforts to understand phenomena which were not hypothesized within social identity and self-categorization theories.

Another important limitation ascribed to social identity theory relates to the generalizations made from experiments using the minimal group paradigm. As Doise (1987, 1988) refers, Tajfel and Turner (1979) did not consider the social determinants of social identity and developed a theoretical model using an "empty" experimental paradigm from which they extrapolated their conclusions into the real world. Although in both social identity theory and self-categorization theory, the authors assume that the classification and content of social categories have evaluative significance, they never formulate thoroughly this classification or content.

Hence, in an attempt to make sense of the social world and the power relations existent within it, Deschamps (1982) proposes an analysis of social identities in which the differences in groups' status must be taken into consideration when studying intra and intergroup differentiation. Therefore, he proposes that the expression of social identities might differ depending on whether the groups are considered "dominant" or "dominated" within the bigger social structure.

This idea was formalized by Lorenzi-Cioldi (1988) in a series of studies, and it was concluded that indeed, the phenomena of inter-individual and intergroup differentiation are more associated with a dominant ingroup membership, than with a dominated ingroup membership. In further research developments, it was also shown that, depending on the relative groups' status under scrutiny, outgroup differentiation can occur (for an overview see Valentim, 2003, 2008).

Finally, it is important to note that both social identity theory and self-categorization theory assume ingroup identification as an epiphenomenon of social identity processes. Hence, ingroup identification and the degree to which individuals identify more or less with their ingroups were never introduced in the conceptualization of both theories. Nevertheless, much research has shown (see, for example, Doosje, 1995; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998;

Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2003, amongst others) that ingroup identification does affect the different reactions of ingroup members towards outgroup members. It is now widely acknowledged that high identifiers and low identifiers perceive an intergroup situation differently (especially a threatening one) and these differential perceptions lead to distinct behavioral consequences. Therefore, as Doosje (1995) refers "we would argue that it is important to incorporate individual differences with respect to group identification as an input variable" (p. 91) in the rationale for explaining and describing intergroup relations.

We can thus conclude that throughout the years, many theoretical developments have increased our understanding of the dynamics of intergroup relations and many phenomena, which, at first, were considered abnormal, are now well-described and have been incorporated within the social identity framework.

Nevertheless, up until now, the literature review has focused mainly on cognitive, motivational and perceptual explanations for intergroup relations and conflict. One may wonder if there are no emotional processes guiding the lives of groups. Although the main focuses of the different theories presented above do not explicitly state this, we would argue that emotions have a central role in understanding intergroup relations and the way individuals relate with each other in social life.

Given this, we will now turn our focus of analysis into theories of emotions and their potential role and functions on the field of intergroup relations.

Appraisal Theories of Emotions

Emotion is a difficult concept to define within the social psychology domain. As Fehr and Russell (1984) state, "everyone knows what an emotion is, until asked to give a definition. Then, it seems, no one knows" (p. 3).

Nevertheless, social psychologists have come to a general understanding of the word emotion, as "ongoing states of mind that are marked by mental, bodily or behavioral symptoms" (Parrott, 2001, p. 3). Furthermore, it is now widely accepted that emotion can be distinguished from mood. In this line, the first "needs" to be about something or directed towards something (be it an object, person or situation), while the latter is a more general evaluation which does not need to be directed towards an object, being a more global evaluation that spreads beyond situations.

But why would it be relevant to study and understand emotions? When dealing with the functions of emotions, Keltner and Haidt (2001) have proposed a four-level analysis of the functions of emotions. According to these authors, at the individual level of analysis, emotions have two distinct functions. Namely, they may serve an informational function, in the sense that they "tell" the individual that there is a given situation or event which needs to be dealt with. Secondly, they may prepare the individual to react to a specific situation, even in the absence of awareness of the eliciting event.

At the dyadic or interpersonal level of analysis, emotions may have three different functions: 1) they may allow individuals to recognize others' emotions, beliefs and intentions, in way to coordinate efficiently social interactions; 2) emotional communication may help individuals respond to significant social events by evoking complementary and reciprocal emotions in others; and 3) they may serve as incentives or deterrents of others' reactions and social behaviour (Keltner & Haidt, 2001).

The third level of analysis refers to group life and Keltner and Haidt (2001) mention that emotions may, first, help individuals define group boundaries and identify ingroup and outgroup members. Within the ingroup, another function of emotions is the definition and negotiation of group-related roles and status and, finally, emotions may also lead individuals to solve or manage group-related problems.

The cultural level of analysis refers to the way in which emotions have been shaped by the cultural context. At this level, the functions of emotions are related to the processes by which individuals understand and accept their cultural identities, the way by which children learn the relevant norms and values within their culture and, finally, the possibility of maintaining and perpetuating cultural ideologies and power structures or relations.

Early approaches in the study of emotion assumed that they derived from bodily changes or from the arousal of the nervous sympathetic system associated with a cognitive recognition of the emotional state (for a detailed description see Parrott, 2001). However, these approaches lost popularity due to the lack of empirical support found during later years of research. These are, however,

approaches that are seeing an upcoming, due to the development of new lines of research within the field of neurosciences.

In further developments, social psychologists came to a general understanding of emotions as a more complex phenomenon with multiple components which influence and are influenced by each other and that may be connected with other factors unrelated to emotion itself.

Following this rationale, the first appraisal theories of emotions emerged, having as a main goal the specification of the cognitive aspects of emotion. These theories have thus allowed for the description of the onset, subjective experience and consequences of emotions. Hereby, it is postulated that specific constellations of appraisals lead to distinct emotional responses, consisting of subjective experiences and specific action tendencies (for an overview see Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001).

The concept of appraisal was first defined by Arnold (1960) as a direct perceptual quality which involves an evaluative perception of events or situations in terms of an individual's goals, needs, concerns and well-being.

First, it is important to distinguish between primary and secondary appraisals. The first are about whether something is or not relevant for the self. Secondary appraisals, in turn, occur within a limited number of dimensions and, here, different appraisal theories of emotion diverge in the number of dimensions or importance they attach to each dimension. However, one common dimension to several appraisal theories is motivational relevance (e.g. Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). This dimension refers both to a dispositional component (i.e. what individuals find important for themselves) and a situational component which makes events or stimuli become relevant to individuals. This is precisely what Frijda (2001) refers to as the laws of social meaning and concern within the study of emotion, meaning that the appraisal process and its consequences are adaptive and help individuals to attain their goals and needs.

Whenever a situation or stimulus elicits a given aggregate of specific appraisals, the subjective emotional experience will be processed in terms of specific forms of bodily arousal and action tendencies. It is then important to recognize that the distinct dimensions of the subjective emotional experience (feelings) are influenced by the appraisals leading to them. Furthermore, these same feelings can

influence both the appraisals that first elicited the emotional situation and also the action tendencies associated with it.

This argument is made more clearly by Frijda (2001) who views emotions as changes in states of action readiness.

> State of action readiness is a central notion in emotion. All emotions – all states, that is, that one would want to call 'emotions' – involve some change in action readiness (…) Several emotions can be unambiguously defined in terms of a particular form of action readiness; they can be defined in terms of some action tendency or some form of activation or lack thereof. (Frijda, 2001, p. 59-60)

This conceptualization of emotion, thus, allows researchers to analyze and distinguish emotions both in terms of their antecedents and consequences. For example, when a person appraises a negative event as an irreparable loss for which he or she is not responsible, they may feel grief and, in turn, feel instigated to let go and do nothing. However, when this same negative event is appraised as being the responsibility of someone who could control it, individuals may feel anger and thus act to change the situation, in a more vigorous way.

Summarizing, independently of the number of different theories within the emotions' appraisal domain, it is clear that conceptualizing the nature of emotion as a multi-component phenomenon clearly benefited the study of emotion within social psychology. The basic premise that different dimensions concur and diverge to produce distinct emotional reactions to specific stimuli and events, sets a fruitful framework from which to look at emotion and conceptualize the ways in which they influence the social life of individuals.

We will now detain ourselves in the description of an extension of the appraisal theories of emotion to the field of intergroup relations.

Intergroup Emotions Theory

In a famous study by Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman and Sloan (1976) it was shown that people "bask in reflected glory" through their association with successful others, even though they were not personally involved in the others' success. Individuals who saw their university team win, would strive to associate

themselves with this success source, by, for example, using terms as "we won", amongst others.

At the time, the role of emotions was not referred to in these experiments, but this article, amongst others, set the basis for a new conceptualization of the ways in which people associate with others (or groups) to enhance their self-image, an argument which is also in line with the assumptions of social identity theory.

This is a very clear example of instances when one derives positive feelings from the association with others. We become ecstatic over the victories of our sports teams; we are happy when our political party wins the elections; we feel proud when our university is evaluated number one on an European university ranking, amongst many other examples. But we might also derive *negative* feelings from our shared memberships. We can get angry or frustrated when our beloved group's image is at stake, or we might experience fear about the terrorist threat due to our membership of the Western world, or feel guilty about misdeeds carried out by other ingroup members in the past.

It is this general awareness that emotions may arise not only from inter-individual instances of behavior or comparison, but rather from intra and/or intergroup processes and relations, that sets the background for the possibility of studying emotions as intergroup phenomena. In this line, Smith (1993) formulated the intergroup emotions theory in an attempt to refine the traditional conceptualizations of intergroup behavior and, especially, negative forms of prejudice and discrimination.

In its traditional forms (see for example Allport, 1954; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; amongst others), prejudice was conceived as an attitude towards outgroups based on a positive or negative evaluation of the attributes associated with these groups. Following this perceptual evaluation of outgroups in terms of a dichotomous differentiation, discrimination would then materialize and represent this general estimation of a group's value through their negative inherent attributes.

Although these theories have shaped, for years, the study of prejudice and discrimination within the field of psychology and have brought about many interesting and relevant findings, they do present some limitations. Firstly, this attitude-based model of discrimination could not account for the multitude of distinct reactions to relevant outgroup members. Within the attitude model, prejudice could

only be perceived as a negative evaluation of groups who have negative characteristics[2]. However, is this true? Do we react in the same way to outgroups who make us fearful and groups who make us angry? The clear answer is no, and although much research has showed that there are, indeed, differentiated reactions to outgroups, the rigidity of the attitude-based model does not allow us to account for these differences.

Secondly, within the attitude-based model of prejudice it is usually assumed that we learn certain negative affective responses through social conditioning, which determines automatically our reactions towards members of devalued groups, regardless of the social context or circumstances. But then, how could one explain instances in which a group, who was a fierce enemy of ours in the past, becomes an allied and significant friend? How could one explain the shifts in discrimination towards different outgroups through time? More recent theories within the attitude domain have tried to make sense of these occurrences through the advent of the possibility of multiple evaluations of objects. But given the classical view of attitudes as an organizing and uniformizing principle of reality independent of contexts, these have not been very successful.

Thirdly, situations in which we are ambivalent and hold incompatible "attitudes" regarding the same group have proven to be problematic within a unidimensional perspective of the evaluation process. The classical views only consider the possibility of ambivalence between components of the attitude, but in reality, there is the possibility of multiple incompatible evaluations towards the same group.

As mentioned above, these limitations, amongst others, of the attitudinal perspective of prejudice and discrimination, lead researchers in recent years to develop new lines of investigation that would allow for "a view of intergroup relations as more group, situation and context specific than that allowed by earlier approaches" (Mackie, & Smith, 2003, p. 1). These new approaches to the study of prejudice and discrimination would thus benefit from a conceptualization of emotion as a theoretical basis for comprehending prejudice in several ways. For example,

---

[2] An important note here relates to the idea that individuals can also evaluate positively outgroups and perceive them to have positive characteristics. This positive prejudice is, nonetheless, usually kept on a secondary level of analysis, since negative prejudices are the ones which may have worst consequences for intergroup relations.

affective reactions to outgroup members seem to outlast the cognitive components of prejudice; affect also seems closer related to behavior than its cognitive antecedents; and emotions can also better explain instances of 'hot' discrimination (for a review see Mackie & Smith, 2003).

Furthermore, within the appraisal of emotions approach, at the inter-individual level, emotion conceptualizations provide a conceptual structure similar to the one proposed in attitude theory. Appraisal theories of emotion postulate that cognitive evaluations produce emotions which in turn lead to behavior, in the same line that beliefs cause attitudes and the latter cause behavior. But while attitudes represent a general, more or less indistinct positive or negative evaluation, emotions contribute to a better understanding of social behavior, given that it is assumed that they allow for more differentiation and specificity in explaining behavior.

Finally, the self-regulatory nature of emotions may also contribute to a better explanation of inter-individual (as revised in the previous section) and social processes and relations. Since it is assumed that different emotions are associated with distinct action tendencies (i.e. if we are fearful, we run away, if we are happy we react effusively, etc.), they may also function to self-regulate and act accordingly towards outgroups in relation to what our emotions tell us.

So, what intergroup emotions theory proposes is to take a step further in the conceptualization of emotions as affecting and even regulating intergroup relations.

> From this perspective, intergroup emotions involve the impulse, desire, or tendency to take action aimed at bringing groups closer together, moving them further apart, changing or justifying a status hierarchy, eliminating a competitor, or nurturing an ally – all in the service of maintaining the ingroup. (Mackie, Silver, & Smith, 2004, p. 228)

Intergroup emotions theory relies on social identity and self-categorization theories, as well as appraisal theories of emotions at the individual and inter-individual level, to explain when emotions are likely to occur and influence intergroup processes and relations.

When a specific social identity is made salient, individuals see themselves more in terms of their group membership than in terms of their individual identities, and their action tendencies will reflect this group level self-categorization. Most

importantly, individuals will not only "see" themselves in terms of this social identity, but they will also "feel" in terms of it.

> In intergroup contexts, we may also expect that differentiated intergroup behaviors occur because specific intergroup emotions have been triggered by particular group-based appraisals. Intergroup situations eliciting fear or anxiety responses may well prompt a motive to escape or avoid the outgroup, whereas anger will generate a willingness to attack or aggress against the outgroup. Disgust and contempt are also more likely to activate avoidance behaviors, while resentment and frustration may lead group members to take actions against the outgroup. (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2003, p. 113)

In other words, when individuals' group membership and thus social identity is made salient in a given context, appraisals of the situation in terms of social identities will occur and lead to collective-based action tendencies. Therefore, individuals' behavior can be explained in terms of group-based concerns, motives and goals, rather than individual-based concerns. Furthermore, this behavior is not random or a general inclination to "do or not do" one general kind of action. Instead, what intergroup emotions theory postulates is that different emotional reactions derived from group memberships will lead to distinct action tendencies.

This is the rationale used to explain why, for example, ingroup members avoid or confront relevant outgroups, depending on the intergroup context. When the ingroup is appraised as strong and holds an advantaged position over the outgroup and there is a situational threat against the ingroup, the most likely emotional experience is anger, which will lead to the desire of aggressing and confronting the outgroup. However, when the ingroup is appraised as relatively powerless or lacking the resources to deal with a threat from an outgroup, fear is the most likely emotional experience, leading to avoidance or escape from the situation (Devos et al., 2003).

It is, therefore, very important to reinforce that the theory of intergroup emotions conceptualizes intergroup emotions as differentiated reactions to outgroups, which are relational in their nature, context specific, affected by institutionalized power structures between groups and derived from subjective interpretations of the situations in which they come to existence.

Over the past years, there has been much research providing indirect and direct evidence for the validity and applicability of this theory (for a detailed review see Devos et al., 2003). By now, there are three well documented aspects of the phenomenon of emotions that can make them distinctively intergroup in nature, as opposed to individual or inter-individual emotions.

The first postulate of intergroup emotions theory is that these emotions are dependent on the psychological identification with a group. Therefore, it is argued that emotions will be affected by the process of identification and the quality and even quantity of that identification. The authors (Mackie & Smith, 2003; Smith, 1993) further extend the conceptualization of ingroup identification as being distinct from membership in a group, in the sense that the first carries within it not only the awareness of belonging to a group, but also the affective significance attached to this membership, much like Tajfel (1972b) had previously defended.

Secondly, the theory postulates that intergroup emotions arise from group rather than personal concerns. It is thus the motives, goals and needs (i.e. concerns) of the ingroup that determine the emotional experience most likely to occur, independently of how these concerns relate directly with the individual's well-being or involvement in the situations or interactions eliciting them.

Finally, the authors envisage intergroup emotions as functionally regulating intergroup interactions between ingroups and outgroups, in the sense that they modulate the cognitive, evaluative and behavioral reactions in intergroup settings.

Summarizing, intergroup emotions theory augments our understanding of intergroup relations and conflict, through the conceptualization of these emotions as phenomena which shape and influence distinct social encounters between groups, as well as the outcomes of such encounters, in a more differentiated and context specific way than previous approaches were able to.

Theoretical Integration

Throughout this chapter we have presented some of the most influential and fertile theories within the field of intergroup relations. We have followed a rationale by which we introduced new insights and conceptualizations of intergroup relations, conflict and emotion developed over the years, and which have contributed to augment our understanding of intergroup phenomena.

However, one may ask how these different theories, postulates and elaborations may be brought together within a comprehensive framework for the purposes of the present dissertation.

As described in Chapter 1, we focus on instances of intergroup relations which were marked by a negative past. The colonial conflicts to which we refer, occurred in a period in which colonization was already condemned worldwide and both these countries did not recognize the rights of self-determination and governance to their colonies. Colonization was carried out through centuries by many European countries. Independently of the ways and the goals by which colonization occurred, it is clear by nowadays standards or even morality, that the exploitation of the natural resources and the native populations of these territories marked each and all of them. It is also widely acknowledged that colonization is condemnable and, according to today's principles and societal norms, should never come to existence again.

It is thus comprehensible that, when a new social order begins to rise, these colonized countries refused to accept their fate as subjugated groups and initiated a conflict by which they desired to change the institutionalized power relations between the "dominant" (colonizer) and the "dominated" (colonized) groups, to use Deschamps (1982) terminology.

Although the colonizer groups (Portugal and the Netherlands) tried, for a while, to assert their power over the colonized territories and populations, soon it became clear they had to accept and recognize the independence of these countries, especially given the international condemnation of colonization at the time.

Indeed, as the theory of realistic conflict would propose, the goals of each group were obstructed by each other and their conflicting interests led to violent conflicts in both circumstances.

Currently, there are still differences in the statuses of the groups involved in both conflicts under analysis, but it is commonly acknowledged that both colonizer groups and their respective colonized groups try to have positive and cooperative relations with each other. However, we argue that the negative past shared by dominant (ingroup) and dominated (outgroups) will also affect present day intergroup relations, especially when this negative past is made salient.

What will happen when dominant ingroup members are confronted with their historical negative misdeeds towards a disadvantaged outgroup? How will they assess this past? What emotions will they feel? What will they be willing to do towards the victimized outgroup?

We propose that the answer to these (and other) questions could be adequately integrated within the framework of the social identity perspective and the theories of intergroup emotions and relative deprivation. Specifically, we propose that the salience of the individuals' national identity will create the pre-conditions necessary for them to analyze the events at stake as being intergroup in nature.

In line with Branscombe and colleagues (2003), one important distinction must be made between self-categorization and ingroup identification. As these authors refer, while individuals must self-categorize as members of the ingroup for group-based emotions to occur, ingroup identification does not need to be high for these individuals to experience emotions on behalf of their ingroup membership. Research conducted by Doosje and colleagues (1998) proved just this point. In their studies, individuals who identified highly with the ingroup felt lower levels of group-based guilt than low identifiers. However, all of these individuals felt they were part of the ingroup and this self-categorization set the basis for the experience of group-based guilt (Doosje et al., 1998).

Subsequently, this self-categorization and identification with the national group pave the way for its members to perceive (appraise) their ingroup as being (or not) responsible for a violation of moral principles, when confronted with the aforementioned historical negative misdeeds. This violation does not need to bear on a given individual's behavior, but rather, should rely on the association between the individuals and their ingroup and the negative actions carried out by other ingroup members in the past.

The differentiated appraisals of the events will, in turn, influence the emotional experience of these individuals as ingroup members *vis a vis* the victimized outgroups. We thus expect these individuals to feel negative intergroup emotions due to their association with an ingroup who has committed wrongful actions against other groups.

Finally, these emotional reactions may lead to distinct action tendencies aimed at resolving the ingroup's need for positive distinctiveness.

Interestingly, we analyze intergroup relations from the perspective of ingroups which, historically and currently, generally hold a higher status within the intergroup context considered. However, the focus on negative misdeeds of this same ingroup may put into question the legitimacy of the status hierarchy.

This loss of morality and desire to restore a positive ingroup identity can be conceptualized in terms of the relative deprivation theory. In this line, when an ingroup is confronted with their own negative misdeeds, they lose the right to be considered a virtuous, honorable group. This relative deprivation of a positive distinctiveness when in comparison to other groups, may lead them to improve their devalued representation, through different strategies aimed at restoring their positive image and valued intergroup relations.

Given its complementary character as part of the explanation of social identity processes and relations, it thus seem to fit well together within the social identity framework as well.

> (Social identity) becomes insecure when the existent state of affairs begins to be questioned. An important corollary to this argument is that the dominant or high-status groups, too, can experience insecure social identity. Any threat to the distinctively superior position of a group implies a potential loss of positive comparisons and possible negative comparisons, which must be guarded against. Such a threat may derive from the activity of the low-status group or from a conflict within the high-status group's own value system (for example, the sociopolitical morality) and the actual foundations of its superiority. (Tajfel & Turner, 2001, p. 105-106)

Thus, feeling negative emotions may lead to the restoration of an ingroup's worth and value (positive distinctiveness) because they signal that the ingroup is concerned with their past misdeeds, desires to acknowledge them but, most importantly, make amendments.

Hopefully, a more detailed description of all the processes mentioned along this Chapter within a real context of intergroup relations marked by a negative past, will refine our understanding of the possible applications and limitations of such a comprehensive framework.

Chapter 3. Group-based Emotions: Conceptualizations of Guilt, Compunction and Anger

_____

3.1. What Are Intergroup Emotions and Group-based Emotions?

The pervasive nature of emotions across different levels of analysis is unquestionable. From the intra-personal to the intergroup and cross-cultural levels, much research has been conducted regarding emotions, their phenomenology and their implications for individuals' lives and groups. Within the domain of intergroup relations, mainly in the analysis of conflicts, nationalism and crowd behavior, the "hot" side of such instances of collective behavior is many times referred to. This "hot" side is, of course, strongly associated with emotions and recent developments in social psychological research have focused precisely on the role of emotions in intergroup relations.

Up until now we referred to emotions within the field of intergroup relations as intergroup emotions. But there might be distinct kinds of intergroup emotions, depending on the subject who feels them and the object to which they are directed to.

Iyer and Leach (2008) have presented a typology of intergroup emotions, with the aim of classifying current conceptual and empirical approaches, by differentiating them along the dimensions of either individual or group subjects (i.e., who feels them) and objects (i.e., the target) of emotions. Drawing from several lines of research, these authors suggest that emotions can operate at distinct levels and a more refined, comprehensive classification would thus allow a better understanding of emotional experiences at the intergroup level.

In this typology, they propose 6 types of emotions. One of these refers to emotions which are felt by an individual towards another individual. Since these are interpersonal emotions, they will not be outlined here.

Iyer and Leach (2008) distinguish 5 types of emotions within the intergroup domain. The first time of intergroup emotion occurs when the subject of the emotion is an individual who categorizes himself or herself in terms of a salient group membership and relates to an outgroup as an object of the emotion. We can label them as intergroup emotions. Here, the emotional experience requires an evaluation of the intergroup relation and context, and reflects both a self-categorization as an ingroup member and a reaction to a relevant outgroup, given their interrelations.

The second type of emotions can be conceptualized as personal emotions directed at outgroups. This type of emotion refers to situations in which individuals, who do not necessarily categorize or identify with a given ingroup, react to other individuals who are perceived as outgroup members. As Iyer and Leach (2008) refer, some research has shown that emotional reactions reflecting concern about perceived traits or actions of an outgroup have several implications for prejudice and discrimination, across different intergroup contexts. For example, other-focused emotions, such as sympathy towards outgroups, may be evoked, even though there is no relevant ingroup membership on which to base appraisals of these emotions. However, the authors also suggest that these emotions may have consequences for intergroup relations, because they may provoke action tendencies directed at improving the outgroup's conditions.

In line with the previous type of emotions described, it is also possible that individuals may feel emotions on an individual basis, which are directed at their ingroup. This third type of intergroup emotions is labeled as personal emotions directed at ingroups. Although there is no direct evidence confirming the characteristics (i.e. appraisals, phenomenology and action tendencies) of such emotional experiences, Iyer and Leach (2008) refer research conducted on vicarious emotions as indirect proof for the existence of these emotions. It is also important to note that the authors assume that these emotions operate at the intragroup level, barely presenting consequences for intergroup relations.

A fourth type of emotion occurs when the subject belongs to an ingroup and the object of emotion is an individual, who does not need to be categorized as an

outgroup member. Although no research has been conducted regarding this type of emotions, it is assumed that they would have implications for intergroup relations, since, for example, the authors refer that Europeans' negative attitudes towards George Bush lead to more negative views of the United States as a nation (Iyer & Leach, 2008).

Finally, a fifth type of emotion in intergroup settings refers to group-based emotions directed at ingroups. These emotions occur when an individual, who identifies and categorizes himself as an ingroup member, feels emotions about the ingroup's character, circumstances or position. Furthermore, they can occur in relation to the actions taken by some members of this ingroup.

Within this type of emotions, the authors further distinguish between emotions about the ingroup's circumstances and emotions about the ingroup's traits or actions (Iyer & Leach, 2008). When, for example, researchers ask individuals about their emotions regarding their advantaged position over outgroups, they then refer to the first kind of emotion abovementioned. However, when individuals report emotions based on their ingroup membership and in relation to characteristics, attributes or actions of their ingroup, they are said to be referring to the latter kind of emotions aforementioned. These emotions do not relate directly to intergroup relations, but rather to situations in which the focus is the ingroup's own qualities. Nevertheless, these emotions are assumed to have consequences for the intergroup context.

The research conducted on group-based emotions about historical negative events, in which an ingroup has mistreated other groups, is conceptualized within this fifth type of emotions. For example, the influential work by Doosje and colleagues (1998) on collective guilt falls within this type of group-based emotions. Although, at the time, Doosje and colleagues (1998) refer to collective guilt, Iyer and Leach (2008) propose that this is a group-based emotion because it reflects individuals' emotional experiences which are based on their group membership and that the term *collective* should be dropped, because it can be confused with emotions which are generally shared collectively by all group members (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Rivera, 2007).

The focus of our analysis rests on negative group-based emotions directed at the ingroup, due to the negative actions other members of this ingroup have

committed in the past. In the context of the colonial conflicts here examined, we thus assume that group-based guilt, compunction and anger are perceived by individuals (who categorize themselves as members of the national group) as reflecting negatively on the group's moral standing. These emotions, will therefore, be based on ingroup-focused appraisals of the harm committed and will present consequences both for the ingroup and the intergroup relations context.

It is important to note that these emotions, given our reliance on historical intergroup conflicts as the basis for our analysis, have not been manipulated, but rather assessed.

In the next sections of this chapter we present and develop our conceptualization of group-based guilt, compunction and anger as relevant emotions within the context of intergroup relations followed by a historical negative past between groups.

3.2. Group-based Guilt and Compunction

At the individual level, the first attempt to conceptualize and assess guilt in a systematic and differential way, was carried out by Krugler and Jones (1992). In their work, they refer previous attempts of measuring guilt, although they believe these fall short in their efforts to fully explain this emotion. Hence, they set out to distinguish between state and trait guilt, moral standards and shame. Their results showed that state and trait guilt are very difficult to distinguish, and there were scarce indications that guilt and shame may be conceptualized as two distinct emotions. On the other hand, they also proved that *affective guilt* can be distinguished from *moral standards* (Krugler & Jones, 1992).

Some years later, Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton (1994) propose an interpersonal approach to the conceptualization of guilt.

> By guilt we refer to an individual's unpleasant emotional state associated with possible objections to his or her actions, inactions, circumstances, or intentions. Guilt is an aroused form of emotional distress that is distinct from fear and anger and based on the possibility that one may be in the wrong or that others have such a perception. (Baumeister et al., 1994, p. 245)

Within their conceptual review, the authors establish that guilt arises from interpersonal transactions and varies significantly, depending on the interpersonal context. Furthermore, they show that guilt patterns appear to be strongest, most common and consistent in the context of communal relations, in which there are expectations of mutual concern (Baumeister et al., 1994). Of course, they discuss guilt in terms of subjective feelings, rather than in legal or technical terms.

At the interpersonal level, Hoffman (2000) argues that guilt is brought forth when people see themselves as the causal agents of another individual's distress and empathize with this individual's suffering. The distress of this realization creates in the individual a state of tension, remorse and regret over the actions which harmed the other (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). In turn, this negative emotional experience will create a desire in the individual to change its negative behavior and consequences. This desire may take the form of confession, apology or a desire to be forgiven (Baumeister et al., 1994; Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

The specificity of guilt as a self-conscious emotion deriving from the awareness that one's standards have been violated, also sets the basis to the analysis of guilt at the intergroup level.

In a seminal study by Doosje and colleagues (1998), they argue that individuals who categorize themselves as members of an ingroup may feel *guilty by association* when other ingroup members have committed wrongful actions against another group. More specifically, when individuals were confronted with unambiguous negative information about negative behavior of other ingroup members in the past, they tended to feel *collective* or group-based guilt. Moreover, the intensity of the experience of guilt by ingroup members depended significantly on their level of identification with the ingroup (a topic we return to later in this Chapter). Furthermore, these authors (Doosje et al., 1998) also demonstrated that group-based guilt (collective guilt, in their terminology) created a desire to compensate the victimized outgroup, as measured by abstract compensatory behavioral tendencies.

Since the publication of this article, many researchers have focused on the role of group-based guilt in intergroup relations. Barkan (2000), in a work entitled "The guilt of nations" argues that

The new international emphasis on morality has been characterized not only by accusing other countries of human rights abuses but also by self-examination. The leaders of the policies of a new internationalism – Clinton, Blair, Chirac, and Schröder – all have previously apologized and repented for gross historical crimes in their own countries and for policies that ignored human rights. These actions did not wipe the slate clean, nor as the story told in the books makes clear, were they a total novelty or unprecedented. Yet the dramatic shift produced a new scale: Moral issues came to dominate public attention and political issues and displayed the willingness of nations to embrace their own guilt. This national self-reflexivity is the new guilt of nations. (p. XVIII)

Barkan (2000) does not reflect much on the conceptualization of guilt, but he does propose that the new international morality, focused on guilt, will present several consequences for intergroup relations (some of which are discussed in detail later in this Chapter).

So, what are the antecedents (appraisals) which cause ingroup members to feel group-based guilt? First, it is argued that individuals can only feel group-based guilt if they categorize and identify themselves with the ingroup (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; amongst others).

Secondly, the experience of group-based guilt is dependent on the assessment of the ingroup's responsibility for the harm committed against outgroups. If the ingroup is not perceived as being responsible for a violation of moral standards, low levels of guilt are expected. However, when this collective responsibility is undeniable, then group-based guilt will be felt by ingroup members (Clark, 2008; Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004; Mallett & Swim, 2007; Zebel et al., 2007).

Finally, related to appraisals of responsibility, are also appraisals of legitimacy. If a high status position of an ingroup, *vis a vis* relevant outgroups, is questionable and considered unjust, then group-based guilt may rise to the surface. This assumption comes from the fact that the higher status position of the ingroup was achieved through the mistreatment of other groups and thus it was not earned or deserved (Branscombe et al., 2003; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003).

However, it is important to note that group-based guilt is an aversive experience which may lead to social identity threats (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). Can we expect that all ingroup members who are confronted with the negative actions of their ingroup will feel group-based guilt? The answer is no. Indeed, much research (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Rensmann, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2004, amongst others) has proven that individuals may use several strategies to avoid the experience of such a negative, aversive emotion. We return to this topic later in the chapter when we consider several potential antecedents of group-based guilt.

In the same line, we conceptualize group-based *compunction* as an aversive, self-conscious emotion, characterized by an unpleasant state of tension, remorse and self-criticism which rises from the perception that one's ingroup has committed wrongful actions against an outgroup.

The distinction between group-based guilt and group-based compunction rests on the fact that the latter also contains a component of self-criticism (in this case, ingroup-criticism) within it (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerinck, & Elliot, 1991; Stephan & Stephan, 1996).

The concept of compunction was first brought up in the field of intergroup relations by Devine (1990; Devine et al., 1991) to explain instances in which low-prejudiced individuals still sometimes respond to outgroup members in a discriminatory way. This discrepancy between attitudes and behavior would thus lead to compunction, that is, feelings of guilt and self-criticism, being that the latter may be sometimes interpreted as shame[3]. In turn, this discrepancy would be solved after regulatory attempts aimed at changing the discriminatory behavior. We argue that the experience of group-based compunction relies on the same kind of appraisals as group-based guilt, and will also present similar consequences to intergroup relations.

Nevertheless, we argue that ingroup-criticism is an important and distinctive aspect of group-based compunction in comparison to group-based guilt. This

---

[3] One important word of caution is necessary here: as it will be visible in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the present work, our assessment of group-based compunction is composed of several items, of which a few have customarily been conceptualized as measures of shame. Nevertheless, we presently conceptualize them as reflecting ingroup-criticism in nature.

ingroup-criticism is generally assumed to be related to feelings of shame and hence, we also equate the role of this emotion in our analysis.

Within the domain of group-based emotions it has been shown that group-based guilt and group-based shame (which we conceptualize as ingroup-criticism) are distinct emotional experiences, which are based on differential (although very similar) appraisals and present different consequences for intergroup relations (Brown, González, Zagefka, Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Lickel et al., 2004; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996; amongst others). In this line of research, it has been shown that, while the appraisal of group-based guilt rests on the recognition of negative actions committed by the ingroup, group-based shame focuses on the perception of the group's character as being inherently flawed.

Lickel and colleagues (2004) have shown that the main distinction between group-based guilt and shame relies precisely on this aspect: while a perception of control (for the negative actions, in terms of compensation) will lead to the experience of group-based guilt, an ingroup image threat would be the essential ingredient for group-based shame to emerge. Nevertheless, as Harvey and Oswald (2000) state "there are no clear antecedental differences between the two. Thus, any one situation can lead to either emotion" (p. 1791).

Consequently, group-based guilt and shame may be better distinguished through their consequences in terms of intergroup relations. While group-based guilt is assumed to have an approach function, shame is expected to lead to avoidance of the intergroup situation (Lickel et al., 2004; Schmader & Lickel, 2006).

However, so far, the results of several studies have provided inconsistent evidence for this assumption. For example, while Lickel and colleagues (2004) found clear evidence for this rationale, Harvey and Oswarld (2000) found that both guilt and shame predicted anti-social behavioral intentions after individuals watched a civil-rights video and only after their personal integrity was reaffirmed, did they react more pro-socially. In the same line, Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus and Dumont (2006) could not distinguish between guilt and shame in a study analyzing the consequences of several group-based emotions for intergroup relations.

Furthermore, Brown and colleagues (2008) have found that group-based guilt predicts reparation attitudes longitudinally, while group-based shame only presented cross-sectional associations with reparation attitudes, and no longitudinal effects.

In an attempt to clarify these inconsistencies in results, Brown and Cehajic (2008) went on to refine the conceptualization of group-based shame and present a rationale in which the reputational aspects of shame are the ones which better predict avoidance in intergroup relations. They further developed this rationale by presenting different mediators of group-based guilt and group-based shame in intergroup behavioral tendencies.

In the present dissertation, we measure group-based compunction as an ingroup-focused variable which, as mentioned previously, is composed of both guilt and ingroup-criticism, and we expect this emotional experience to have relevant consequences for intergroup relations marked by a negative past.

3.3. Group-based Anger

In the Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Psychology (Manstead & Hewstone, 1996) the term anger is defined as "an emotion that results from displeasure at an undesired event, particularly one that is perceived as having resulted from someone's blameworthy action" (p. 25). This unpleasant state is commonly characterized by a sense of blame, meaning that individuals recognize the role of another person in committing a controllable act aimed at offending the individual, intentionally or not (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). Furthermore, anger often arises when there is an obstruction to individuals' achievement of goals, when events are inconsistent with the motives of individuals (Roseman, 2001), or when a situation is evaluated as being unfair or unjust or as violating someone's norms or standards (Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Scherer, 2001).

Finally, anger is most likely to arise when individuals perceive to have control over the situation or if they feel that they can cope with its consequences (Scherer, 2001). For example, in a series of studies by Tiedens, Ellsworth and Mesquita (2000), at the individual level, it was shown that individuals tend to attribute a higher social status to an angry person, in comparison to a sad person, and that the expression of anger in an opponent may increase the willingness of individuals to make bigger concessions during negotiations. These results have also

been corroborated by Van Kleef, De Dreu and Manstead (2004), which showed that participants tend to be more flexible towards an angry opponent, than towards a happy opponent.

Summarizing, at the individual level, the appraisals most commonly associated with anger are: 1) blame in some form; 2) the impedance of achieving desired goals; 3) the consciousness that a situation is inconsistent with the person's motives or norms; 4) the perception of an event as unfair or unjust; 5) a sense of control or possibility of change of the situation.

However, there is some incongruence amongst different authors regarding the necessity of each of these appraisals to evoke anger, but as Pennekamp (2008) refers, "emotions are generally not elicited by a single appraisal, but by a combination of appraisals" (p.12). Hence, anger may be elicited, in different situations, through a combination of the aforementioned appraisals.

Traditionally, at the individual level, anger is also assumed to be very closely linked with aggression (Averill, 2001; Berkowitz, 2001; Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman, Wiest, & Schwartz, 1994). However, many authors argue that anger may have an adaptive function, presenting positive consequences for inter-individual relations. Given an appropriate situation, the expression of anger may operate as a vehicle to resolving an unsatisfactory situation and thus become relevant for the maintenance of a relevant relation with the wrongdoer (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).

Given this conceptualization of the expression of anger as signaling that a certain violation of standards has occurred (and someone is to blame for it) and its potential of leading to a new situation in which the former acts have been corrected for, we may conclude that, at the intergroup level, it will be a relevant emotional experience. Furthermore, we argue that this emotion, which is usually studied as an other-directed emotion can also be self-directed and can occur when an individual is confronted with its negative actions towards others.

Therefore, at the group level, anger can refer both to an emotion which individuals feel in relation to the negative actions of an outgroup towards the ingroup (Pennekamp, 2008), but also to an emotion that ingroup members feel when confronted with the negative misdeeds of their own ingroup (Iyer et al., 2007). In other words, group-based anger can be outgroup-directed or ingroup-directed.

As it is the case in the distinction of guilt at the individual and at the group levels of analysis, for group-based anger to surface, the focus of the "blame" should occur at the group level, instead of the individual level. Needless to say, individuals need to acknowledge the situation as intergroup in nature and their appraisals should occur because of their identification and self-categorization within an ingroup.

When individuals appraise a situation in which the ingroup's goals were impeded by other groups, group-based anger directed at relevant outgroups may be experienced (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Moreover, when the ingroup is threatened by a relevant outgroup, group-based anger will occur if the ingroup members perceive they can handle the outgroup threat (Mackie et al., 2000; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004).

In intergroup settings in which a disadvantaged group is confronted with the violent actions committed against members of the group by outgroups, or in which their disadvantaged position is made salient *vis a vis* another group benefiting from an advantaged position, group-based anger is a very likely emotional experience. Especially when these actions or disadvantaged position are considered as unjustified, illegitimate, unjust or unfair, the experience of group-based anger is most likely.

Interestingly, these appraisals are the same as the ones considered when explaining group-based guilt. Indeed, what distinguishes group-based guilt from group-based anger is the focus of the latter on "blame", as an instigator of the emotional experience. While group-based guilt derives from the awareness that one's ingroup has done something, in group-based anger this consciousness is taken one step further by finding a target/blamed entity on which to allocate the responsibility for the actions or situation causing this emotion.

Research at the intergroup level has shown that group-based anger directed at outgroups presents interesting and lasting consequences. For example, Gordijn, Wigboldus and Yzerbyt (2001) have shown that group-based anger motivates group members to take action against the outgroup. In a different vein, researchers have also showed that anger is a stronger negative predictor of forgiveness for historical negative events when compared with a general negative outgroup evaluation (Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, & Kensworthy, 2007; Tam et al., 2008).

Furthermore, when individuals are reminded of their ingroup's slavery past, the relevance they attribute to this past and the level of outgroup-blame predicts the levels of group-based anger they experience (Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel & Fischer, 2007).

Brown, Wohl and Exline (2008) also presented similar results regarding current intergroup relations. In their studies, the relationship between ingroup identification and the desire to forgive and retaliate against the 9/11 terrorists was mediated by group-based anger.

Nevertheless, all of the studies mentioned above refer to instances in which the outgroup is the focus of the blame. Is it possible that individuals may also blame their ingroup for negative misdeeds? We believe so. We assume that situations in which the ingroup may be to "blame" for the negative actions committed against outgroups, anger may be an important determinant of intergroup action tendencies.

Therefore, in the present dissertation, we conceptualize group-based anger as a negative ingroup-focused emotion, characterized by a high level of readiness for action that involves a feeling that the ingroup has committed wrongful acts against another group.

In fact, previous research has shown that group-based anger towards the ingroup leads individuals to make amendments for past misdeeds and take action in way to improve the outgroup's conditions (Gordijn et al., 2006; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach, Iyer, & Pedersen, 2006). For example, the studies conducted by Gordijn and colleagues (2006) showed that the manipulation of identification with a perpretator ingroup lead to two patterns of associations with group-based anger: high identifiers tended to feel less anger and showed less support for action tendencies aimed at addressing the outgroup's situation, while low identifiers tended to experience more group-based anger and displayed higher support for the action tendencies. Similarly, Iyer and colleagues (2007) showed that group-based anger focused on the role of the ingroup in the Iraq war, lead individuals to advocate compensation, confrontation of the agents responsible for the war and withdrawl from Iraq.

Furthermore, in the context of Australia's intergroup relations between the majority white group and the aborigines, it was shown that anger about the ingroup's structural advantage over the aborigines' disadvantaged group, was a strong predictor of the willingness to take political action aimed at addressing this advantage (Leach

et al., 2006). This work also showed that although group-based guilt is associated with abstract intentions of compensation towards the outgroup, this emotion was not a significant predictor of specific actions, such as writing letters, organize demonstrations and vote regarding intergroup inequality. It was group-based anger which better predicted the support for these specific actions.

The authors interpret these differences between group-based guilt and anger in terms of their differential phenomenology and action potential. Given that group-based guilt is associated with a lower action potential than group-based anger (which is also characterized by a more agitated phenomenology), group-based guilt is associated with abstract action intentions, that may not lead to behavior. Group-based anger thus seem to be a better predictor of actual behavior and efforts aimed at reducing intergroup inequality.

A previous study by Iyer and colleagues (2003) had already pointed indirectly to this potential difference between the two emotions. In a study regarding the relative disadvantaged position of African Americans in comparison to European Americans, these authors found that group-based guilt predicted affirmative action programs aimed at compensating African Americans. Nevertheless, this emotion did not predict support for affirmative action programs that increase opportunities, that is, for non-compensatory efforts promoting equality.

These findings are also in line with the relative deprivation literature regarding collective disadvantage and intergroup inequality (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000: Smith & Kessler, 2004). Feelings of group relative deprivation are very often associated with political protest and active attempts to change the social system. Mackie and colleagues (2000) thus propose that anger strongly mediates the relationship between group relative deprivation and the desire to change the unjust social system. Smith and Kessler (2004) go beyond this rationale and propose that the association between group relative deprivation and collective change may be more complex than usually assumed. However, they do postulate that anger may be one of the relevant mediators of this relation.

It is the distinction between the potential consequences of group-based guilt (and compunction) and group-based anger that leads us to analyze both emotions in our empirical work (for further details see Chapter 6 and 7).

Although both emotions rely on (more or less) the same appraisals does not leave out the possibility that they may have distinct consequences for intergroup relations Thus we propose to analyze these potential differences regarding distinct outcomes of both emotional experiences and to address some of the possible inconsistencies found in previous research.

3.4. Antecedents of Group-based Guilt, Compunction and Anger

The present section aims to conceptualize and describe several antecedents of group-based guilt, compunction and anger. We propose, generally, that all variables presented here will be associated with the experience of these three emotions. However, the degree to which they are (or not) associated with each of the emotions, will in turn be covered in the empirical part of this work.

For a better distinction of the different antecedents examined and their associations with group-based guilt, compunction and anger, we have divided them in different subsections. These subsections try to clarify, in terms of the particular and shared characteristics these antecedents have with each other, the approach used in this dissertation to study their role in predicting group-based emotions.

In the first subsection we center our analysis on ingroup-focused antecedents of emotions. These refer to variables which we conceptualize as being directly related to the ingroup and the ingroup's experience of the emotions analyzed. Variables such as ingroup identification, exonerating cognitions and collectivism are presented in this subsection.

The next subsection deals with variables which can be envisioned as being more related to the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup or even more outgroup-focused than ingroup-focused. In this section, we describe how we expect outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions to be related to group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

Finally, we explain how we expect subjective perceptions of the violent past to be related to the experience of the emotions at stake.

3.4.1. Ingroup-focused antecedents of group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

Most of the research conducted on intergroup emotions refers several antecedents of the experience of these emotions. Amongst them, one of the most well documented antecedents is ingroup identification. In fact, several lines of research have focused on the role of ingroup identification in predicting emotions at the social level (Doosje et al., 1998; Mackie et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; amongst others).

Other variables, such as political orientation (Doosje et al., 1998), exonerating cognitions (Roccas et al., 2006) or appraisals of legitimacy (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004), domain relevance (Pennekamp et al., 2007), responsibility and justifiability (Mallett & Swim, 2007) have also been associated with group-based emotions.

What all of these variables have in common is the fact that they all focus on ingroup perceptions, appraisals and justifications of the events under study, in relation to the ingroup's actions and image. Indeed, much of the research conducted until now focuses on how members of the ingroup understand their intergroup relations *vis a vis* outgroups in terms of the consequences for their own group-image, self-categorization and reputation. Therefore, in this subsection we describe several variables which put the focus of analysis on the ingroup members and their understanding of their group's history and actions.

Ingroup identification: A distal antecedent of group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

As previously stated, ingroup identification can be defined as the recognition of an individual's belonging (membership) to a group, plus its affective significance (Mackie et al., 2004). In this line, ingroup identification should be linked to a pervasive and implicit orientation towards other individuals who are members of the same group as an individual, and distancing from individuals who belong to other groups. Furthermore, individuals should identify strongly with groups which fulfill their need for positive intergroup distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 2001).

> Different group members may be differentially identified with the group and
> to the extent that intergroup emotions depends on identification, intergroup

emotions theory suggests that the more highly identified the member, the more easily, frequently, and intensely intergroup emotions should be generated. (Mackie et al., 2004, p. 231)

In their work, these authors present several studies showing that indeed, members of the ingroup who identify more strongly with their group tend to feel higher levels of intergroup emotions.

But the picture is not so clear cut as it may seem at first. Doosje and colleagues (1998), when studying group-based guilt in relation to an ingroup's negative past found that high identifiers experience less group-based guilt than low identifiers, when their national group's history is portrayed with some ambiguity regarding the negative or positive aspects of this history. They explain these findings in terms of a defensive reaction by high identifiers to a group-image threatening situation. Furthermore, they propose that high identifiers would more likely experience positive rather than negative group-based emotions. In turn, low identifiers showed higher levels of group-based guilt because they do not feel their social image threatened by the negative or ambiguous information, and are more willing to accept this negative information.

Similar results were also found for the experience of group-based anger. Gordijn and colleagues (2006) manipulated ingroup identification and found that high identifiers felt less group-based anger when confronted with their ingroup's misdeeds.

These findings would set the basis for what would be considered the "paradox of group-based guilt" (Roccas et al., 2006).

Being identified with one's group should be associated with experiencing stronger group-based emotions and thus should be associated with feeling stronger group-based guilt. But being identified with the group should also be associated with legitimization of the group's wrongdoings and hence feeling little or no guilt. (Roccas et al., 2006, p. 699)

In their research, Roccas and colleagues (2006) argue that this paradox comes from the fact that ingroup identification is not a unidimensional concept and should not be measured with simple items such as "I identify with members of (the

ingroup)", "Being a (name group) is an important part of how I see myself", amongst others.

They, thus, move on to propose that ingroup identification is a complex phenomenon and its assessment should take its multidimensional nature into consideration (Roccas et al., 2006). Hence, they propose a dual conceptualization of ingroup identification consisting of two modes of identification: attachment to and glorification of the ingroup. Attachment to the ingroup refers to the kind of items mentioned above and reflects instances in which individuals categorize themselves as group members and feel attached to the group, while desiring to contribute to it. Glorification of the ingroup refers to a view of the ingroup as being superior to and being more worthy than other groups. Individuals who tend to glorify their ingroup adhere strongly to its norms and values and highly respect its symbols (such as flags, national anthem) and traditions, feeling betrayed when others do not show respect for the ingroup.

Furthermore, individuals who are attached to the ingroup would be the ones who feel higher levels of group-based guilt and anger, while glorifiers of the ingroup would be motivated to defend the group's image and deny any negative actions or characteristics for which the ingroup could be held responsible, thus rejecting feelings of group-based guilt and/or anger. This need for maintaining a positive ingroup-image would also be related to the use of exculpating motives (exonerating cognitions) to avoid the experience of group-based guilt.

Indeed, this conceptualization proved to be an improvement in the measurement of ingroup identification. However, further analysis of the role of ingroup identification as an antecedent of group-based emotions lead to the creation of a hierarchical, multi-component model of ingroup identification (Leach et al., 2008). The model proposed by Leach and colleagues (2008) identifies five distinct components of ingroup identification: 1) individual self-stereotyping (individuals perceiving themselves as similar to other ingroup members); 2) ingroup homogeneity (shared communalities between all ingroup members); 3) solidarity (psychological bonds or ties between ingroup members); 4) satisfaction (desire to maintain a positive evaluation of the ingroup); and 5) centrality (salience and importance of ingroup membership).

Moreover, these five components would fit into two more general dimensions of ingroup identification, namely self-definition and self-investment. Self-definition is composed of individual self-stereotyping and ingroup homogeneity, and refers to individuals' perceptions of being similar to a prototypical ingroup member. The self-investment dimension contains solidarity, satisfaction and centrality, and manifests itself through an individual's perceived bond with the ingroup and positive feelings about this group membership (Leach et al., 2008).

These two dimensions have been shown to relate to group-based guilt in a distinct manner. Self-stereotyping was associated with higher levels of group-based guilt, while the self-investment dimension was associated with more legitimization of the ingroup's actions.

Although a more refined assessment of ingroup identification has certainly proved very beneficial in explaining its association with group-based emotions, there might be different explanations for the divergent patterns of results sometimes found in the literature (Doosje et al., 1998, 2006; Gordijn et al., 2006; Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). As Iyer and Leach (2008) suggest, the operationalization of ingroup identification may cause different effects on group-based emotions, depending on their level of specificity regarding ingroup identification components and other contextual differences in the intergroup relation, which may also influence this association. Most importantly, ingroup identification can also be conceptualized as a distal predictor of with indirect effects for group-based emotions. Indeed, previous research has shown that ingroup identification is a distal antecedent of group-based emotions and that its effect on individuals' emotional experiences would, thus, be mediated by more proximal antecedents of these emotions (Branscombe, 2004; Branscombe et al., 2004).

In the present work, our analysis of ingroup identification relates to instances in which the national ingroup has committed negative actions against other groups and, therefore, our analysis of ingroup identification refers only to national identification and its effects on group-based emotions.

National identification refers to a pervasive and temporally consistent aspect of an individual's social image and its development is assumed to occur in early socialization with other individuals of the national group (Doosje et al., 1998). Given its persistent character along an individual's life span, it is thus possible that national

identification may suffer changes or interpretations throughout time. Depending on the intergroup context and the relevant ingroup's norms at a given moment in history, it is thus possible that different interpretations of events may materialize. Rensmann (2004), for example, has found that there are generational differences in the interpretation of atrocities committed by the Nazi regime in Germany and these, of course, present different consequences for group-based emotions.

In a context in which colonization and colonial conflicts are undeniably condemnable, we do not expect such differences to occur. However, we do believe that the level of ingroup identification individuals' report will be associated with the experiences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

Political orientation.

Intergroup relations clearly represent instances of collective behavior in which politics and socio-political factors may influence the emergence, development and resolution of conflicts and intergroup tensions. For example, without a major shift in the political ideologies in South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions could have never existed.

Therefore, political orientation, as self-referenced by individuals, may play a role in the way they perceive and feel instances of intergroup harm, for which their ingroup is held accountable. Political orientation can be defined as an individual's positioning regarding a set of attitudes and beliefs based on different political and social issues and their subjective relevance for this individual. Furthermore, it reflects an individual's psychological dispositions towards more right-wing (conservative) or left-wing (liberal) principles (Vigil, 2010).

A more right-wing political orientation has been found to, generally, be associated with a social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), cognitive rigidity (Rokeach, 1960; Sidanius, 1985; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; amongst others). This may lead us to conclude that conservatives tend to favor the status quo and feel threatened in the face of change. These findings have also been interpreted within the approach-avoidance model of behavior regulation, by which differences between liberals and conservatives can be understood in the light of threat management and uncertainty. Hence, more right-wing individuals (conservatives) would manage threat and uncertainty through

resistance to change and maintenance of the social order due to their focus on negative outcomes (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Left-wing oriented individuals (liberals) would favor approach-based motives by which change can be introduced within the social system (Janoff-Bulman, Sheik, & Baldacci, 2008).

One may, thus, argue that political orientation may be associated with ingroup identification modes and thus influence the experience of group-based emotions. Doosje and colleagues (1998) found that, indeed, political orientation and ingroup identification are correlated, such that high identifiers tend to have a more right-wing political orientation. Furthermore, political orientation also influenced the experience of group-based guilt. These same results were found by Branscombe and colleagues (2004).

In a different vein, Roccas and colleagues (2004) found that a left-wing political orientation was associated with a higher endorsement of group-based guilt and the use of less exonerating cognitions, as a means to escape the ingroup's responsibility. In this line, we thus assume that political orientation may not be one of most determinant antecedents of the experience of group-based guilt, but that it may be associated with other variables which can influence this emotional experience.

Exonerating cognitions.

There are many reasons for which individuals should avoid the experience of negative group-based emotions. Negative emotions are aversive and characterized by an unpleasant state, which individuals feel the need to resolve and expiate.

However, before the rise of the experience of group-based emotions, individuals may already have biases which allow them to avoid such emotional experiences.

As Rensmann (2004) argues, when individuals are confronted with the negative misdeeds of their ingroup, they can react to this information in several distinct ways. First, they can attempt to maintain an advantaged position in comparison to the outgroup and express their support for policies which maintain the status quo between the groups. Secondly, ingroup members may deny the "harm-advantage link". In this way, they may blame the outgroup for their disadvantaged position, for example, by adhering to interpretations of the events which reflect the

belief in a just world strategy. Individuals may also create an interpretation of the events by which both groups are to blame and hence diminish their responsibility for the misdeeds.

A third strategy which can be used is to minimize the advantage. In these cases, individuals may try to correct, in the present day, for the historical disadvantages of outgroup members. Finally, the ingroup may also repair the harm committed, by acknowledging the ingroup's wrongdoings and taking action in dealing with its consequences. The last two strategies can be interpreted within the social identity framework as "social creativity" strategies, by which there is a redefinition or change of the situation.

The first two strategies may rise as ways to avoid feeling negative group-based emotions. Furthermore, we argue that within these strategies, individuals may try to legitimize their negative past actions in different ways or to diffuse or reject the ingroup's responsibility for it. For example, it was found that when Portuguese individuals are confronted with their negative past misdeeds, they can feel less group-based guilt by referring that other European countries also acted in a wrongful manner towards other groups (Marques, Paez, & Serra, 1997).

Exonerating cognitions can be defined as cognitive motivated biases that lead individuals to process and recall information which is compatible with their goals and motivations. By using exonerating cognitions individuals can deny or mitigate their experience of negative group-based emotions.

Indeed, Roccas and colleagues (2004, 2006) found that individuals who glorify their ingroup tend to endorse exonerating cognitions to escape the experience of group-based guilt. By endorsing justifications of the wrongdoings, these individuals were able to maintain a positive ingroup identity and refuse any responsibility for the ingroup's actions.

As stated in social identity and self-categorization theories, individuals strive to maintain positive intergroup distinctiveness and often prefer to deny a threatening ingroup-image. The use of such justifications may therefore accomplish this motive and this is also probably the reason why glorifiers or highly identified individuals adhere so easily to such justification biases (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas et al., 2004, 2006).

Given this line of reasoning, it is therefore proposed that exonerating cognitions are a proximal antecedent of negative group-based emotions. When individuals justify their ingroup's actions by means of exonerating cognitions, they will tend to feel less group-based anger, compunction and guilt.

Nevertheless, although individuals may desire to avoid negative information about their ingroup's past misdeeds, there might be other variables, at the cultural level, such as collectivism, which may potentiate the experience of negative group-based emotions.

Collectivism.

Hofstede (1980) has proposed that cultures may be distinguished amongst themselves through the analysis of different dimensions of national culture. In his conceptualization, these dimensions allow us to comprehend how countries, such as the United States of America and Japan, may differ in terms of general cultural characteristics leading to distinctive norms, beliefs, values, attitudes and behavior within each culture. Thus, he affirms that understanding how cultures are defined along four (or five, as described in later conceptualizations) different dimensions allows researchers to better comprehend several findings within cross-cultural psychology. These dimensions are: 1) individualism-collectivism (i.e., the degree to which individuals are, or not, integrated in groups and the reliance on social and familiar networks); 2) power distance (i.e., the degree to which individuals believe that power is unequally distributed); 3) masculinity versus femininity (i.e., the distribution of emotional roles between genders); 4) uncertainty avoidance (i.e., a society's tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity); and 5) long-term orientation (i.e., the degree to which societies foster future or past and present aspects and virtues of their culture), which was later added by Hofstede and Bond (1988). These dimensions are comparative in nature, and a country's score on one dimension has no relevant value, unless it is compared with another country's value on the same dimension.

Of most interest to us is the dimension of individualism-collectivism. According to Hofstede (1980), the extreme poles of this dimension are characterized by individual's self-image as defined in terms of "I" or "we". Individualism is thus conceptualized as a preference for loose social bonds, by which individuals are

expected to take care of themselves and their family members exclusively. Collectivism is seen as a preference for tight social bonds within a societal structure which favors loyalty, attachment and dedication to one's ingroups (Hofstede, 1980). Triandis (1989) further explains that Western cultures are predominantly individualistic, whereas Asia, Latin America and Africa are more collectivistic in nature.

In an attempt to better differentiate between collectivism and individualism, Triandis and Gelfand (1998), created a measure which encompasses two interrelated types of individualism and two interrelated types of collectivism.

In horizontal individualism, individuals try to maintain a unique and distinctive identity, away from their group belongings and want to be self-reliant, although they do not desire to become distinguished or have high social status. Vertical individualism is defined in terms of individuals who want to become distinguished and acquire social status, through competition with other individuals.

Horizontal collectivism, in turn, is characterized by the pursuit of common goals with others, interdependence and sociability, although it does not imply compliance with authority. In vertical collectivism, people stress the integrity of the group, make personal sacrifices for the common good of their ingroup and support competition with outgroups.

Taken together, these differential components of individualism and collectivism, characterize instances in which individuals perceive themselves as distinct and unique persons versus instances in which they identify with ingroups and feel more as interchangeable members of these groups. These general dimensions may thus influence the ways in which individuals appraise and feel events in which their ingroups are implicated.

Other research (Rhee, Uleman, & Lee, 1996) has shown that individualism-collectivism should be considered as two independent dimensions, because models treating them as distinct dimensions have a better fit than models which regard them as a bipolar unique dimension.

Jetten, Postmes and McAuliffe (2002) have shown that individualism and collectivism are related to ingroup's norms regarding behavior. In their studies, they found that in an individualistic culture those who identify strongly with their ingroup are more individualistic than those who identify weakly with this ingroup. In

contrast, in collectivistic societies, high identifiers are less individualistic than low identifiers. These results lead them to conclude that when there is a salient ingroup norm of individualism, individuals tend to adhere to more to this norm and become themselves more individualistic.

We believe that collectivism, as a general positive orientation towards life among groups, may influence the way individuals perceive their ingroup's role on negative historical misdeeds. Although collectivism may not always be associated with the experience of group-based emotions, when individuals accept the negative role their national group had in historical conflicts, collectivism may be positively associated with group-based emotions. Therefore, we conceptualize collectivism as a potential proximal antecedent of such negative emotional experiences.

Furthermore, we argue that collectivism is also associated with ingroup identification, because both variables reflect an individual's level of association and commitment to the ingroup.

3.4.2. Outgroup-focused and relational antecedents of group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

Ingroups could not exist if they did not have other groups (outgroups) with which to compare and relate to. According to Baumeister and colleagues (1994), individuals tend to feel more guilt when they harm a relationship with a significant other and fear the consequences for this highly esteemed communal relation. Drawing from this rationale, we argue that ingroup members may feel higher levels of group-based emotions when they are confronted with the negative misdeeds their ingroup has committed against relevant outgroups. This argument is also in line with intergroup emotions theory (Smith, 1993).

However, research has focused mainly on the role of majority groups in perpetuating instances of conflict and discrimination and has many times forgotten to consider both sides (i.e. majority and minority groups, perpetrator and victimized groups) of a conflict. Therefore, we argue that research must focus on all sides of an event occurring at the intergroup level to fully understand its causes, phenomenology and consequences. Nevertheless, this is not the main point of our argumentation in the present section.

Rather, we argue that, although ingroup-focused variables are very important and contribute enormously to our understanding of the reasons why individuals may or may not experience group-based emotions, there might other kinds of variables influencing the emotional experience of ingroups confronted with their group's past negative actions. With this rationale in mind, we propose that ingroup's members perceptions of the relevant outgroup and of the relationship the ingroup has with this outgroup may influence the experience of negative group-based emotions. Therefore, in this subsection we focus on variables which are focused on characteristics and perceptions of the ougroup and on the nature of the relationship between both groups.

Outgroup identification.

At the interpersonal level, guilt implicates a concern with the victim of the wrongful behavior (Baumeister et al., 1994). Hence, it is expected that, at the group level, this concern may also rise when individuals take the perspective of the victims of the harm inflicted by the ingroup.

When we look at the literature on intergroup emotions, it is clear we have not been the first ones to think of outgroup-focused variables as influencing the experience of group-based emotions and, thus, presenting consequences for intergroup relations. Some studies have shown exactly this focus on outgroup-focused and relational variables in the explanation of the experience of intergroup emotions.

For example, Zebel, Doosje and Spears (2009b), have found that manipulating the source of information, when presenting negative information to individuals about their ingroup's history, does affect the experience of group-based guilt. When confronted with a victimized outgroup's perspective of the harmful intergroup events, even high identifiers tend to experience higher levels of group-based guilt. However, when the source of information is another perpetrator group, which is seen as an illegitimate evaluator of the ingroup's negative actions, high identifiers feel lower levels of group-based guilt (Zebel et al., 2009b).

But the story does not end here. When individuals are instructed to take the victimized outgroup's perspective, low identified individuals will experience higher levels of group-based guilt (Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2009a). However, highly

identified individuals will exculpate the ingroup's behavior, by affirming that the victimized group is being too harsh on their evaluation of the intergroup situation. This will, in turn, make these high identifiers feel less group-based guilt (Zebel et al., 2009a). These lines of research do show that a concern with the outgroup's suffering and victimization may lead to higher levels of negative group-based emotions, because of the ingroup's negative actions. Along these lines, we propose that individuals who, besides identifying with their ingroup, also identify with the victimized outgroup, will experience higher levels of group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

Outgroup identification can be defined as an individual's orientation towards outgroup members and the value associated with this orientation and desire for a positive relation with such an outgroup (Figueiredo, Doosje, Valentim, & Zebel, 2010; Figueiredo, Doosje, & Valentim, 2012a). Moreover, this variable is self-focused in nature: it reflects and individual's consciousness of having a bond or link with the outgroup.

We propose that, when individuals perceive to share a bond with the outgroup through identification with this group, they will experience more negative group-based emotions, because they understand how the outgroup has been victimized by the perpetrator ingroup and empathize with their suffering. On the contrary, when individuals do not see themselves as being related in that way to the outgroup, the experience of negative group-based emotions may be tampered and mechanisms aimed at exculpating the ingroup may develop.

We further distinguish our conceptualization of outgroup identification from literature focusing on more inclusive levels of categorization and identification. Several studies have shown that manipulating the level of inclusiveness of individuals self-categorization may influence the experience of group-based emotions. In the context of post conflictual relations following the Holocaust, Wohl and Branscombe (2004) have presented evidence that categorizing a victimized (Jews) and perpetrator group (Germans) as two distinct groups leads to higher group-based guilt assignment to the perpetrator group. On the other side, when both groups are categorized at a common level of inclusiveness (as human beings), guilt assignment by the victimized group is lessened. This superordinate categorization also seems to increase forgiveness from the victimized group's perspective, because

the similarities between both groups are heightened and their "human" nature is emphasized.

In our work, we do not think outgroup identification reflects such a superordinate categorization, given that the distinction between ingroup and outgroup is still made salient and thus is relevant for the way individuals self-categorize and identify with their ingroup and the victimized outgroup. Instead, we assume that these are two distinct identification processes. Individuals who identify with their ingroup may or may not also identify with the relevant outgroup. In turn, these distinct patterns of identification, arising from the possibility or identifying or not with the outgroup, will present consequences for the experience of group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

In a study conducted in Portugal, it was found that Portuguese individuals tend to identify with Mozambique (one of the former Portuguese colonies) below the mid-point of the scale, while Mozambicans identify slightly more with Portugal (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010). In this study, the authors also found that a lower level of identification of Portuguese participants with the Mozambican group was associated with a more positive interpretation of the impact of several colonial events (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010). Furthermore, Valentim (2003) showed that Portuguese individuals, while feeling quite similar to Africans, report, nonetheless, a low level of identification with this group.

The outgroup-focused, relational nature of this variable may thus be an important aspect of the intergroup context and should be analyzed as such. Proven right, our conceptualization may shed further light into the dynamics of negative group-based emotions after intergroup conflict.

We further propose that there may be other outgroup-focused variables influencing the experience of group-based emotions. Next, we describe another bonding variable that we expect to be associated with emotions at the group level: outgroup perceptions.

Outgroup perceptions.

According to the social identity framework, ingroup members tend to differentiate more between ingroup members than between outgroup members (ingroup differentiation), which are usually portrayed more in terms of general

characteristics held by all outgroup members (outgroup homogeneity) (Simon, 1992; Valentim, 2008). These perceived differences in variability have been explained in terms of stereotypicality of the group: when we are part of an ingroup, we tend to perceive it as more diverse and heterogeneous than other groups. In the same line, we use stereotypical information to characterize outgroup members, thus creating a more homogeneous vision of these individuals (Park & Judd, 1990).

These perception biases will, in turn, have effects for intergroup relations. Generally speaking, previous research has shown that individuals tend to assign less human and more animal-like characteristics to outgroup members, while assigning ingroup members more human-like qualities (Bandura, 2002). This, in turn, will lead ingroup members to perceive their negative actions against other groups as less severe and consequential than it would be possible, if empathic concerns and equal perceptions would be allowed (Bandura, 2002; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). For example, Haslam (2006) has shown that when individuals animalize outgroup members, essential characteristics of these individuals as human beings are denied and thus they are evaluated as lacking culture and rationality. There are two distinct kinds of dehumanization: mechanistic dehumanization, which occurs when we attribute machine-like characteristics to human beings and animalistic dehumanization, which is composed of attributions denying an individual's human essence and assigning them animal-like characteristics (for a revision see Zebel, Zimmerman, Viki, & Doosje, 2008).

This latter conceptualization of dehumanization has been applied to the field of emotions, and it was found that, indeed, individuals tend to attribute more secondary emotions, such as affection, admiration, and so forth, to ingroup members, when compared to outgroup members. However, the assignment of primary emotions was essentially equal amongst ingroup and outgroup members (Viki, Winchester, Titshall, Chisango, Pina, & Russell, 2006).

Although we do not analyze dehumanization in our work, we do believe these results have interesting connections with our work. Given that individuals are inclined to dehumanize and homogenize outgroup members, what will happen when, instead, they have to attribute them characteristics which are human in nature, independently of their valence?

Hence, we propose to study outgroup perceptions as a potential proximal antecedent of negative group-based emotions. Outgroup perceptions can be conceptualized as ingroup's beliefs about the attributes and characteristics of the outgroup. When these are positive in nature, we may assume the ingroup has a positive view of the outgroup and thus values their interdependent relationship. In turn, these positive outgroup perceptions will lead to higher levels of negative group-based emotions when the ingroup is confronted with negative information about its past misdeeds. However, when the attributes ascribed to the outgroup are more negatively evaluated they may signal that individuals do not value their intergroup relationship and, thus, little negative group-based emotions will be felt.

Drawing from the same rationale by which we conceptualize outgroup identification to be a relational variable, we also consider outgroup perceptions as a variable reflecting the degree to which ingroup members feel they share a bond with outgroup members, which allows us an insight into the nature of the intergroup relation existent between both groups. Based on this framing of both variables, we thus expect them to predict the degree to which individuals may or may not report distinct emotional experiences regarding the shared history between both groups.

While we do believe both variables (i.e. outgroup identification and outgroup perceptions) are *bonding* variables, we presuppose these are different in their nature: outgroup identification may be seen as a more self-focused measure of an individual's identification or association with the outgroup, whereas outgroup perceptions may reflect group-based beliefs about the inherent characteristics of the outgroup.

Furthermore, we state that both variables are distinct from other concepts, such as outgroup perspective-taking (Zebel et al., 2009a) or empathy towards the outgroup (Stephan & Finley, 1999). An individual may feel empathy towards outgroup members and their suffering and may even "step into their shoes". However, he or she may not identify with these outgroup members or even have a positive view of the outgroup as a whole. Hence, the consequences of these different variables for the experience of negative group-based emotions, albeit similar, may also present some differential consequences for intergroup relations.

Meta-perceptions.

Another aspect of intergroup relations that may be influenced by the nature of the relationship between groups, refers to meta-perceptions, which can be thought of as the ingroup's belief structures about the characteristics and attributes that the outgroup may hold regarding the ingroup (Vorauer, Main, & O'Connel, 1998). These beliefs can be activated due to evaluative concerns which rise during intergroup interactions and are differentiated, depending on the outgroup that is involved in the relevant context (Bizman & Yinon, 2003; Vorauer, Hunter, Main, & Roy, 2000).

At the individual level, instances in which an individual is afraid of someone else's evaluation, these evaluative concerns may have consequences for their behavior, due to self-presentational concerns. If I want another person to like me romantically, I will probably pay more attention to my outfit and general appearance when I have a date with the person than on an average day. If I have a job interview I will try to say the things I presume the interviewer would like to hear and that are socially desirable. If I meet a friend of a good friend, I will try to be sympathetic and friendly to that person, so he or she will also like me. These are a few of the many situations in which we are confronted with concerns about the way other people see us and think of us. Indeed, Sheldon and Johnson (1993) have found that the frequency with which one thinks about another person's perceptions of the self tends to be quite high.

Therefore, we may also anticipate several instances in which evaluative concerns may be relevant for intergroup interactions. Indirect evidence for this phenomenon was first brought up by Vorauer and colleagues (1998). These authors found that ingroup members hold meta-stereotypes about their own ingroup by demonstrating consensus across members of this group as to how they think their group is perceived by a lower status outgroup. Furthermore, they also showed that students' meta-perceptions regarding another student's possible impression of them, was affected by the latter student's ethnicity, along traits that are relevant to the meta-stereotype (Vorauer et al., 1998).

In another series of studies, Vorauer and colleagues (2000) found direct support for the idea that dominant (high status) group members easily frame ambiguous intergroup situations in terms of how they expect to be evaluated by a dominated (low status) outgroup. These findings further suggest that ingroup

members tend to develop quite sophisticated knowledge structures regarding the way they perceive to be evaluated by others and that these structures emerge naturally during intergroup interactions involving evaluation by an outgroup member. It was also stated that ingroup members who are concerned about their evaluation by outgroup members readily frame the interaction in evaluative terms and behave to diminish the likelihood of receiving negative appraisals from the outgroup (Vorauer et al., 2000).

In a study assessing a subordinate (lower status) group's meta-stereotypes, Klein and Azzi (2001) also found that this group may strategically use meta-stereotypes to look for acceptance from a dominant group. In this line, the threat of negative meta-stereotypes may result from the fear of not being accepted by the high status group and lose access to the resources controlled by it (Klein & Azzi, 2001).

These results may lead us to assume that, indeed, meta-perceptions can be powerful cues to understand intergroup interactions and will present consequences for intergroup relations.

Oldenhuis (2007) proposes that meta-stereotypes (beliefs regarding specific stereotypes an outgroup may hold about the ingroup) and meta-perceptions (beliefs, which need not to be stereotypical, regarding how individuals are viewed by others) may affect people differently, depending on the outgroup which holds the specific meta-stereotypes and meta-perceptions.

We hypothesize that meta-perceptions are negatively associated with negative group-based emotions. Given that meta-perceptions tend to be reciprocal (i.e. the more ingroup members like an outgroup, the more they expect outgroup members to like the ingroup, Oldenhuis, 2007), we propose that, when individuals perceive the outgroup to have a positive view of the ingroup, the experience of group-based emotions will be lessened.

Because these positive meta-perceptions should rely on the positive characteristics of the ingroup, they would thus signal that the ingroup has a good moral stand point in its interdependence with the outgroup. And if this is the case, why would the ingroup feel negative group-based emotions due to their past negative actions?

The mechanism by which we propose that meta-perceptions are negatively related to the experience of group-based guilt, anger or compunction is, thus, one by

which ingroup members do not have to "carry the cross on their shoulders" anymore for their past misdeeds. If they believe the outgroup likes them, then it means a peaceful and balanced relationship between both groups has been achieved. Therefore, the ingroup should not feel bad anymore about what happened in the past. In other words, a "past is past" strategy can be seen as a defensive intergroup interpretation of the events, and of the nature of the intergroup relations between the (formerly) victimized outgroup and the (formerly) perpetrator ingroup.

Given this rationale, we thus propose that positive meta-perceptions will affect negatively the experience of negative group-based emotions.

Perceptions of past compensation.

Within what Barkan (2000) calls a new world morality, the recognition of a group's guilt has provoked may instances in which perpetrator groups have apologized or compensated a victimized outgroup. In regards to compensation, several attempts to minimize the structural differences between historical victimized and perpetrator groups have been made, especially in the context of the Second World War and the Holocaust. But when is compensation enough? When should ingroup members stop compensating and making amendments for past misdeeds?

We argue that an important antecedent of negative group-based emotions refers to the perceptions of compensation as already being enough or having been done in the past. Independently of whether or not compensation has indeed occurred, we propose that ingroup members' perceptions of this compensation are a significant determinant of group-based emotions. In fact, in the contexts used for our analysis of group-based emotions, none of the perpetrator groups (Portugal and the Netherlands) has ever apologized or directly compensated for the colonial conflicts and overall negative consequences of colonization.

But these facts may not be so important when we analyze the intergroup relations from the ingroup's perspective. What might be most relevant for the ingroup members' experience of group-based emotions is their perceptions of past compensation. We argue that these perceptions may be blurred by the fact that, most likely, Portugal and the Netherlands have contributed significantly to their former colonies, by means of diplomatic relations and developmental funds. Indeed, for many European countries, postcolonial relations were marked by some financial and

diplomatic investments in the relations between colonizer and colonized countries. Hence, to the degree that ingroup members feel their national representatives have contributed to the former colonies, they may perceive that compensation has been done and thus, no more efforts of compensating the outgroup need to be implemented.

In turn, these perceptions of past compensation as being enough, would lead individuals to feel less negative group-based emotions, because the ingroup has already amended for its past misdeeds. For example, in a study by Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe and Brehm (2008), in which they manipulated the difficulty of making reparations for gender inequality, it was shown that the level of difficulty of addressing the misdeeds affected the experience of group-based guilt. They argue that the motivational nature of group-based guilt is precisely what leads to a decrease in its experience, due to the difficulty of making reparations: if I cannot repair the harm done, then guilt will be of little use and I should not feel it. On the contrary, when I perceive reparation as possible and desirable, then the experience of group-based guilt will be higher because it motivates me to repair and improve the damaged relation.

We propose that, if individuals perceive that compensation has been done by their ingroup, they will not need to feel negative group-based emotions for their past misdeeds. The intergroup relation was repaired and restored. Therefore, there is no more need of to feel bad for the historical negative past.

We further argue that these perceptions of compensation are relational in nature, because they focus on efforts of the ingroup to restore its good relations with the outgroup and hence, signal a concern for the intergroup relation.

Perceptions of the past.

Another important determinant of group-based emotions may be related to individuals' perceptions about the nature of the intergroup past relations. When intergroup relations are perceived to be balanced and fair, intergroup relations are also perceived as equalitarian and thus, little negative group-based emotions should be felt by the ingroup and the outgroup. However, when individuals believe this relationship is unequal and unfair, negative group-based emotions may rise.

Furthermore, distinct interpretations of the historical past may also exist at the same time.

As previously shown, for example, high identifiers tend to be defensive and reject negative group-based emotions when they are confronted with their ingroup's role in past conflicts (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas et al., 2004, 2006). Also, when the ingroup can escape its responsibility and justify its past actions by comparing these actions with other group's misdeeds, the experience of negative group-based emotions will be diminished (Marques et al., 1997).

In a different vein, Rensmann's (2004) empirical review has shown that there are intergenerational effects on the experience of group-based emotions. He refers the work of Brendler (1994, as cited in Rensmann, 2004) and his typology of German individuals, regarding their reactions to the Holocaust. In his analysis of "third generation" of Western Germans, born after 1970, he found four distinct categories of individuals regarding their processing of their national identity in association with the Holocaust. The first represents typical reactions as the ones from the perpetrator generation: these individuals downplay negative information about the Nazi regime, feel subjected to a persecution due to their German identity, do not display guilt or empathy towards the victims, and show signs of authoritarianism.

The second cluster of individuals is relatively similar to the first one: individuals use defensive mechanisms to maintain a positive social identity, do not seem to take the perspective of the victims, and, although they acknowledge guilt at the surface, this is not related to manifest guilt feelings.

A third cluster is represented by "ambivalent" individuals, who show some guilt for the Holocaust but do not report anger towards the perpetrators. They downplay the role of German individuals involved and suggest that the Nazi atrocities could have not been avoided. Finally, a cluster which was labeled "non-nationalist" is composed of individuals who have internalized the perspective of the victims and feel guilt for their ingroup's misdeeds.

Licata and Klein (2010) also found support for this generational effect on the experience of emotions regarding an ingroup's negative past. In the context of the Congolese colonization by Belgium, they found that young adults feel higher levels of group-based guilt and are more supportive of compensation efforts than older adults. They interpret these differences in terms of the different ideological

backgrounds in which these generations were socialized, due to their differential representations of the collective memories of colonialism and ingroup identification. This generational effect happened beyond the degree of ingroup identification different individuals may report (Licata & Klein, 2010).

Also in the context of Holocaust reminders, Doosje and Branscombe (2003) found that attributing the negative actions of the Germans internally (due to intrinsic characteristics of the German group) was stronger from the victimized group's perspective than from the perpetrator group's perspective (these made more external attributions for the Germans behavior). The same pattern of results was also obtained when analyzing the occupation of Indonesia by the Netherlands, given that internal attributions were most common for another group's misdeeds than for the ingroup (Doosje & Branscombe, 2003).

Furthermore, Lastrego and Licata (2010) found that, also in regards to the Congolese colonization by Belgium, individuals' level of racism and support for reparation policies was mediated by representations of the ingroup's historical past. The degree to which individuals believed (or not) that the past colonization had been negative, influenced their desire to compensate the outgroup (Lastrego & Licata, 2010).

Cabecinhas and Feijó (2010) also found, in the Portuguese context of colonization, that Portuguese participants who hold positive perceptions of the colonization period in the light of the glorified "voyages of discovery" tend to feel less negative emotions about this period. They attribute these results to the *luso-tropicalist* pervasive discourse still held by younger generations. However, when rating the colonial war, these same individuals perceive it as the most negative event in the history of Portugal and feel frustration, shame and digust regarding this negative past (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010).

We propose exactly the same rationale: when individuals perceive the colonization past to be negative (i.e. violent), they will report higher negative group-based emotions. However, when they do not perceive this past as being violent, little negative emotions should be expected.

3.5. Consequences of Group-based Guilt, Compunction and Anger

One of the most important reasons for studying emotional processes within intergroup relations, pertains to the theorized consequences of such emotional experiences.

As Baumeister and colleagues (1994) argue, one important aspect of expressing guilt at the individual level, relates to the fact that guilt signals that a significant relationship has been damaged and needs to be repaired. This focus on the positive consequences of individual negative emotions alerts us to the potential positive consequences of negative group-based emotions at the intergroup level of analysis. Therefore, the present section aims to cover the hypothesized consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger in our empirical analysis.

3.5.1. Restitution as a potential consequence of group-based emotions.

Over the past years, many government representatives across the world have pronounced themselves regarding the negative actions of their national group and have apologized for the mistreatment of their ingroups towards other groups[4]. From Australia to France, from Germany to the United States, and beyond, there have numerous appeals to intergroup reconciliation, through the acknowledgment of an ingroup's misdeeds and respective apology towards others.

Negative group-based emotions derive from the perceived responsibility an ingroup has for immoral acts committed against other groups. These aversive feelings, in turn, lead individuals to look for strategies to diminish the negative emotional states, by means of avoidance or compensation (Iyer, Leach, & Pedersen, 2004). However, given that avoidance can be conceived as a negative consequence for intergroup relations, because it prevents ingroup and outgroup members to achieve a more equalitarian and balanced relationship, we should focus our analysis in potential positive consequences of group-based emotions.

---

[4] Interestingly, we can also consider a different point of view, by which it is defended that restitution and compensation for past conflicts should not occur. Indeed, history is covered with instances of violence and conflicts and some people may argue that, if we are to compensate for some of these events, we should then compensate for all negative actions committed by groups against other groups. Therefore, being that "history is history" and war was, is and will always be part of it, these negative instances should be left alone and compensation should not be done. Although this might be a valid argument, we argue that studying group-based emotions and their potential positive consequences for intergroup relations, such as restitution, should be considered and analyzed.

In this line, research conducted on group-based guilt has shown that this emotional experience has pro-social consequences. This emotion thus has an important role in the creation of better social conditions for ingroup and outgroup members after a past marked by violence and conflict. An examination of the negative past, its emotional processing and its associated consequences can also be considered as a key issue to avoid the repetition of these same historical misdeeds (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).

Barkan (2000, 2004) describes different forms of restitution, which groups may use to repair their negative misdeeds against other groups, as a way of resolving existent inequities. He thus refer to restitution as "the entire spectrum of attempts to rectify historical injustices" (Barkan, 2000, p. XIX) and distinguishes different types of restitution. Restitution, in a more restrict term, refers to the restoration of specific and actual belongings stolen (through confiscation or seize) to their rightful owners, be it land, material goods, art or ancestral remains.

Apology refers to a recognition of the wrongdoing and admission of responsibility for it and, although it does not imply the return of specific material items or resources, it reflects and acknowledgment of the ingroup's misdeeds. Apologies can therefore enhance a positive social identity between the ingroup and the outgroup and contribute to better intergroup relations (Lastrego & Licata, 2010). Finally, reparations constitute a form of material reimbursement for goods that cannot be restituted, such as human lives, culture, economy or even identities (Barkan, 2000). Within this last type of restitution - reparation - we include compensation efforts, aimed at redressing an outgroup's role as victims of past misdeeds and restitution for the negative misdeeds.

Besides the potential consequences for restitution and, more specifically, compensation, we argue that negative group-based emotions may also be related to other pro-social actions aimed at changing the victimized outgroup's situation, beyond efforts of restitution.

As previously mentioned, negative group-based emotions regarding an ingroup's negative misdeeds, may lead individuals to make amendments but also to promote adherence to social change strategies aimed at improving the outgroup's situation, be it through affirmative action programs or other direct courses of actions,

such as demonstrating and lobbying (Gordijn et al., 2006; Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006).

Compensatory behavioral intentions.

One of the most empirically researched consequences of group-based emotions is compensatory behavioral intentions (Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje et al., 2004; Doosje et al., 2006; Iyer et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2004; Mallett & Swim, 2004; amongst others). These compensatory intentions refer to an ingroup's willingness to repair their negative misdeeds through abstract efforts of compensation of the victimized outgroup.

Items such as "I think the Portuguese/Dutch owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese/Dutch have done" or "I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese/Dutch have done" tap into these abstract compensation intentions and represent a general willingness of individuals to repair the harm committed (Figueiredo et al., 2010).

For example, Swim and Miller (1999) found that White guilt mediated the relationship between acknowledgment of ingroup privilege and attitudes towards affirmative action. In other studies, compensation was also assessed and usually group-based guilt and anger have been associated with compensatory behavioral intentions (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2003).

Depending on the costs of compensation or reparation efforts, individuals may consequently feel more or less negative group-based emotions (Schmitt et al., 2008), but when we propose general abstract intentions of compensation, we expect group-based emotions to predict positively these behavioral intentions. Indeed, Doosje and colleagues (2004) found that different forms of reparation may have distinct consequences for perpetrators and victims. Perpetrator groups can feel good about compensation, because these improve their moral standing *vis a vis* the victimized outgroup, and they lead to closure of the negative intergroup event, creating better intergroup relations. However, when we refer to financial compensation, both the perpetrator and the victimized groups may also perceive this action as "blood money", for which the ingroup is buying a way off the negative intergroup situation. Regarding the victimized group, compensation may have

positive consequences, because it acknowledges their past mistreatment, allows them for the construction of a more positive social identity and also enhances the intergroup relations.

So, we think it is very important to take into consideration the kinds of compensation proposed within intergroup relations and their prospective negative or positive consequences.

Group-based emotions lead to behavioral reactions aimed at alleviating the negative intergroup relation or at avoiding this same relation. When confronted with past events for which the group cannot escape responsibility, compensatory behavioral intentions may rise as a way to signal the ingroup's intentions of rebuilding positive intergroup relations. However, compensatory behavioral intentions may also just reflect a socially desirable aspect of intergroup relations. Since these do not reflect actual means by which to alleviate the victimized outgroup's situation, and hence they do not implicate any real costs for the ingroup, these may be strongly endorsed by the ingroup. However, it is not clear if they are indeed associated with actual behaviors on the ingroup's side.

Compensatory behavioral intentions can be considered as passive means of compensation, given their abstract conceptualizing and the fact that they do not implicate an individual's actual behavior towards the outgroup. For example, Gordijn and colleagues (2006) found that appraisals of unfairness were not significant predictors of condemnation of a discriminatory proposal towards outgroup members. In fact, these appraisals did determine support of the outgroup but they did not predict real action against the proposal. Anger was the most significant determinant of this concrete action. As the authors refer "It is easy to say that you will show support for something. (…) But if you really want to take action against something that you do not want to happen, you have to be very angry" (Gordijn et al., 2006, p. 27).

This distinction between behavioral intentions and actual behavior is also relevant when we consider the phenomenology of the different emotional experiences under study. Hence, we propose that while group-based guilt and compunction are good predictors of abstract compensatory behavioral intentions, group-based anger may be a stronger predictor of more pro-active instances of behavior aimed at improving the intergroup relations in the present day.

Historical conflicts: the role of perceptions of time in compensation.

Above, we have mentioned an aspect of the intergroup context which may influence a perpetrator ingroup's willingness to feel negative group-based emotions and, in turn, their desire to compensate the outgroup – perceptions of past compensation. However, we do not believe this may be the only aspect of the intergroup context which may influence the desire to compensate (or not) the outgroup.

In our work, we propose that the subjective time past between the negative intergroup events and the present day will affect the extent to which the ingroup is willing to compensate the outgroup. But while perceptions of past compensation are conceptualized as influencing compensatory intentions via their effect on group-based emotions, we suggest that perceptions of time will influence compensation intentions directly.

The Portuguese colonial war ended 38 years ago and the Indonesian war of independence culminated 63 year ago. This chronological time difference may be important for the way the historical past is remembered and felt but, most importantly, it will be individuals' perceptions of the subjective time between the past and nowadays that will affect the desire to compensate the outgroup. For example, Peetz, Gunn and Wilson (2010) found evidence that, when German individuals were induced to perceive the Holocaust as closer in time, they tended to report more group-based guilt and a higher willingness to compensate the victims.

However, we conceptualize subjective time as being an independent antecedent of the desire to compensate the outgroup, regardless of the emotions felt. While appraisals of responsibility and illegitimacy have shown to be associated with outgroup compensation, via their relations with negative group-based emotions, perceptions of time may independently, directly and significantly predict this willingness to compensate.

It has been shown that national identities and collective memories may be influenced by the passage of time and the reconstruction of events throughout the group's history and socialization (Licata & Klein, 2010; Rensmann, 2004). In this line, Iguarta and Paez (1997) have also argued that there is a need for some psychological distancing when remembering collective traumatic events. Also

Barkan (2000) suggests that a generation must pass until individuals within a group are able to deal with their past misdeeds.

We can thus assume that perceptions of time may influence the degree to which individuals are determined to compensate an outgroup. If too much time has passed, why would the ingroup compensate? Once again, "past is past" could represent a defensive strategy by which individuals can deny their role in historical atrocities and refuse to compensate for these same events. But when, subjectively, the historical past is still close in mind to the present day, then something should be done to repair the historical injustices.

One reason why we propose this association between perceptions of time and compensatory behavioral intentions relates to the fact that when the events are perceived to still be close in time, the ingroup's image is still tainted by this historical negative past. Therefore, the ingroup must do something to restore its moral standing. Then, what better way to do this then to show an aspiration for restoring the intergroup positive relation and amend for the negative misdeeds?

By doing so, ingroup members can once again derive a positive group-image and feel morally valued in the intergroup arena. Therefore, in our analysis, we propose that perceptions of time may be a potent and significant predictor of compensatory intentions, above and beyond the emotional experiences usually associated with compensation.

3.5.2. Collective change as a potential consequence of group-based emotions.

So far, we have discussed restitution efforts aimed at reestablishing a positive intergroup relation between perpetrator and victimized groups, after a shared past marked by negative events. We believe restitution is an important consequence of group-based emotions, and this is why we stress the relevance of studying such negative emotional experiences. Nonetheless, we also propose that these emotions influence other behavioral intentions, which are not directly aimed at restitution efforts.

As it was previously shown in this Chapter, group-based emotions have been associated with action intentions and actual behavior aimed at changing a disadvantaged outgroup's situation, above and beyond intentions strictly related to

efforts of compensation for the ingroup's negative misdeeds. The literature on relative deprivation and social change is a good example of research in which instances of intergroup disadvantage may lead to the desire of changing the social system and fight for a more equalitarian intergroup context, independently of an ingroup's involvement in the unfair intergroup relations (Smith & Kessler, 2004).

Given that our focus of analysis relies on past events about which ingroup members cannot escape their responsibility for causing harm to another group, we do not intend to review the aforementioned literature here. Nevertheless, we do want to stress that group-based emotions may not only provoke the desire to compensate the outgroup, but that they may also influence the extent to which an ingroup is willing to take action to reduce the injustices and inequalities existent at the intergroup level, especially when they are confronted with an outgroup which they have mistreated in the past.

Therefore, we will examine a potential consequence of group-based guilt and anger which focuses on the ingroup's willingness to address its role in historical atrocities and redress its moral positioning *vis a vis* the outgroup and other groups: subjective importance of discussing the negative past.

Subjective importance of discussing the past.

In many instances of intergroup conflict, perpetrator groups may try to deny their responsibility as instigators and executors of negative actions (Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Marques et al., 1997; Rensmann, 2004; Roccas et al., 2004). However, in other cases, the ingroup may be willing to acknowledge its role in historical conflicts and redress this past through the use of different mechanisms aimed at changing the intergroup situation.

While most research has shown the consequences of negative group-based emotions in terms of restitution and compensation efforts, a smaller body of research has also proven that these emotions influence other intergroup strategies and behaviors aimed at eliminating structural disadvantages between groups (Iyer et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2007; Smith & Kessler, 2004; amongst others). Iyer and colleagues (2007) found that, in the context of the war of Iraq, when American and British group members are confronted with their illegitimate involvement in this conflict, different group-based emotions predict different strategies aimed at changing the

current state of affairs. While group-based shame predicted intentions of withdrawal from Iraq, group-based guilt did not predict any political action intentions. Furthermore, group-based anger was a strong predictor of compensation towards the outgroup, confrontation of the responsible entities of the conflict and withdrawal from Iraq (Iyer et al., 2007).

These differentiated consequences of group-based emotions are, precisely, what turns them into such an important aspect of intergroup relations and this is why efforts at distinguishing between their different consequences should be fostered and developed. While some research has shown that group-based guilt predicts action intentions not directly related to compensation efforts (Figueiredo et al., 2010; Mallet & Swim, 2004), other research has proven that this emotion, in comparison to others, may not be so relevant in the prediction of efforts aimed at social change and political action (Figueiredo et al., 2012a; Iyer et al., 2003, 2007).

Therefore, we propose that, when we analyze distinct group-based emotions at the same time, most likely we will find different results in comparison to situations in which we only analyze one group-based emotion. The potential of integrating distinct but interrelated emotions into the net of possible emotional reactions an ingroup may have when confronted with its negative misdeeds, may thus shed light into their distinctive characteristics and consequences.

Drawing from this literature, we propose that ingroup members may desire to acknowledge their group's involvement in historical atrocities by discussing and reflecting upon this negative past, through the public discussion of such issues and the inclusion of the same in the school curriculum.

A way of acknowledging this negative past may, thus, be achieved through the public discussion and analysis of the history of the ingroup and its negative past actions. Furthermore, through the inclusion, in the school curriculum, of such instances of intergroup conflict for which the ingroup is to blame, new processes of socialization which acknowledge the negative past of the ingroup may also emerge. Therefore, the subjective importance attached to such strategies of addressing the ingroup's negative past may be influenced by the group-based emotions anteceding them.

The ingroup's willingness to put itself in the spotlight and have its negative actions being discussed, assessed and evaluated by its members and other groups

may, therefore, be considered a strategy of social change by which the creation of new narratives, collective memories and identities is possible, for both the perpetrator and the victimized groups. This strategy would not only benefit the ingroup by reaffirming its morality but would also benefit the outgroup by allowing their victimized past to be recognized, talked about and reflected upon, and, furthermore, by allowing this outgroup to construct a more positive social identity.

Therefore, we expect that, when individuals feel more group-based guilt or anger, they will perceive these strategies of addressing the negative past as more relevant and needed for the creation of better intergroup relations.

3.5.3. Forgiveness.

Another important aspect of intergroup relations after a violent conflict relates to the role of forgiveness in allowing for the formation and establishment of better intergroup relations, based on equalitarian standards and norms.

As the remarkable title of a book by Desmond Tutu (1999) noticeably states there is "no future without forgiveness". Indeed, group members cannot achieve positive relations with each other if they cannot forgive their enemies or opposite parts in a conflict. And there may be many ways in which intergroup forgiveness can be accomplished. In the case of South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions allowed for a reunited reconstruction of a country torn apart by racism and discrimination. Other instances of mass murder, genocide and intractable conflict only reached a more positive ending, on the victimized group's side, after the responsible individuals for such atrocities were condemned in the International Court for Human Rights, and so forth.

In social psychology, traditionally, forgiveness has been analyzed from the victimized groups' perspectives. Numerous studies have shown that intergroup relations can improve after forgiveness has occurred, and after the victimized groups moved on into creating and defining a social identity beyond their victimized position (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Niens, & Noor, 2004; Manzi & González, 2007; Scobie & Scobie, 1998; Tam et al., 2007; Tam et al., 2008; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005).

For example, Wohl and Branscombe (2005) found that introducing a more inclusive level of categorization amongst group members leads to greater forgiveness

of a historical perpetrator group and also decreases the assignment of group-based guilt for the negative actions.

In the context of Northern Ireland's conflictual religious relations, intergroup forgiveness decreased when there were higher levels of group-based anger and dehumanization of the opponent group (Tam et al., 2007). Also, in the context of political reconciliation in Chile, it was found that group-based anger predicted negatively the desire to forgive the other political group (Manzi & González, 2007). Therefore, we may conclude that the extent to which the victimized group feels negative group-based emotions towards the perpetrator group, will influence negatively their desire to forgive this group.

But what happens when we ask members of a perpetrator group whether they think if they should be forgiven for their past misdeeds? How do ingroup-focused emotions influence the perpetrator's desire to be forgiven by the victims of their negative actions?

In our work we tried to answer these questions by analyzing the role of negative group-based emotions in the desire to be forgiven by the victimized outgroup. Therefore, our perspective towards the analysis of forgiveness is somewhat distinct from the traditional lines of research: we do not focus on the victimized group's desire to forgive (or not) a perpetrator group but we rather analyze the dynamics of forgiveness from the perpetrator's point of view.

We further propose that the degree to which ingroup's members endorse beliefs about the need to be forgiven by the victimized outgroup will be influenced by the negative group-based emotions they express due to their ingroup's negative historical moral transgressions. More specifically, we expect negative group-based emotions to be negatively associated with the desire to be forgiven by the victimized outgroup. If individuals feel bad about their negative actions, they usually tend to redeem themselves by repairing the harm inflicted to a relevant other. Only after they feel this harm has, indeed, been amended for, can the other relevant one forgive the individual.

The same kind of rationale is thus proposed at the intergroup level. When ingroup members still report high levels of negative group-based emotions, they may perceive their past misdeeds have not yet been addressed and resolved. Therefore, these negative emotional experiences will incite them to compensate and redeem

their actions, by means of different strategies. On the other side, these emotional experiences will lead ingroup members to feel they cannot be forgiven yet.

Our proposition is that the group-based emotions we analyze in our work will predict low levels of forgiveness assignment for the ingroup, because of the need to resolve these emotional experiences by attuning to their negative misdeeds.

3.6. Synthesis

In the present Chapter we have presented the theoretical basis which sets the background for the empirical studies presented in the following Chapters of this dissertation. Given the diversity and quantity of concepts, theories and research here described, we believe it may be useful to present a general and systematic overview of our main assumptions and hypotheses.

Firstly, we propose that when individuals are confronted with the past negative misdeeds of their ingroup towards other groups, they may experience group-based guilt, compunction and anger. These emotions are ingroup-focused and may influence present day intergroup relations between the historical perpetrator ingroups and the victimized outgroups.

Secondly, the intensity of such group-based emotions will in turn be determined by several antecedents of such emotional experiences. We divide these antecedents into two different categories: 1) ingroup-focused antecedents of group-based emotions; and 2) outgroup-focused and relational antecedents of group-based emotions. Within the first category, we propose that ingroup identification is a distal antecedent of the negative group-based emotions under analysis. Furthermore, we also introduce more proximal antecedents of group-based guilt, compunction and anger. We expect a more right-wing political orientation to be associated with lower levels of group-based emotions. In turn, exonerating cognitions, which are conceptualized as beliefs that exculpate the ingroup for the negative misdeeds, will be negatively associated with group-based guilt, compunction and anger. Finally, we expect collectivism to be positively associated with the experience of negative group-based emotions.

Regarding the second category of antecedents of group-based emotions (i.e., outgroup-focused and relational antecedents), we assess outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions, meta-perceptions, perceptions of past compensation and

perceptions of the past relations between the ingroup and the outgroup and we analyze their potential associations with group-based guilt, compunction and anger.

While we expect outgroup identification and outgroup perceptions to be positively associated with group-based emotions, meta-perceptions are assumed to be negatively related to such emotional experiences. Furthermore, if ingroup members perceive past compensation as being enough, then they may experience lower levels of negative group-based emotions, because they may think that the ingroup has already corrected for its negative past actions. Finally, when the members of the ingroup perceive the past as being violent, their experience of group-based emotions may be accentuated.

Importantly, we also analyze the potential positive consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger for the present day relations between groups involved in the colonial conflicts under analysis. In this line, we expect that the negative group-based emotions under study will be positively associated with the desire to compensate the outgroup. Along this line, we further propose that compensatory behavioral intentions will also be affected by perceptions of how much time has passed between the historical colonial conflicts and the present day. We further assume that higher levels of negative group-based emotions will be associated with a higher subjective importance of discussing the past and the negative actions committed by the ingroup against other groups. Finally, we assess the degree to which group-based emotions may relate to the desire of the ingroup to be forgiven by the outgroup for its past negative misdeeds.

In the following Chapters, empirical evidence for our main assumptions and hypotheses is thus presented.

Part II. Empirical Studies

Chapter 4. A Shared Past and a Common Future: The Portuguese Colonial war and the Dynamics of Group-based Guilt[5]

_____

Abstract

In the present study we examine feelings of group-based guilt among Portuguese participants in relation to the Portuguese colonial war, and its consequences for social behavior. Specifically, we focus on the way Portuguese university students identify with their national group and the outgroup and their feelings of group-based guilt regarding their ingroup's past misdeeds during the colonial period. The consequences of group-based guilt are also analyzed. 130 Portuguese university students answered a questionnaire and results show that students feel low levels of group-based guilt in relation to this period. Our results show that ingroup glorification is positively related to the use of exonerating cognitions to justify the ingroup's behavior, presumably to avoid responsibility for the harm committed by the ingroup. Outgroup identification correlates with compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the negative past. As expected, feelings of group-based guilt show a significant correlation with compensatory behavioral intentions. Links between political orientation, ingroup attachment and glorification, exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt are analyzed and their implications for intergroup relations are discussed.

Key-words: Group-based guilt; modes of national identification; subjective importance of discussing the past; outgroup identification; compensation

---

[5] This Chapter is based on an article by Figueiredo et al. (2011).

As many other nations with a past of colonization and domination throughout the world, Portugal has recently been confronted with a need to readdress the positive way in which this period of Portuguese history is portrayed, in way to deal with the more negative consequences of the colonization period.

Especially considering the Portuguese colonial war, which lasted, in total, 13 years (1961 to 1974) in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, there is much still to discuss about the moral standing of Portugal in relation to its former colonies.

In the present study we attempt to begin unveiling the ways in which Portuguese people identify with their ingroup and the victimized outgroup (i.e. former colonies) and experience group-based guilt in relation to this period. Therefore, we focus on the role of ingroup identification, as well as identification with the victimized outgroup and their relationship with feelings of group-based guilt and its social consequences.

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) assumes that people's self-image consists of an individual (personal self) and a group level (social self) and, therefore, a part of people's self-image is based on their membership to different social groups. This connection with social groups (in this case, a national group) can generate emotional-affective reactions resulting from the ingroup's behavior (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). In this line, feelings of group-based guilt might occur (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer et al., 2003), particularly when people perceive the behavior of their ingroup to be unjust or immoral (Branscombe et al., 2004; Doosje et al., 1998) and the categorization of the self according to that group membership cannot be denied (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004).

In this line, Branscombe and colleagues (2003) argue that there are two conditions for individuals to feel group-based guilt. One of these is that individuals can only feel group-based guilt if they recognize their belonging to a group (even if their identification is not strong) and the second condition is that individuals must hold the ingroup accountable for a humanitarian violation. These feelings will be stronger, the more advantages there are in the present for the dominant group (McGarty & Bliuc, 2004).

Even individuals who did not play an active role in the harm perpetrated by the ingroup can feel group-based guilt, simply by their association with that group

(Branscombe, 2004). Feelings of group-based guilt can thus emerge and reflect a conscious social affiliation, marked by a negative history (Rensmann, 2004).

Intergroup emotions theory (Smith, 1993) also provides insightful ideas about the way members of an ingroup perceive members of an outgroup, showing that people can experience emotions based on their identity as group members and their ingroup's relation with outgroups. By studying these emotions, it is possible to understand the way people perceive and interact with each other, as well as their perceptions about events that implicate the ingroup and an outgroup (Mackie et al., 2004). In this line, when analysing the dynamics among groups who share a historical past marked by negative events, it is possible that individuals feel group-based guilt, while showing a desire to compensate the victims or apologize for the harm committed (Branscombe et al., 2003; Doosje et al., 1998; Mallett & Swim, 2004).

Roccas, and colleagues (2006) propose a multidimensional model of ingroup identification and they describe two modes of identification, namely attachment to the ingroup (i.e. the cognitive and affective involvement with the group) and ingroup glorification (i.e. the level to which people consider their ingroup to be superior compared to other groups and the level of idealization they present when referring to the group). These two different modes of identification were proposed as a possible solution by Roccas and her collaborators for the paradoxical findings regarding ingroup identification occurring in some studies (Branscombe et al., 2004; Doosje et al., 1998).

According to Roccas and colleagues (2006), a high level of attachment to the ingroup will increase the levels of group-based guilt felt by the individual, as they feel more implicated in the past of the ingroup. On the contrary, a high level of glorification of the ingroup would be associated with the use of more exonerating cognitions to explain the ingroup's negative behavior. For example, when people glorify their ingroup's past, they are less likely to accept negative information about their group's behavior (Doosje et al., 2004). Glorification can also make people adhere more to external attributions that might explain the negative actions perpetrated by the ingroup (Lickel et al., 2004). These tendencies, in turn, lead to less group-based guilt for the ingroup's past behavior.

In the present study we conceptualize ingroup favoring biases as exonerating cognitions, which are beliefs that can help the individual to exculpate or absolve the ingroup for the harm committed, by minimizing the negative actions or by blaming the victims. Through the use of these exonerating cognitions, individuals try to maintain a positive view of the ingroup (Roccas et al., 2004).

In this line, when the ingroup cannot escape its responsibility for the perpetrated act against an outgroup, the experience of group-based guilt will be higher. Still, when the responsibility for the acts can be diffuse, group-based guilt might not be felt. In a study conducted in Portugal (Marques et al., 1997), the fact that many European nations acted in wrong terms against their colonies, allowed Portuguese people to feel low levels of guilt. Also, in the studies of Valentim (2003) about the perceptions of Portuguese and Africans, Portuguese participants do not support the idea that the Portuguese colonial past was a history of violence and barbarism. This diffusion of responsibility among groups allows the members of these groups to perceive their ingroup as less responsible for the harm committed.

In this study, we consider the two modes of identification (attachment and glorification) with the ingroup, and their possible implications on feelings of group-based guilt, as well as the way exonerating cognitions can affect the relations between these variables.

In a study conducted by Doosje and colleagues (1998), national identification was also related to political orientation, such that a high level of identification was correlated to a right-wing political orientation (Doosje et al, 2004). Roccas and colleagues (2004) also found an association between political orientation, guilt and exonerating cognitions. Thus, individuals with a left-wing political orientation felt more group-based guilt and used less exonerating cognitions, when confronted with harmful actions committed by their ingroup. In the present study we also expect to find the same relations between political orientation and group-based guilt.

We argue that another means by which an individual can feel group-based guilt is by perceiving a common bond with those harmed (i.e. identification with the outgroup). Previous research has shown that presenting individuals with a more inclusive common ingroup leads them to feel more group-based guilt, because the former outgroup has been included in the same ingroup as the individual and, therefore, the proximity between the perpetrator and the victim is stronger (Wohl,

Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Therefore, it is possible to argue that, if the individual feels a bond with the victimized outgroup, feelings of group-based guilt will be higher. In this line, a sense of identification with the outgroup can lead to a greater willingness of acknowledging the wrongdoings of the past and a bigger chance that individuals feel group-based guilt.

On the contrary, it is also possible that in the case of the Portuguese participants, *luso-tropicalism*[6], which refers to a social representation of the Portuguese nation emphasizing the unique relationships Portugal had with its colonies, may influence the experience of group-based guilt. The idea that the Portuguese dealt with people from different cultures in a special positive way and that they are not prejudiced may lead them to feel lower levels of collective guilt. Furthermore, these beliefs may make these individuals believe there were no negative consequences of the colonial period. Therefore, in the present study, we test these different predictions.

When analyzing group-based emotions elicited by specific events that connect the national group of an individual with an outgroup, it is important to address the implications that these emotions have on the perceptions of members of the outgroup and the action tendencies that can be elicited by specific group-based emotions on individuals who are members of the ingroup.

By signaling that the relation between individuals or groups was damaged, group-based guilt might serve an important social function in the creation of better social conditions, after a past of violence and intergroup conflict, thus presenting several implications for the present and future relations between groups. This idea was confirmed in different studies (Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2004), where it was concluded that feelings of group-based guilt predict the desire to make reparations due to the ingroup's negative behavior. This willingness comes from the desire that individuals have to reduce their feelings of guilt due to inequities and it has as a consequence behaviors such as apologies, compensation and redistribution of power in interpersonal relations or future acts that aim to avoid the same mistakes

---

[6] These ideas first came to light by the hand of Gilberto Freyre, a Brazilian anthropologist, and were then assimilated and adapted to the political discourse of the government at the time of the colonial war, whereby they tried to defend Portugal's unique right to have colonies spread around the world (for more details on the concept of *luso-tropicalism* see Vala et al., 2008 and Valentim, 2003).

(Mallett & Swim, 2004). For these reasons, it is believed that an examination of the past and the mistakes committed can be the key to avoid repeating the same mistakes (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004).

Barkan (2000, 2004) suggests that, whatever form of compensation is used to correct for past injustices, compensation does allow the construction of a mechanism that helps to deal with the pain and recognize the harm inflicted to the outgroup and the responsibility of the ingroup, making the ingroup able to reconstruct their group identity in a more positive way, thus creating better intergroup relations (Barkan, 2000, 2004). In other studies it has also been shown that institutional definitions of rights and law enforcement that try to prevent abuses (as well as their condemnation) were developed after extreme experiences of war (Spini, Elcheroth, & Fasel, 2008; Valentim & Doise, 2008). Therefore, we argue that the compensation of victims, whether done through apologies or public recognition of the past misdeeds, can be seen as an institutional way of recognizing the victims suffering and of improving intergroup relations. In the present study we will analyze the relations between group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions as a means to improve intergroup relations.

Another form of compensation can occur by means of a public discussion about the negative consequences of the actions perpetrated by the ingroup. By acknowledging the importance of discussing the wrongdoings of an ingroup, individuals are recognizing that there is a need to create better relations between the ingroup and the outgroup and are willing to address these negative actions. Though this is not a concrete way of eliminating the inequalities existent due to the intergroup relations in the past, it may help to restore psychological balance between the perpetrators and the victims, since the latter group can feel comprehended and listened to through these public discussions and have their identity as former victims acknowledged.

So far, and to our knowledge, only the studies by Valentim (2003) about the reciprocal perceptions of Portuguese and African individuals, the studies of Marques and colleagues (1997), which focus on the perceptions and emotions of Portuguese pupils about the colonial past have, and Cabecinhas and Feijó (2010), have focused on the perceptions and emotions about the Portuguese colonial past from a psychosocial perspective.

This study intends to open the path for understanding how the colonial past is perceived in Portuguese society by focusing on attachment and glorification modes of national identification and their relation to group-based guilt regarding this period of Portuguese history. Furthermore, we will also analyze the connections between outgroup identification and group-based guilt, since identifying with the outgroup, and thus its suffering, might increase feelings of group-based guilt and the desire to compensate the victims for the past misdeeds. The effects of group-based guilt as contributing to the compensation of the victimized outgroup as well as the subjective importance of discussing the past, which we conceptualize as another way of compensating the victims and improving intergroup relations through the acknowledgment of transgressions that occurred in the past will, also be considered.

Method

Participants.

One-hundred thirty six Portuguese University students participated in this study, on a voluntary basis. Six subjects were excluded from analysis due to not having Portuguese nationality. The remaining 130 participants comprised 95 women and 35 men (age $M = 21,45$; range 18-42).

Design and procedure.

The questionnaire used in the study was administered at the end of classes and during class breaks among students of Psychology, Archeology and Civil Engineering in three faculties of the University of Coimbra. In the beginning of the questionnaire it was explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Portuguese colonial period and war. Anonymity and confidentiality of the answers given by the participants was assured.

Measures.

Political orientation. Individuals political orientation was accessed using an item ranging from extreme-left (1) to extreme-right (7).

Ingroup identification. Participants were asked to indicate their level of national identification with the Portuguese, by means of a measure of sixteen items,

as used by Roccas and colleagues (2006). This measure makes a distinction between two different modes of identification, attachment to the ingroup (Cronbach's α = .88), which is constituted by 9 items, and ingroup's glorification (Cronbach's α =.74), which has 7 items. Sample items for attachment are "It is important to me that everyone will see me as Portuguese" and "I am strongly committed to my nation". Sample items for glorification of the ingroup are "In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation" and "In general, Portugal is better than other nations". The distinction between items measuring the two modes of identification was verified by means of an exploratory factor analysis with Varimax rotation, where the same solution used by Roccas and colleagues (2006) occurred, except for one item ("Other nations can learn a lot from us"), which was supposed to load on the ingroup's glorification factor, but loaded on the attachment to the ingroup factor.

Outgroup identification. Subsequently, there was a measure of identification with the outgroup comprised of one item ("I identify with Africans from the former Portuguese colonies"), which was adapted from Valentim (2003) and measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*).

Exonerating cognitions. A 5 item scale of exonerating cognitions (Cronbach's α = .73) ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) was included to examine the extent to which participants held exonerating beliefs that could absolve the national group for the colonial war. Sample items of exonerating cognitions are "The Portuguese were victims of the colonial war" and "The descriptions of the colonial war are too negative in relation to the role of the Portuguese".

Subjective importance of discussing the past. Participants were then asked about the perceived importance of giving increased attention in the media and in the school curriculum towards the positive and the negative aspects of the colonial war, using 2 positive items and 2 negative items ranging from 1 (*not important at all*) to 7 (*very important*). Examples are "How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the positive aspects of the colonial war in former Portuguese colonies in Africa?" and "How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the negative aspects of the colonial war in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa?". Drawing from these scales, we computed a new variable, subjective importance of discussing the past, by subtracting the mean of the positive

items from the mean of the negative items (Cronbach's α = .77). Therefore, a positive value represents a tendency to give more importance to the discussion and presentation of the positive aspects of the colonial war and a negative value represents a willingness to address the more negative aspects of the colonial war.

Group-based guilt. Feelings of group-based guilt were tapped using a 7 item measure, of which five items were derived from Branscombe and colleagues (2004) and the other two were made specifically for this study (Cronbach's α =.94). Sample items are "I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the people of the colonies that were brought about by the Portuguese" and "I feel guilty for the bad acts committed by the Portuguese during the colonial war".

Compensatory behavioral intentions. To capture compensatory behavioral intentions, 4 items derived from Doosje and colleagues (1998) were used (Cronbach's α =.86), with a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Two of these items address efforts of the Portuguese government to compensate the people of the former colonies (e.g. "I think the Portuguese government owes something to the people they colonized and fought against") and two of them were about individual compensatory behavior (e.g. "I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of the people from the former Portuguese colonies because of the negative things the Portuguese have done").

Results

Correlation coefficients were computed among the eight constructs. The results of the correlational analyses (see Table 1), show that 13 of the 28 correlations were statistically significant and were greater than or equal to .18.

Ingroup's glorification correlates strongly with attachment to the ingroup, $r(128) = .42$, $p < .01$. In addition, ingroup glorification correlates positively and significantly with political orientation, $r(128) = .32$, $p < .01$, a measure in which a higher value indicates a right-wing political orientation. Furthermore, ingroup glorification also correlates positively with exonerating cognitions, $r(128) = .46$, $p < .01$, and subjective importance of discussing the past, $r(128) = .38$, $p < .01$.

The measure of political orientation is positively and significantly related to the use of exonerating cognitions, $r(128) = .31$, $p < .01$, and subjective importance of

discussing the past, $r(128) = .25$, $p < .01$. The first variable is also negatively and significantly correlated with feelings of group-based guilt, $r(128) = -.18$, $p < .05$.

Table 1

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations Among the Constructs

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Political orientation	3.68	1.21	-						
2. Ingroup attachment	4.65	.81	.17	-					
3. Ingroup glorification	3.55	.76	.32**	.42**	-				
4. Outgroup identification	3.19	1.22	-.11	.04	-.12	-			
5. Exonerating cognitions	3.21	.88	.31**	-.09	.46**	-.19*	-		
6. Subjective importance of discussing the past	-.42	1.23	.25**	.07	.38**	-.01	.40**	-	
7. Group-based guilt	2.95	1.14	-.18*	.06	-.10	.09	-.12	-.27**	-
8. Compensatory behavioral intentions	3.73	1.03	-.03	-.02	-.06	.34**	-.01	-.22*	.31**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Exonerating cognitions correlate positively with subjective importance of discussing the past, $r(128) = .40$, $p < .01$.

Outgroup identification is negatively correlated with the use of exonerating cognitions, $r(128) = -.19$, $p < .05$, and positively correlated with compensatory behavioral intentions, $r(128) = .34$, $p < .01$.

Subjective importance of discussing the past correlates negatively and significantly with feelings of group-based guilt, $r(128) = -.27$, $p < .01$, and compensatory behavioral intentions $r(128) = -.22$, $p < .05$.

As expected, we also found a significant positive relationship between feelings of group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions, $r = .31$, $p < .01$.

Discussion

The significant correlation between both modes of ingroup identification (i.e. attachment and glorification) suggests that individuals have a congruent pattern of identification with the national group (Roccas et al., 2006), such that individuals who

are attached to the ingroup also glorify the ingroup, though there are individual differences in the level of endorsement of both ways of identifying with the group.

The endorsement of a high level of ingroup glorification among Portuguese participants is positively associated with the use of exonerating cognitions and positively associated with subjective importance of discussing the past.

These results are consistent with the ones found by Roccas and colleagues (2004) and advance our knowledge about the willingness that individuals have to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial war. Therefore, we argue that individuals who glorify and defend the ingroup through the use of exonerating cognitions are not so open to negative information about their ingroups' history and, therefore, do not want to discuss these negative aspects of the past. This result may be due to *luso-tropicalism*, since individuals who endorse this representation of Portuguese society believe that the Portuguese colonial period was not so violent when compared to other countries and, therefore, individuals do not recognize the need to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial past and war.

The pattern of correlations found in this study is also consistent with the one found by Roccas and colleagues (2004) in relation to the links between political orientation, exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt. It can be argued that a right-wing political orientation is associated with more defensive reactions to the ingroups' past history. Individuals who glorify the ingroup and have a right-wing political orientation also perceive a lower need to discuss the negative aspects of the past, thus diminishing or under-valuing the negative aspects of the colonial war. These results suggest that a more right-wing political orientation prevents individuals from feeling group-based guilt, making them feel less responsible for the ingroup's past actions, results that support previous findings by Doosje and colleagues (1998).

Even though we could not find, as expected, a direct link between exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt in the present study, we showed that exonerating cognitions are associated with the tendency to minimize the negative consequences of the group's wrongdoings, making individuals give less importance to the negative aspects of the colonial war. This kind of moral disengagement from the ingroup's wrongdoings might be damaging for the present day relationships between groups, since the outgroup does not feel validated in their suffering and the lack of

information about the negative consequences of the war does not allow both groups to create a more egalitarian relationship.

Drawing from the rationale of Baumeister and colleagues (1994), we expected outgroup identification to be connected with feelings of group-based guilt. However, this was not the case, because no significant relation was found between outgroup identification and feelings of group-based guilt. We argue that in the case of our Portuguese sample this result could be mediated by *luso-tropicalism*, but it could also be due to a more general mechanism. According to this general explanation, the reason why individuals identifying with the outgroup do not feel group-based guilt is associated with the thendency of these same individuals to distance themselves from the ingroup when identifying with the outgroup, therefore undermining the experience of group-based guilt for the ingroup's past misdeeds.

In this line, and since we found a significant association between outgroup identification and compensatory behavioral intentions, we suggest that outgroup identification can, *per se*, serve a relationship enhancing function, since the proximity the individual feels with the outgroup can work as a mechanism to alleviate imbalances and reach a more egalitarian relationship among the groups, fostering a desire to compensate the outgroup (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004). Therefore, a high level of outgroup identification can help to enforce norms that prescribe the positive treatment of the outgroup, in the absence of a connection between outgroup identification and group-based guilt. At the same time, a high level of identification with the outgroup decreases the probability of individuals using exonerating cognitions, since there is a perceived bond between the individual and the outgroup and the minimizing or exculpating biases might be damaging to the relationship between the individual and the valued outgroup.

Subjective importance of discussing the past has a mean value of -.42. This result is informative about the importance young Portuguese university students attach to the discussion of the negative consequences of the colonial war. Until recently, there has not been much public discussion about the colonial war in Portuguese society and it is still not a relevant topic in the school curriculum. Thirty four years have passed since the war ended and, although things are changing at the moment, so far, public opinion has been far away from the discussion about the colonial war and the perceived moral stand of the Portuguese in relation to this

period. Present day Portuguese students seem to show greater concerns about their ingroup's negative past history. This tendency may open the way for the discussion of this negative period of Portuguese history and, in turn, give way to intergroup reconciliation. This acknowledgment of the past wrongdoings of the Portuguese nation, might help to improve intergroup relations and create a more balanced relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup (Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2004). Therefore, we suggest that subjective importance of discussing the past can serve a relationship enhancing function, whereby perpetrators and victims acknowledge that the past relationships between the groups were negative. In turn, this acknowledgment may allow the groups to create a better understanding of each others' side and a set a new basis to create more positive intergroup relations in the present day.

We found a congruent pattern between group-based guilt, behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the past. Low levels of group-based guilt are associated with a tendency not to acknowledge the ingroup's negative past, by not paying attention to the suffering of the victims and by attaching importance to the more positive aspects of the colonial war. At the same time, individuals who feel lower levels of group-based guilt also report a lower wish to compensate or provide a restitution of equality in the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup.

The association between group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions provides more evidence that, in fact, guilt serves a social function, through the acknowledgment that something wrong happened and that equality has to be reached in way to improve intergroup relations (Barkan, 2004).

In relation to feelings of group-based guilt, the data show that, in general, people do not feel much group-based guilt about the Portuguese colonial war, $M = 2.95$ on a 7 point scale; $t(0) = -10.43$, $p < .001$. This result might be due to the mean age of the subjects or to the fact that we did not include a summary of the colonial war in the questionnaire, which could induce guilt on the subjects. However, our intention was to explore the levels of group-based guilt reported on a neutral stand (i.e., without giving any information which could influence the answers of the participants). Furthermore, this result is not so odd, since "acceptance of collective guilt (…) has typically been below the mid-point of the scale in a variety of studies" (Doosje et al., 2004, p. 98).

Although the tendencies shown in the correlations between ingroup glorification, exonerating cognitions and group-based guilt are compatible with the literature existent on this topic (Roccas, et al. 2006), the fact that, in this study there were no significant relations is unexpected. Even when we tried to analyze exonerating cognitions as a potential mediator of the relation between ingroup glorification and group-based guilt, we were not able to find any significant relations. Perhaps we can assume that Portuguese participants have different ways of addressing their feelings of group-based guilt and it seems ingroup identification is not the main route through which their levels of group-based guilt are intensified or diminished. In a different line, we can also expect other more proximal antecedents of group-based guilt to mediate the relationship between this emotion and ingroup identification. Further research should look into the dynamics of group-based guilt and its antecedents regarding the Portuguese colonial war.

McGarty and Bliuc (2004) report a study where they could not find an association between ingroup identification and group-based guilt, a result they attribute to the insufficiency of a national identification measure to capture the subtleties of the collective processes that lead to group-based emotions.

In a different line, Vala and colleagues (2008) have presented data showing that, unlike other European nations, in the Portuguese case there is not an association between national identification and prejudice. They argue their results are due to *luso-tropicalism*. According to these authors (Vala et al., 2008), *luso-tropicalism*, as an element of Portuguese national identity, cancels out the association between ingroup identification and prejudice. However, using other measures, Valentim (2003) found an association between nationalism and prejudice, results that are in accordance with the ones found in other European countries (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). We should then retain the interpretation of these authors (McGarty & Bliuc, 2004; Vala, Brito, & Lopes, 1999; Valentim, 2003), about the importance of taking into consideration the different dimensions of national identity on this topic. Though we cannot have any certainties about why we could not find a significant relation between ingroup attachment and glorification and feelings of group-based guilt, further studies should address the different aspects of national identification and the potential effects *luso-tropicalism* might have for intergroup relations, as well as the

emotions derived from the processing of the past wrongdoings committed by the Portuguese.

In addition, a better understanding about the dynamics relating outgroup identification, group-based guilt and subjective importance of discussing the past is needed, and further studies should address these variables, since they have not been consistently analyzed.

Conclusion

This study was a first attempt to study the phenomenon of group-based guilt amongst the Portuguese population in relation to the colonial war. The authors are aware that some limitations exist in relation to the present article: the study here reported had a correlational design and, therefore, we cannot assume the direction of the relations between the variables. In addition, the concept of outgroup identification is still recent and further research is needed to fully understand its role in the experience of group-based guilt.

Nevertheless, we believe this first step is valuable because it provides us with some insights regarding the experience of group-based guilt among Portuguese participants in relation to the national group's negative past misdeeds. Further studies should also include other measures of ingroup identification, such as the one developed by Leach and colleagues (2008), in way to better comprehend the relations between different modes of ingroup identification and group-based guilt.

The present study represents a first step to better understand the emotional reactions of Portuguese participants in relation to their colonial past. We have found that people who identify strongly with their group (in terms of glorification), were most likely to point to other causes for the ingroup's misbehavior, and were more likely to support the discussing the positive aspects of this past. In addition, participants with a more right-wing political orientation were more likely to find excuses for the ingroup's negative actions, and were also more likely to be in favor of positive information about their group. Furthermore, a right-wing political orientation was associated with lower levels of group-based guilt. Supporting earlier studies, guilt was associated with the desire to compensate the harmed group. It is interesting to note that outgroup identification has clear relations: to the extent that people identify with the outgroup, they are less likely to adhere to exonerating

factors, and they are more willing to support outgroup compensation. Finding ways to address the role of outgroup identification in the improvement of intergroup relations could be an important avenue for future research in this area.

Chapter 5. Dealing with Past Colonial Conflicts: How Perceived Characteristics of the Victimized Outgroup Can Influence the Experience of Group-Based Guilt and Remembering in Portugal and the Netherlands[7]

_____

Abstract

In the present paper, we examine different outgroup-focused predictors of group-based guilt in relation to past colonial conflicts perpetrated by Portugal and the Netherlands. Specifically, we address the role of the perceptions of the ingroup towards the victimized outgroup, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions (i.e. the ingroup's beliefs regarding the outgroup's perceptions of it) as potential predictors of group-based guilt. Using structural equation modeling in a Portuguese sample ($N = 178$) and a Dutch sample ($N = 157$), we found that the experience of group-based guilt in relation to colonial conflicts can be positively predicted by outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification (Dutch sample only). Meta-perceptions were a negative predictor of group-based guilt (Dutch sample only). Furthermore, our results show that group-based guilt is positively associated with compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the past. Results point to the important role of outgroup-focused variables in shaping the experience of group-based guilt regarding past conflicts between groups. The findings suggest possible avenues of further research and ways to improve intergroup relations following past conflicts.

---

[7] The present Chapter is based on an article by Figueiredo et al. (2010).

Countries with a colonial past — as many other countries which have been involved in wars and genocide and other events in which morality comes into play — have been confronted with a need to readdress the way the colonial period is portrayed. This is also the case for Portugal and the Netherlands, two colonial powers which conquered many territories and were involved in colonial conflicts.

For example, white Australians officially acknowledged the misdeeds of their ancestors when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd publicly apologized in February 2008:

> We apologize especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry. To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry. And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry. (Johnston, 2008, para. 1)

This need to readdress past misdeeds of the colonial period can influence the experience of group-based guilt. Guilt is a self-conscious emotion, whereby individuals acknowledge they have behaved in a wrongful way towards others and try to correct their misdeeds (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Iyer et al., 2003). However, as guilt is not a very pleasant emotion, it is more common that people and nations find excuses for their behavior. In the present paper, we are interested in factors that can help override this inclination to refrain from seriously considering the past actions of ingroups who have committed wrongful actions actions outgroups.

We investigate the Portuguese colonial war (Study 1) and the Indonesian war of independence with the Netherlands (Study 2) as events with the potential to induce group-based guilt. Our studies focus on the role of outgroup identification and the ingroup's perceptions and meta-perceptions (i.e. the ingroup's beliefs regarding the outgroup's perceptions of it) and their potential relations with group-based guilt. We are also interested in the relationship between group-based guilt and the subjective importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past.

According to intergroup emotions theory (Smith, 1993), people do not experience emotions only as individuals; they can feel them as group members, although not through direct transposition. Thus, it is possible for people to feel guilt

as a group member without having committed transgressions themselves, via the association of the individual with the ingroup (Doosje et al., 1998). According to Branscombe and colleagues (2003), there are two necessary conditions for individuals to feel group-based guilt: recognizing their belonging to the group (even if their identification with the ingroup is not strong) and holding the ingroup accountable for a violation.

This guilt by association, which we label group-based guilt, has been widely researched (for an overview see Branscombe & Doosje, 2004), and it has been linked with several ingroup-focused variables, such as ingroup identification (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2003; Rensmann, 2004; Zebel, 2005), and exonerating cognitions (Lickel et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2006). This paper aims to add new dimensions to the research on group-based guilt by highlighting *outgroup*-focused variables as potential predictors of group-based guilt.

At the interpersonal level, it has been argued that the experience of guilt may be affected by others. For example, Baumeister and colleagues (1994) state that guilt involves a sense of communal bonds with significant others and that the experience of guilt will be stronger when these others are relevant for the self. These authors argue that this happens because showing guilt is a way by which individuals regulate behavior with the purpose of strengthening and preserving social relationships. We apply this line of reasoning to the intergroup level (Baumeister et al., 1994). The main argument we make in this article is that, at the group level, perceptions of a communal bond and relatedness between the perpetrator ingroup and the victimized outgroup will lead to higher levels of group-based guilt in relation to colonial conflicts.

We hypothesize that if the ingroup does not value the outgroup, low levels of group-based guilt will be experienced. However, if the ingroup values its relations with the outgroup, the sense of a shared relationship is heightened and, therefore, feelings of group-based guilt should arise if there is a transgression of moral standards, as it is the case in the Portuguese and Dutch contexts for the period we are discussing. Thus, if there is a sense of relatedness and a bond linking the ingroup and the outgroup, the door is open for the experience of group-based guilt.

In a limited number of studies, other authors have shown ways in which outgroups can influence the experience of group-based guilt (Iyer et al., 2004; Zebel,

Doosje, & Spears, 2004, 2009a, 2009b). Zebel and colleagues (2009b) have shown that, when the source of information about the misdeeds of the ingroup is a victimized outgroup, highly identified individuals feel higher levels of group-based guilt. Furthermore, taking the perspective of the outgroup has also been shown to produce higher levels of group-based guilt among members of the ingroup (Zebel et al., 2009a).

These findings suggest that outgroup-focused variables can influence the way group-based guilt is experienced. In our studies, we propose to analyze different outgroup-focused variables that might affect the experience of group-based guilt about the past mistreatment of other groups by the individuals' national group. Specifically, we investigate the role of outgroup identification and the ingroup's perceptions and meta-perceptions of the outgroup as potential predictors of group-based guilt.

In terms of outgroup identification and perceptions of the ingroup, we argue that the more people identify with the outgroup and have a positive view of it, the more they are likely to experience high levels of group-based guilt over past misdeeds of their ingroup towards the outgroup. These two concepts differ in their group/self focus, in the sense that outgroup perceptions are related to group-based beliefs about the outgroup while outgroup identification is a self-focused measure of individual identification with the outgroup. We expect these variables to have slightly different patterns of correlations with the other variables studied. Nevertheless, we expect them both to correlate positively with group-based guilt.

We conceptualize these variables (i.e. outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification) as *bonding variable*s, because we believe outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification are two partially independent dimensions of a single higher-order concept, a communal bond with the outgroup. Based on this assumption, we expect these variables to reflect a sense of relatedness and a concern with the victimized group and we propose that they are both linked positively to group-based guilt.

We also argue that these bonding variables go beyond concepts such as outgroup perspective taking (Zebel et al., 2009a) or empathy towards the outgroup (Stephan & Finley, 1999), because we believe that, although an individual can take the perspective of an outgroup or feel empathy in relation to the suffering of an

outgroup, it is not necessarily true that this same individual will identify with the outgroup or have a positive view of it. Therefore, the variables included in the present study (i.e. outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification) may have different outcomes when in comparison with the aforementioned variables, regarding group-based guilt and its consequences. Our conceptualization of outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification as two partially independent dimensions of a higher order concept (i.e. bonding variables) will also allow for different patterns of relations between variables, since we expect that some people will not necessarily identify with the outgroup even though they may have positive perceptions of this outgroup.

We expect meta-perceptions to play a role in the experience of group-based guilt. Meta-perceptions refer to the group members' beliefs about the way their ingroup is perceived by the outgroup (Vorauer et al., 1998). Meta-perceptions are thus activated through evaluative concerns that appear during intergroup interaction and can change accordingly to the outgroup involved (Bizman & Yinon, 2003; Vorauer et al., 2000).

We hypothesize that meta-perceptions are negatively correlated with group-based guilt. This negative association might occur because individuals who think the outgroup has a negative perception of the ingroup relate this to their own moral concerns about the misdeeds of the ingroup. When people believe that the outgroup holds a negative view of the ingroup, this could mean that the outgroup still holds the ingroup responsible for negative acts during the colonial period. Therefore, these concerns about the moral standing of the ingroup in relation to the victimized outgroup are expected to lead to stronger feelings of group-based guilt. In this line, we predict a negative association between meta-perceptions and group-based guilt.

We also investigate the social implications of group-based guilt. Group-based guilt is a powerful emotion with social consequences, such as a desire to repair harm, seek forgiveness, and change future behavior. At the intergroup level, it has been found that group-based guilt is associated with the desire to compensate the victimized outgroup and apologize to it (Barkan, 2000; Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2004; Mallett & Swim, 2004).

Additionally, we explore the link between group-based guilt and subjective importance of discussing the past misdeeds of the ingroup. Are people in favor of

remembering and discussing the negative aspects of the conflicts of Portuguese and Dutch colonialism as a means of reestablishing balance in relations between the ingroup and the outgroup?

We suggest that individuals who feel higher levels of group-based guilt about the ingroup's misdeeds will have a stronger desire to discuss negative information about these events. Therefore, these individuals would be more willing to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial period. By doing so, they demonstrate that they are prepared to acknowledge the negative actions of the past and to deal with their feelings of group-based guilt. These ingroup members may thus be in favor of opening the way for an open public discussion and, possibly, the re-construction and improvement of relations between the ingroup and the outgroup.

The main hypotheses of focus in our studies are:

H1: Outgroup perceptions are related positively to group-based guilt.

H2: Outgroup identification is related positively to group-based guilt.

H3: Meta-perceptions are negatively related to group-based guilt.

H4: Group-based guilt predicts compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing negative information about the past events.

We further explore the potential relationships of the three predictors (outgroup perceptions, outgroup identification, meta-perceptions) with compensatory behavioral intentions.

We chose to use two cases of colonization and two samples — Portugal and the Netherlands — because we believe the proposed theoretical model may fit different samples with a past of colonial conflicts. Nevertheless, we expect to find differences between the samples regarding the strength of the relationships between variables. Specifically, we hypothesize that the associations between the variables will, in general, be stronger in the Dutch sample, because, in general, the Netherlands has more positive group relations with Indonesia, its former colony analyzed.

It is worth noting that the Portuguese colonial war happened approximately thirty-five years ago and the Indonesian war of independence with the Dutch occurred approximately sixty years ago. This difference may also lead to stronger relationships among variables in the Dutch sample, since it is easier to acknowledge misdeeds that took place longer ago, than in comparison with negative actions closer to the present day (Barkan, 2000).

Study 1: Portugal

In Study 1 we analyze the levels of group-based guilt felt by Portuguese participants about the Portuguese colonial past. From 1961 to 1974 there were wars of independence in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, which had negative consequences for both the former colonies and Portuguese society. This colonial conflict occurred when Portugal was under the New State dictatorship and resulted from the government's unwillingness to grant independence at a time when most European colonizers were recognizing the right of self-determination and the United Nations were condemning colonization worldwide.

Figueiredo, Valentim and Doosje (2011) report that Portuguese individuals who identify with the outgroup make less use of exonerating cognitions for the misbehavior of the ingroup and are more willing to compensate the outgroup. In this study, we take these results further and analyze how outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions, and meta-perceptions relate to group-based guilt. Links between group-based guilt, compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the past are also analyzed.

Method.

Participants.

One hundred seventy-eight Portuguese university students participated in this study, on a voluntary basis or for course credits. Eight respondents were excluded from analysis (six because they were not Portuguese, two due to missing data). Of the remaining 170 participants, 91.8 percent were women (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 4.19$; range 18–50).

Design and procedure.

The study used a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Portuguese colonial period were assessed using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire was administered at the end of a class and participants took about half an hour to complete it. It began by explaining that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Portuguese colonial period and about

the Portuguese colonial war. Demographic variables such as age, gender, and nationality of the participants and their parents were covered in the questionnaire.

Measures.

Outgroup perceptions. We measured Portuguese perceptions of Africans from the former colonies using a bipolar scale with nine items, partially derived from Valentim (2003) and ranging from 1 (*negative attribute*) to 7 (*positive attribute*). Examples of items include: "In general, I think the Portuguese think the Africans are unkind / kind"; "negative / positive"; "narrow-minded / open-minded"; "unfriendly / friendly". The nine items comprised a very reliable scale ($\alpha = .85$).

Outgroup identification. Participants were asked to indicate their level of identification with the outgroup by means of one item ("I identify with Africans from the former colonies"), measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*).

Meta-perceptions. To measure Portuguese meta-perceptions concerning Africans from the former colonies, the same nine items used for outgroup perceptions were applied, restructured to read: "In general, I think the Africans think the Portuguese are unkind/kind," etc. ($\alpha = .86$), measured using the same seven-point scale.

Group-based guilt. Feelings of group-based guilt were assessed using the four items of the scale introduced by Doosje and colleagues (1998), adapted to capture feelings of guilt about the Portuguese colonial war in Africa ($\alpha = .88$) on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Examples of items used are: "I feel guilty for the negative actions that the Portuguese people had against other groups during the colonial war" and "I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the people of the former African colonies that were brought about by the Portuguese".

Compensatory behavioral intentions. To capture compensatory behavioral intentions, four items derived from Doosje and colleagues (1998) were used ($\alpha = .83$), with a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Examples include: "I think the Portuguese owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese did" and "I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese have done".

Subjective importance of discussing the past. Participants were then asked about the importance of remembering the positive and negative aspects of the colonial period in the media and the school curriculum, using four items with a seven-point scale. The negative items were subtracted from the positive items so as to create a composite measure for perceived importance of remembering *negative* aspects of the colonial conflict (α = .79), with possible values ranging from -6 (discuss the positive aspects of the past) to +6 (discuss the negative aspects of the past). Examples include: "How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the positive aspects of the Portuguese colonial period?" and "How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the negative aspects of the Portuguese colonial period?"

Results.

Correlations.

The means and standard deviations of the constructs are presented in Table 2, their correlations in Table 3. Table 2 shows that the Portuguese in general, present outgroup perceptions, outgroup identification, and meta-perceptions significantly below the mid-point of the scale, suggesting that they hold quite a negative view of Africans from the former colonies. Regarding group-based guilt, the Portuguese also present an average score significantly below the mid-point of the scale; this is unsurprising because most research on group-based guilt shows that individuals usually report levels of guilt below the mid-point of the scale (Doosje et al., 2004).

As expected, outgroup perceptions correlate significantly with outgroup identification, meta-perceptions, group-based guilt, and compensatory behavioral intentions (see Table 3). Outgroup identification also correlates significantly and positively with compensatory behavioral intentions, but, unexpectedly it does not correlate significantly with group-based guilt or with meta-perceptions. Perceptions of the outgroup, outgroup identification, and meta-perceptions are not significantly correlated with subjective importance of discussing the past.

Group-based guilt correlates significantly with compensatory behavioral intentions and is significantly and positively associated with subjective importance of discussing the past, as we predicted in our hypotheses. Finally, compensatory

behavioral intentions also correlate positively with subjective importance of discussing the past.

Table 2

Means, Standard Deviations, and Independent Sample t-tests for the Portuguese and Dutch Samples

	Portuguese sample		Dutch sample			
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*F*(1, 310)	*p*
Outgroup perceptions	3.72*	.97	4.58*	.74	74.10	< .001
Outgroup identification	3.49*	1.19	2.50*	1.24	51.31	< .001
Meta-perceptions	3.86*	.87	4.22*	.73	14.99	< .001
Group-based guilt	3.44*	1.41	3.64*	1.09	1.94	> .15
Compensatory behavioral intentions	4.30*	1.03	2.81*	1.03	162.72	< .001
Subjective importance of discussing the past	.41*	1.33	.90*	1.44	9.64	< .001

* Means significantly different from the mid-point of the scale (*p* < .05).

Structural Equation Model.

To examine the hypothesized relationships between the variables for the Portuguese sample, we tested a structural equation model using EQS (see Figure 1). The model included hypothesized paths from outgroup identification, Portuguese perceptions of Africans, and Portuguese meta-perceptions of Africans, to group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Paths from group-based guilt to compensatory behavioral intentions and to subjective importance of discussing the past were also included. Given the potential relationships between the predictor variables in the model, we allowed for associations between the three predictor variables.

Note: Standardized parameter estimates; *$p < .05$.

Figure 1. Structural equation model testing outgroup-focused antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt for the Portuguese sample.

The resulting model fits the data well. The χ^2 value is small and statistically not significant: χ^2 (4, $N = 170$) = 5.74, $p > .10$. The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .93, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .98, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .99, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .04, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .05. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 1.

The correlation between outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification is statistically significant, as is the correlation between outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions. The correlation between outgroup identification and Portuguese meta-perceptions of Africans is not statistically significant in the present sample.

We found support for Hypothesis 1: Outgroup perceptions were reliably associated with group-based guilt. When people perceive the outgroup in favorable terms, they are more likely to experience guilt. There was no direct significant path from outgroup perceptions to compensatory behavioral intentions.

Unexpectedly, outgroup identification was not related to group-based guilt (Hypothesis 2), but it was significantly associated with compensatory behavioral intentions. The more people identify with the outgroup, the more they are willing to compensate the outgroup. Thus, in this study, there was a significant path from outgroup identification to outgroup compensation, but it was not mediated by group-based guilt.

Our data do not lend support for Hypothesis 3: Portuguese meta-perceptions of Africans were not significantly related to either group-based guilt or compensatory behavioral intentions. Finally, confirming Hypothesis 4, group-based guilt was reliably associated with compensatory behavioral intentions. More importantly, group-based guilt was significantly related to a more recent consequence of guilt, namely the subjective importance of discussing the negative aspects of the colonial past in the media and in the school curriculum.

To further test our hypotheses, we tested a model in which subjective importance of discussing the past could be conceptualized as a mediator of the relationship between the three predictor variables and group-based guilt. Even though the correlations between the variables do not show direct support for this hypothesized model (see Table 3), we do think it is possible to conceptualize subjective importance of discussing the past as a mediator of the relationship between group-based guilt and the three predictors. In this line, subjective importance of discussing the past could be a cause, rather than a consequence of group-based guilt, because it is possible to argue that perceiving the discussion of the past as important might open the way for individuals to experience group-based guilt.

Since this is a novel variable in the literature, we were interested in discovering how it relates to the experience of group-based guilt and, therefore, we tested a different theoretical model, in which subjective importance of discussing the past is an antecedent of group-based guilt, rather than a consequence of this emotion. In fact, this alternative model fits the data poorly, with a reliable chi-square value: χ^2 (7, $N = 170$) = 15.61, $p < .05$. The other fit indices also indicated weaker fit in comparison to the main hypothesized model: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .81, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .71, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .92, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .97, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .07, and

root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .09. In a word: the results support the first theoretical model, but not the alternative model.

Discussion.

As expected, outgroup perceptions were significantly related to group-based guilt, but, contradicting our hypothesis, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions did not associate significantly with group-based guilt in the Portuguese sample. The lack of significant associations between outgroup identification and group-based guilt and between meta-perceptions and group-based guilt might be because members of the national group consider themselves victims of the colonial war, as much as the outgroup does. This might be due to the fact that the war is still quite close in time to the present generations (just thirty-five years ago) and that there are still war veterans and Portuguese civilians who lived in the colonies and who view themselves as victims of the war. These facts may influence the perceptions of the younger generation here studied. Still, it is important to stress that the present study assesses Portuguese perceptions and meta-perceptions of Africans and, as such, it could be that individuals are showing general perceptions of Africans and not only about Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. We believe this is unlikely, because all the other measures used in the study referred specifically to Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. Nevertheless, attention should be paid to this potential limitation when generalizations are drawn.

It is important to stress that — even though there was no direct significant path from outgroup identification to group-based guilt — outgroup identification *did* significantly correlate with compensatory behavioral intentions. Thus, feeling a bond with the outgroup is related to the desire of compensating the victimized outgroup.

In line with Hypothesis 4, group-based guilt predicts support for compensatory behavioral intentions, confirming previous research in this domain (e.g. Doosje et al., 1998). Furthermore, and importantly, we were able to find support for our more novel consequence of group-based guilt: when people feel more group-based guilt they are more likely to consider it necessary to remember negative information about the colonial past in the media and at schools. We also tested an alternative model in which perceived importance of remembering negative information was specified as a predictor of group-based guilt. This alternative proved

to have a weaker fit with the data than the main model, providing further evidence for the robustness of our theoretical model.

Study 2: The Netherlands

Study 2 examines whether the theoretical model established in Study 1 can be confirmed using another sample, this time referring to the Dutch colonial conflict with Indonesia (i.e. the Indonesian war of independence). The war the Netherlands fought between 1945 and 1949 for control of Indonesia had negative consequences for the people of Indonesia and the Netherlands. When compared to the Portuguese colonial war, this conflict occurred longer ago in time (sixty years) — and, hence, we expect this temporal distancing may affect participants perceptions and feelings regarding the negative events under analysis. Furthermore, the intergroup relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia are better than the relations between Portugal and its former African colonies. Therefore, we expect Study 2 to show stronger correlations between the variables than Study 1.

The hypotheses are the same as for Study 1:

H1: Outgroup perceptions are related positively to group-based guilt.

H2: Outgroup identification is related positively to group-based guilt.

H3: Meta-perceptions are negatively related to group-based guilt.

H4: Group-based guilt predicts compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the past.

In the same line as Study 1, we examined the possible relationships between the three predictor variables (outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions, meta-perceptions) and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Method.

Participants.

One hundred fifty-seven Dutch university students participated in this study, either for course credits or for a €7 payment. Seventeen respondents were excluded from analysis (fifteen without Dutch nationality, two due to missing data). Of the remaining 140 participants, 77.9 percent were women (age $M = 21$ years, $SD = 4.60$; range 17–47).

Design and procedure.

As in Study 1, we used a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Dutch colonial past were assessed using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire was administered along with four other unrelated questionnaires, with participants taking about an hour to complete all of them. At the beginning of the questionnaire it was explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia. Demographic variables such as age, gender, and nationality of the participants and their parents were also covered in the questionnaire.

Measures.

All measures used in Study 2 were the same as used in Study 1.

Outgroup perceptions. The nine bipolar items capturing Dutch perceptions of Indonesians comprised a very reliable scale (α = .82).

Outgroup identification. Identification with the outgroup was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*very much*).

Meta-perceptions. The nine-item scale measuring Dutch meta-perceptions of Indonesians was also reliable (α = .81).

Group-based guilt. The scale measuring feelings of group-based guilt comprised four items (Doosje et al., 1998), and had a Cronbach alpha of .71.

Consequences

Compensation. We used the same four items to capture compensatory behavioral intentions (α =.76).

Subjective importance of discussing the past. The same four-item scale as in Study 1 was used to measure subjective importance of discussing the colonial period (α = .79). The negative items were subtracted from the positive items so as to create a composite measure for subjective importance of discussing the *past*, with possible values ranging from -6 (discuss the negative aspects of the past) to +6 (discuss the positive aspects of the past).

Results.

Correlations.

The means (and standard deviations) are presented in Table 2, the correlations in Table 3. Table 2 shows that all average scores for the variables are significantly different from the mid-point of the scale, with outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions the only ones significantly above the mid-point, the rest significantly below it.

In Study 2, unexpectedly, outgroup perceptions are significantly related only with meta-perceptions and with none of the other variables (see Table 3). Outgroup identification correlates significantly with meta-perceptions, group-based guilt, and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Table 3

Correlations (r) and p Values (between brackets) Among the Variables in the
Portuguese (Port.) and the Dutch Samples

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Outgroup perceptions	Dutch Port.	.12 (.16)	.64 (.00)*	.07 (.44)	.00 (.96)	.03 (.70)
2. Outgroup identification	.16 (.04)*	--	.17 (.05)*	.23 (.01)*	.24 (.01)*	.05 (.58)
3. Meta-perceptions	.53 (.00)*	.03 (.70)	--	-.16 (.06)	-.22 (.01)*	-.18 (.04)*
4. Group-based guilt	.19 (.01)*	.05 (.52)	.05 (.56)	--	.54 (.00)*	.17 (.05)*
5. Compensation	.18 (.02)*	.18 (.02)*	.04 (.57)	.38 (.00)*	--	.11 (.20)
6. Subjective importance of discussing the past	.14 (.08)	.03 (.68)	.10 (.19)	.18 (.02)*	.19 (.02)*	--

*p < .05

In turn, meta-perceptions are not significantly correlated with group-based guilt, though they are significantly and negatively correlated with compensatory behavioral intentions. Though we did not expect this significant relationship, meta-perceptions are also negatively and significantly associated with subjective importance of discussing the past.

Group-based guilt is associated significantly with both compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the past negative events. The latter two variables are not significantly related to each other, even though we could have expected an association between them (as was the case in Study 1).

Structural Equation Model.

We used EQS to analyze whether the model established in Study 1 could be replicated in another sample with a history of colonial conflict. The model included the same hypothesized paths from outgroup identification, Dutch perceptions of Indonesians, and Dutch meta-perceptions of Indonesians to feelings of group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Paths from group-based guilt to compensatory behavioral intentions and to subjective importance of discussing the past were also included.

To test the hypothesized relations between the predictor variables in the model, we allowed for associations between the three predictor variables in the model. The resulting model fits the data well. The χ^2 value is small and statistically not significant: χ^2 (4, $N = 140$) = 4.39, $p > .10$. The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .99, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .99, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .03, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .03. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 2.

Note: Standardized parameter estimates; *$p < .05$.

Figure 2. Structural equation model testing outgroup-focused antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt for the Dutch sample.

The predictor variables present two statistically significant correlations; the only correlation that does not reach statistical significance is the one between outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification.

In line with Hypothesis 1, outgroup perceptions were reliably and positively associated with group-based guilt. There was no reliable path between outgroup perceptions and compensatory behavioral intentions.

More importantly, and in line with Hypothesis 2, outgroup identification was significantly associated with group-based guilt. In addition, there was a direct positive path from outgroup identification to compensatory behavioral intentions, as was observed in Study 1.

In contrast to Study 1, Dutch meta-perceptions of Indonesians were significantly and negatively associated with both group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Thus, Dutch participants who thought that

Indonesians have a negative view of the Dutch experienced higher levels of group-based guilt. This supports Hypothesis 3.

Confirming Hypothesis 4, group-based guilt was significantly related to compensatory behavioral intentions. In addition, we replicated the positive path from group-based guilt to subjective importance of discussing the past.

Following the same rationale as in Study 1, the same alternative model was tested with the present sample. Again, this model resulted in a weaker fit with the data: χ^2 (7, $N = 140$) = 27.99, $p < .01$. The other fit indices also indicated poorer fit than the main hypothesized model: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .70, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .86, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .87, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .94, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .10, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .15.

Given that the present sample showed an unexpected significant correlation between meta-perceptions and perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the past, we conducted another analysis, where this path was included in another structural equation model. This model proved to have a good fit with the data: χ^2 (3, $N = 140$) = 1.13, $p > .10$. In general, the other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.01, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.01, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .02, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .00. Even though this model proves to have a good fit with the data, the path between meta-perceptions and perceived importance of remembering negative information is not statistically significant and, therefore, our main hypothesized theoretical model proves to have a better fit with the data.

Differences Between the Portuguese and Dutch Samples.

To check for differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples regarding the average scores on the variables under analysis, we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), which showed that there are significant differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples: Wilks' Lambda = .02; F (6, 303) = 2253.70, $p < .001$. As can be seen in Table 2, outgroup perceptions of the Dutch sample are significantly more positive than in the Portuguese sample, $F(1, 310) = 74.10$, $p < .01$. In addition, in the Dutch sample,

outgroup perceptions are positive and significantly above the mid-point of the scale, $t(139) = 9.29$, $p < .01$. In contrast, in the Portuguese sample, outgroup perceptions are negative and significantly below the mid-point of the scale, $t(169) = -3.72$, $p < .01$. The meta-perceptions also show the same pattern: in the Dutch sample, these are positive and significantly above the mid-point of the scale, $t(139) = 3.51$, $p < .001$; in the Portuguese sample, these are negative and significantly below the mid-point of the scale, $t(169) = -2.13$, $p < .05$. Furthermore, the meta-perceptions in the Dutch sample are more positive than in the Portuguese sample, $F(1, 310) = 14.99$, $p < .01$. However, in contrast to the patterns of outgroup perception and meta-perception, participants identify more strongly with the outgroup in the Portuguese sample than in the Dutch sample, $F(1, 310) = 51.31$, $p < .01$.

With respect to group-based guilt, the Dutch sample does not differ from the Portuguese sample, $F(1, 310) = 1.94$, $p > .15$. Both means are significantly below the mid-point of the scale, $t(169) = -5.17$, $p < .0$ for the Portuguese sample and $t(139) = -3.86$, $p < .01$ for the Dutch sample.

The Dutch sample shows a higher mean score on subjective importance of discussing the negative aspects of the past, $F(1, 310) = 9.64$, $p < .01$. As both means are above the midpoint of the scale, we can argue that both the Dutch and the Portuguese participants are willing to remember the negative aspects of the colonial period, $t(169) = -3.97$, $p < .01$ for the Portuguese sample and $t(139) = -7.35$, $p < .01$ for the Dutch sample, but the Dutch are more willing to do so.

In contrast to this pattern, the Portuguese have significantly stronger compensatory behavioral intentions than the Dutch, $F(1, 310) = 162.72$, $p < .01$. In addition, the Portuguese participants tend to support such intentions above the mid-point of the scale, $t(169) = 3.84$, $p < .01$, whereas the Dutch participants are generally unsupportive: their mean is below the mid-point of the scale, $t(139) = -13.78$, $p < .01$.

Discussion.

In Study 2 we were again able to obtain evidence for a link between outgroup perceptions and group-based guilt. As expected, outgroup identification was significantly related to group-based guilt. In addition, we replicated the significant positive path between outgroup identification and compensatory behavioral intentions found in Study 1. These results support our concept of *bonding variables*,

a cluster of variables which are related to a feeling of sharing a bond with the outgroup and which influence the experience of group-based guilt.

Confirming hypothesis 3, meta-perceptions were significantly and negatively correlated with group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Thus, having more positive meta-perceptions leads individuals to show both lower levels of group-based guilt (leading indirectly to lower levels of support for compensation) and a decreased desire to compensate the victims of the ingroup's past colonial misdeeds (via a direct path from meta-perceptions to outgroup compensation). Confirming our hypotheses regarding the social functions of group-based guilt, we found significant positive relationships between group-based guilt and both compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the negative aspects of the colonial past. Once again, the main hypothesized model had a better fit to the data than the alternative model, giving us further evidence for our conceptualization of subjective importance of discussing the past as a consequence of group-based guilt and not as an antecedent of it.

We were not able to achieve the desirable ratio between the number of participants and the number of model parameters, which, according to Kline (1998) should be 10:1 (in our case it was 8:1). Still, we believe this model to be reliable, because it has very good fit indices and was replicated using two different samples with a past of colonial conflicts.

General Discussion

Taken together, the results of the two studies show support for our hypotheses concerning the role of different outgroup-focused variables in predicting feelings of group-based guilt about colonial conflicts.

In both studies, we were able to show a positive relationship between outgroup perceptions and group-based guilt. Individuals experience more group-based guilt when they believe their group has a more positive rather than negative view of the outgroup. We also found evidence that outgroup identification has a positive relationship with group-based guilt (Study 2 only), meaning that the more people identify with the outgroup, the more group-based guilt they will experience. It thus seems that feeling a bond with the outgroup leads people to report higher levels

of group-based guilt and, thus, to be more willing to acknowledge the misdeeds of their national group's colonial past.

These results are in line with the argument of Baumeister and colleagues (1994). When the relationship damaged is with a relevant person or group, individuals feel more guilt than when the other is not relevant to the person who committed the wrongful actions.

Drawing from the differences found between the two samples in relation to the overall average scores of outgroup perceptions (higher in the Dutch sample) and outgroup identification (higher in the Portuguese sample) and taking in consideration the correlation patterns between outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification in both samples (i.e. this correlation only reached statistical significance in the Portuguese sample), it is possible to argue that these two variables are two partially independent dimensions of a higher-order concept, i.e. bonding variables. They do not necessarily need to be strongly related to each other, since we argue that it is possible that some individuals (as is the case for the Dutch) can have positive perceptions of the outgroup without necessarily identifying with them, or vice-versa.

Taking this into consideration, it is still clear that this cluster of results supports our conceptualization of outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification as *bonding* variables, since the existence of a bond connecting the ingroup with the outgroup leads individuals to identify and feel closer to members of other groups. In the case of colonization, where there was contact and a feeling of relatedness between the ingroup (the colonizers) and the outgroup (the colonized), an acknowledgment that negative acts were committed against the outgroup during colonial conflicts can lead members of the ingroup to experience higher levels of group-based guilt. Without this sense of relatedness, feelings of group-based guilt would be lower. Furthermore, it is, probably, this same sense of connectedness that instigates the desire to construct better relations between the groups. Thus, valuing the outgroup and having a positive view of it can have positive consequences for the reconstruction of more positive relations between the groups.

Further research could fruitfully analyze ways to improve the perspective of perpetrator groups toward victimized outgroups, as a means to deal with the past and construct better relations in the future. This relationship-enhancing function of guilt

can, therefore, play a fundamental role in opening the way for future positive relations amongst groups involved in colonial conflicts (Barkan, 2000).

The lack, in both samples, of a significant direct path from outgroup perceptions to compensatory behavioral intentions leads us to suggest that having positive outgroup perceptions does not associate directly with a desire to compensate the victims. Rather, this relationship is mediated by feelings of group-based guilt. We argue that having positive outgroup perceptions does not, *per se*, lead groups to make amends for past misdeeds; this is actually achieved through the experience of group-based guilt.

In both samples, outgroup identification—unlike outgroup perceptions—is directly related to compensatory behavioral intentions. It thus seems that outgroup identification, as one partially independent dimension of the broader concept of bonding variables is, *per se*, related to the desire to compensate the victims of past misdeeds and can, therefore, serve a relationship-enhancing function by signaling that there is an imbalance in the intergroup relationship. This imbalance can be addressed by compensation of the victimized outgroup (Wohl & Branscombe, 2004), via a direct link between outgroup identification and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Although the measure used in the present study has been used in previous studies with reliable patterns of results (for an example see Valentim, 2003), we must treat this pattern of results with caution because the measure used for outgroup identification has only one item, thus limiting our results and the interpretations drawn from them.

We also found that having positive meta-perceptions is associated with lower levels of group-based guilt (statistically significant only in Study 2). We hypothesized positive meta-perceptions to be a predictor of lower levels of group-based guilt, because if the ingroup believes the outgroup has a positive view of the ingroup, then the ingroup believes the misdeeds during the colonial conflict are less salient in the present and that there is already a positive relation between the groups.

Therefore, individuals who believe the outgroup has more positive perceptions of the ingroup will feel less group-based guilt, because they believe the outgroup does not hold them as strongly responsible for the past misdeeds as much as when there are still negative meta-perceptions. Further research should look into

the underlying dynamics by which positive meta-perceptions are related to lower levels of group-based guilt.

Our results also show that both outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions scores are higher in the Dutch sample (although the Portuguese identified somewhat more strongly with the colonial group than the Dutch did), and both relate significantly with group-based guilt in the Dutch sample.

We would argue that meta-perceptions are a stronger predictor in the Dutch sample than the Portuguese sample, because the Dutch seem to have a more positive view of their relations with the Indonesians (higher outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions) than the Portuguese regarding their relations with Africans. Perhaps meta-perceptions only significantly influence feelings of group-based guilt when the perpetrator group has quite positive views of the victimized group.

Following the same reasoning, we think that the stronger, negative influence of meta-perceptions on group-based guilt in the Dutch sample can help to explain why, on average, the Portuguese and Dutch sample do not differ in feelings of group-based guilt about the colonial period. At first, this seemed an odd finding, because the Dutch are significantly more positive about their relations with the Indonesians than the Portuguese about their relations with Africans. However, meta-perceptions inhibit group-based guilt, while outgroup perceptions increase group-based guilt among the Dutch. As a result, the net effect of outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions seems to reach zero, which can perhaps explain why group-based guilt among the Dutch is not higher than among the Portuguese.

Regarding the differences in the average values of outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions between the two samples, it is important to keep in mind that in the Portuguese sample these measures were targeted towards Africans in general and not towards Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. This may have weakened the relationship between these variables and group-based guilt, since individuals might have responded thinking of a general African category, for which their perceptions and meta-perceptions might be more negative than when thinking about Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. Still, the authors believe that, given the nature of the study, participants were already framed to think in terms of Africans from the former colonies. The fact that this measure does not directly state it does not mean individuals were not thinking specifically of Africans from the former colonies.

Drawing from the results of previous research, it is not surprising that we found a significant path from group-based guilt to outgroup compensation. Less expectedly, we observed a significant path in both samples between group-based guilt and subjective importance of discussing the past.

In both studies the alternative model had a weaker fit to the data than our main hypothesized model, supporting our conceptualization of subjective importance of discussing the past as a consequence of group-based guilt and not as an antecedent of the experience of group-based guilt. This suggests that feeling group-based guilt leads to a willingness of the ingroup (perpetrator group) to face its deficits. We believe this acknowledgment of the ingroup's past misdeeds is an important step in improving relations between groups involved in an immoral historical episode, such as the colonial conflicts analyzed here.

Regarding the differences between the Portuguese and Dutch samples, we found that compensatory behavioral intentions are higher in the Portuguese sample. We suggest this difference occurs because the Portuguese perceive they have not compensated the victims of their past misdeeds as much as the Dutch have and, therefore, feel a stronger need to compensate the outgroup. We also found less willingness to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial past on the side of the Portuguese.

Perhaps the time difference between the events makes it easier for the Dutch to look back and be more critical of their historical misdeeds, since the events are longer ago in time and, thus, do not involve the self so much in the actions taken by the ingroup (e.g., Barkan, 2000). In contrast, for the Portuguese sample, the events are more recent and the consequences of the war are still relevant for today's Portuguese society. When an event such as the colonial war is still too recent, people might refrain from accepting negative aspects of their group's history and therefore deny or fail to acknowledge the need to remember them (Barkan, 2000). Further studies should analyze the role of time in the way an ingroup perceives its past misdeeds and its intergroup relations with a victimized outgroup.

Interestingly, even though the Portuguese are less willing to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial past, they are more inclined than the Dutch to compensate the outgroup. This might be due to the influence of the timing of events, as explained above. But there is another possible explanation: compensating the

victims might be an instrumental way of dealing with the ingroup's past negative actions. From this perspective, compensating an outgroup for the misdeeds of the past is an easier way of acknowledging the past and coming to terms with it than actually discussing the negative aspects of the past relationships between the groups.

It is important to acknowledge that our samples are mostly composed of female participants and that there is some evidence that women are more prone to feelings of guilt than men (Stapley & Havilan, 1989). Still, we believe these gender differences do not affect our results or the associations between the variables under study, because we are interested in the associations between the variables under study and not the intensity of the emotion *per se*.

The present research investigated the role of three outgroup-focused variables in the prediction of group-based guilt. We have shown that outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification can be conceptualized as bonding variables which are related to the experience of group-based guilt. Further research should analyze the possibility of creating ways for individuals to bond with the outgroup and thus create awareness of the negative events of the past as a way to improve intergroup relations. Future avenues of research should also focus on the underlying processes by which outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions might influence feelings of group-based guilt and the social consequences of this emotion by which intergroup relations can be improved.

Chapter 6: Group-based Compunction and Anger: Their Antecedents and Consequences in Relation to Colonial Conflicts[8]

_____

Abstract

Group-based emotions are emotions that people can experience as group members. Two studies conducted in two countries with a history of colonization – Portugal ($N = 280$) and the Netherlands ($N = 184$) – examine hitherto less studied antecedents and consequences of group-based compunction and anger. While previous research has focused mainly on ingroup-focused antecedents of group-based emotions, such as ingroup identification and perceptions of responsibility, our research focused on variables related to the perceptions of the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup and outgroup-focused variables, such as outgroup identification and meta-perceptions (i.e., what the ingroup believes the outgroup thinks of them). Results from structural equation modeling showed that group-based compunction and group-based anger have similar antecedents (i.e., exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions). Furthermore, the results showed that group-based compunction and group-based anger have distinct but related consequences for the improvement of intergroup relations (i.e., compensation, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment). The implications of our results for the field of intergroup relations are discussed.

---

[8] The present Chapter is based on an article by Figueiredo et al. (2012a).

The need for groups to address past transgressions of their history has shed light into the dynamics of group-based emotions and how these might affect present day relations between groups. Specifically considering the colonial period, there are still many colonizer countries struggling with their history of violence and domination over other groups and, therefore, in need to address their past misdeeds against these groups.

In the present article we analyze two contexts of colonization, the Portuguese and the Dutch, that ended with violent conflicts over the independence of the colonies. Through this cross-national replication, we intend to investigate the communalities and differences between these countries regarding the experience of two group-based emotions - compunction and anger - and their antecedents and consequences.

In the past decades, much research has shown that individuals feel emotions due to their membership and affiliation to different social groups. Drawing from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and appraisal theories of emotions, the theory of intergroup emotions (Smith, 1993) has proven to be very fruitful in enriching our understanding of the ways in which people can experience emotions as group members, due to appraising an emotional event in terms of their group membership. These emotional processes have also been shown to influence intergroup relations.

We aim to extend the existing knowledge regarding group-based emotions by analyzing less studied antecedents of these emotions, as well as some possible under-investigated consequences of them. More specifically, we focus on the way that more distal antecedents of emotions (i.e. self-investiment) and more proximal antecedents of emotions (i.e. exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions) affect the experience of two negative group-based emotions - compunction and anger towards the ingroup - and their consequences for compensatory behavioral intentions, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment.

Group-based compunction refers to an intertwined experience of guilt and self-criticism/shame due to the misdeeds committed by the ingroup. In the past, Devine and colleagues (1991) have shown that, at the interpersonal level, individuals might feel negative affect in the form of compunction following from a transgression

of standards. Furthermore, Zebel and colleagues (2007) have shown that when one's family is being associated with gloomy aspects of the colonial past, individuals experience compunction when reminded of this past. In this line, we argue that, at the group-level, individuals who are confronted with negative actions committed by their national ingroup against other groups (in this case, the populations of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa and Indonesia), are expected to experience group-based compunction.

In its turn, group-based anger refers to a negative ingroup-focused emotion that involves a feeling that the ingroup has committed wrongful acts against another group. This emotion is characterized by a high level of readiness for action and previous research has shown that group-based anger directed at the ingroup leads individuals to make amendments for past misdeeds and take action in way to improve the outgroup's conditions (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). Furthermore, research has also shown that, although group-based anger and other group-based emotions, such as guilt and shame, are related to each other, they do have independent consequences for intergroup behavior (Iyer, at al., 2007). Therefore, in this study we analyze the potentially different role of group-based compunction and group-based anger for different forms of intergroup behavior.

By now, it is well documented that ingroup identification is an important antecedent of different group-based emotions (Doosje et al., 1998; Leach et al., 2008; Mackie et al., 2000; Roccas et al., 2006), since many times, individuals are more likely to experience group-based emotions regarding acts committed by groups they feel attached to. Nevertheless, this relation has proved to be curvilinear in nature (Doosje et al., 1998).

The self-investment dimension of ingroup identification, as defined by Leach and colleagues (2008), refers to a sense of satisfaction, solidarity, salience and importance derived from being part of a group that the individual values. We intend to investigate in which way ingroup self-investment is a distal antecedent of group-based emotions and in which way it might affect more proximal antecedents of group-based compunction and anger.

When a group membership is relevant to individuals, they may tend to avoid negative information about the groups they belong to and value. Exonerating cognitions refer to ingroup favoring biases, which are beliefs that can help the

individual to exculpate or absolve the ingroup for the harm committed. These biases can occur either by minimizing the negative actions through selective comparison with other perpetrator groups (Marques et al., 1997) or by blaming the victims in way to maintain a positive view of the ingroup (Roccas et al., 2006). Hence, we expect self-investment to be positively related to such exonerating cognitions. In turn, through the use of these exonerating cognitions, individuals may mitigate the experience of group-based compunction and anger because these cognitions can be used by ingroup members to exculpate the ingroup for its past negative behavior.

In addition, we analyze how ingroup self-investment associates with collectivism and how, in turn, collectivism relates to the dynamics of group-based emotions. In Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) conceptualization, collectivism refers to a worldview whereby individuals value their group memberships and tend to hold the norms and values of the groups they belong to as relevant to their definition and identity. We anticipate ingroup self-investment and collectivism to be positively associated, because we argue that both variables reflect a sense of satisfaction and enjoyment derived from group life and spending time with ingroup members.

Furthermore, we believe collectivism may play an important role in the experience of group-based compunction and anger. If individuals value their ingroup identities and their belonging to the group, they will tend to be more affected by the negative actions committed by the ingroup and, therefore, feel higher levels of group-based emotions. In this line, collectivism is conceptualized as a positive orientation towards different ingroup memberships and, in this line, we assume it will have consequences for emotional processes in intergroup relations.

In the present research, we also investigate outgroup identification, a variable that reflects a sense of connectedness with the outgroup and a concern for its welfare. We expect this variable to be positively associated with group-based anger and compunction (Figueiredo et al., 2010).

Meta-perceptions, the ingroup's beliefs regarding the outgroup's perceptions of it, have shown to be negatively related to group-based guilt. When individuals believe the outgroup has a positive perception of the ingroup, they may think there is no need to feel bad about the misdeeds that happened between both groups in the past (Figueiredo et al., 2010). In the present study, we intend to analyze if, indeed, when individuals believe that the outgroup has positive perceptions of the ingroup,

they tend to feel lower levels of negative group-based emotions. We argue this will be the case, because holding positive meta-perceptions may signal that the intergroup relationship is positive in nature and, therefore, ingroup members do not need to feel negative emotions and redeem for their past negative misdeeds anymore.

In terms of action tendencies, we predict that negative group-based emotions are related to the desire to make reparations due to the ingroup's negative behavior. Therefore, we analyze three possible consequences of negative group-based emotions: compensatory behavioral intentions, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment.

Much research has shown (Doosje et al., 1998; Mallett & Swim, 2004) that group-based guilt is associated with a desire to make amendments and compensate the victimized outgroup. In the present research, we expect group-based compunction (but not group-based anger) to be associated with compensatory behavioral intentions. We argue that this is the case because previous research (Leach et al., 2006) has shown that guilt and shame are usually more associated with passive means of compensation, while group-based anger is mostly associated with compensation social change strategies that are more proactive in nature.

A study by Figueiredo and colleagues (2010) has shown that individuals who feel more group-based guilt perceive that it is important to discuss the negative events of the past in the public sphere. Given that, in this study, the authors only analyzed one negative emotion, we predict that when both group-based compunction and anger are under analysis, only group-based anger will be associated with subjective importance of discussing the past. Since the latter emotion has a higher level of action readiness it may be strongly associated with more dynamic ways of coming to terms with a negative past, when in comparison to group-based compunction. Because of the experience of group-based anger, individuals may desire to acknowledge what happened in the past and to discuss openly the morality of such events. This discussion may, in turn, lead to the creation of better intergroup relationships (Kanyangara, Rimé, Philippot, & Yzerbyt, 2007).

Another important consequence of group-based emotions is forgiveness. Much research has focused on forgiveness from the victimized group's perspective and has shown that, in fact, the transgressor's group emotions may influence the willingness of the victimized group to forgive the perpetrator's group for their

misdeeds (Brown et al., 2008; Cehajic et al., 2008; Tam et al., 2007; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Though we believe this line of research is highly valuable, we think it is important to investigate forgiveness not only from the victim's perspective, but also from the perpetrator's perspective. Specifically, we address the following issues: Do members of the perpetrator group, who were not involved in the harm done, feel they should be forgiven by the victimized group? What are the conditions influencing the ingroup's desire (or even need) to be forgiven by the outgroup?

Consequently, in the present research, we analyze forgiveness assignment, a variable which we conceptualize as the desire of the ingroup to be forgiven by the outgroup for the negative actions this ingroup has committed against the victimized group in the past. We expect group-based compunction and group-based anger to be negatively related to forgiveness assignment. This argument stems from the idea that when individuals experience high levels of negative group-based emotions, they feel that the situation between the groups is still not resolved and, therefore, the ingroup should attune for the negative misdeeds. This would mean that ingroup members believe that forgiveness is still not attainable and thus, the ingroup should not be forgiven yet.

The main hypotheses of our studies are:

H1: Exonerating cognitions are negatively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger.

H2: Collectivism is positively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger.

H3: Outgroup identification is positively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger.

H4: Meta-perceptions are negatively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger.

H5: Group-based compunction is positively related to compensatory behavioral intentions and negatively related to forgiveness assignment.

H6: Group-based anger is positively related to subjective importance of discussing the past and negatively related to forgiveness assignment.

We also explore the potential relationships of the four antecedents (exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions) with the three theorized consequences of group-based compunction and anger

(compensatory behavioral intentions, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment).

To test all of the above mentioned hypotheses, we believe structural equation modeling is the best statistics available, given that we want to analyze the ways in which the variance of all of these variables, taken together, contributes to explain the complex emotional processes involved in intergroup relations, as well as their antecedents and consequences.

Study 1: Portugal

In Study 1 we analyze group-based compunction and anger of Portuguese participants regarding the Portuguese colonial war. This conflict occurred between 1961 and 1974 in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and the war brought about negative consequences for both the former colonies and Portuguese societies. This colonial conflict occurred when Portugal was under the New State dictatorship (1926-1974) and resulted from the government's unwillingness to grant independence at a time when the United Nations were condemning colonization worldwide, and most European colonizers were recognizing the right of self-determination of their colonies.

Method.

Participants.

Two hundred eighty Portuguese university students participated in this study on a voluntary basis. 88.6% of the participants were female (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 3.42$; range 17-50).

Design and procedure.

The present study had a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Portuguese colonial war were assessed using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire was administered at the University of Coimbra at the beginning or at the end of classes and participants took about half an hour to complete it. It was first explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Portuguese colonial period and about the Portuguese colonial

war. Several demographical variables, such as age, gender and nationality of the participants and their parents were also covered in the questionnaire and anonymity and confidentiality was guaranteed.

All items used in the present study were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Measures.

Ingroup self-investment. To measure ingroup identification, we adapted the scale by Leach et al. (2008) to capture the different modes of identification with the Portuguese national group. For the present study, the composite measure of self-investment, which is comprised of centrality, satisfaction and solidarity, was used. This measure is composed of 10 items (Cronbach α = .88). Example items are "I often think about the fact that I am Portuguese" [centrality], "I am glad to be Portuguese" [satisfaction], and "I feel a bond with the Portuguese" [solidarity].

Exonerating cognitions. The measure capturing exonerating cognitions was derived and augmented from Roccas and colleagues (2006) and is comprised by 11 items (Cronbach α = .74). Example items are "The Africans from the former Portuguese colonies must take responsibility for what happened in their countries", "Portugal had a right to maintain its colonies in Africa" and "The Africans from the former colonies are responsible for the negative consequences of the colonial war".

Collectivism. The measure of collectivism is comprised of 8 items (Cronbach α = .75), as created by Triandis and Gelfand (1998). Example items are "I feel good when I cooperate with others", "To me, pleasure is spending time with others" and "It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups".

Outgroup identification. Participants were asked to indicate their level of identification with the outgroup by means of 5 items ("I identify with Africans from the former colonies", "I feel a bond with Africans from the former colonies", "I feel strong ties with natives/individuals from the former colonies", "I am similar to the natives of the former colonies" and "I feel solidarity with the natives from the former colonies"), which were derived and augmented from the measure used by Valentim (2003). These items comprised a reliable scale (Cronbach α = .89).

Meta-perceptions. We measured perceptions of the Portuguese towards Africans from the former colonies using a bipolar scale consisting of 9 items,

partially derived from Valentim (2003). Examples of these are "In general, I think the Africans think the Portuguese are unkind-kind [unfriendly-friendly] [lazy-hard workers]". These 9 items comprised a very reliable scale (Cronbach α = .93).

Group-based compunction. To measure the level of group-based compunction, individuals indicated how much they experienced this emotion regarding the past misdeeds of their ingroup (Cronbach α = .81). This scale was derived from Watson, Clark and Tellegen (1988) and was comprised of 6 items ("I feel [guilty] [remorseful] [ashamed] [humiliated] [regretful] [disgraced] for the behavior of the Portuguese during the colonial war").

Group-based anger. To address the levels of group-based anger towards the ingroup, individuals indicated how much they experienced this emotion regarding the past misdeeds of their ingroup (Cronbach α = .80). This measure consists of 3 items that were derived from Watson and colleagues (1988): "I feel [angry] [outraged] [furious] for the behavior of the Portuguese during the colonial war".

Compensatory behavioral intentions. To capture compensatory behavioral intentions, 4 items derived from Doosje and colleagues (1998) were used (α =.85). Examples are "I think the Portuguese owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese have done" and "I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of people from the former colonies because of the negative things the Portuguese have done".

Subjective importance of discussing the past. Participants were then asked about the importance of remembering the positive and the negative aspects of the colonial period in the media and the school curriculum, through 4 items previously used by Figueiredo and colleagues (2010). We first aggregated the two positive items and the two negative items and then the negative items were subtracted from the positive items in way to create a composite measure for perceived importance of remembering *negative* aspects of the colonial conflict (α = .77), with possible values ranging from -6 (discuss the positive aspects of the past) to +6 (discuss the negative aspects of the past). Example items are "How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the positive aspects of the Portuguese colonial period?" and "How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the negative aspects of the Portuguese colonial period?".

Forgiveness assignment. The measure capturing forgiveness assignment consisted of 5 items (Cronbach α = .66). This measure addresses the degree to which participants feel that their ingroup should be forgiven for their past misdeeds during the colonial war. Example items are "The Africans should move past their negative feelings towards the Portuguese for the harm they inflicted to them during the colonial war" and "Portuguese today cannot be held accountable for what their ancestors have done to Africans during the colonial war".

Results and Discussion.

Correlations and means.

The correlations between all the variables under analysis and the means (and standard deviations) are presented in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively.

Table 4

Correlations (r) and p Values (between brackets) Among the Variables in the Portuguese (Port.) and the Dutch Samples

	Ingr. SI	Collectivism	Outgr. Id.	Meta-percept.	Exon. Cogn.	Compunction	Anger	Compens. Behav. Intent.	Subject. Import. Past	Forgiveness
Ingr. SI (Port./Dutch)		.29*	.17*	.13*	.22*	-.03	-.09	-.08	-.21	.06
Collectivism	.26*	--	-.01	-.01	.02	.10	.16*	.03	-.16*	.13*
Outgr. Id.	.02	.06	--	.17*	-.16*	.34*	.27*	.42*	.01	-.25*
Meta-percept.	.11	.14	.30*	--	.04	-.10	-.14*	-.03	-.02	-.06
Exon. Cognit.	.22*	-.13	.01	.12	--	-.30*	-.39*	-.36*	-.28*	.36*
Compunction	.06	.21*	.40*	.03	-.07	--	.70*	.40*	.13*	-.27*
Anger	.01	.15*	.37*	-.07	-.03	.87*	--	.38*	.21*	-.21*
Compens. Behav. Intent.	-.21*	-.04	.34*	.01	-.08	.43*	.49*	--	.13*	-.33*
Subject. Import. Past	-.17*	-.06	.09	-.08	-.30*	.20*	.19*	.05	--	.12
Forgiveness	.20*	.03	-.06	.06	.28*	-.42*	-.46*	-.53*	.06	--

*p < .05

Table 5

Means, Standard Deviations and F-tests for Univariate Follow-up Tests for the Portuguese and the Dutch Samples

	Portuguese sample		Dutch sample			
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*F*(1, 461)	*p*
Ingr. SI	4.57	.80	4.12	1.06	27.78	< .001
Collectivism	5.61	.65	4.82	.70	154.59	< .001
Outgr. Id.	3.65	1.03	2.53	1.27	107.14	< .001
Meta-percept.	3.85	1.16	3.86	.91	.01	> .90
Exon. Cognit.	4.09	.57	3.62	.65	67.66	< .001
Compunction	3.59	.85	3.61	1.28	.04	> .80
Anger	3.87	.96	3.13	1.44	45.14	< .001
Compens. Behav. Intent.	3.77	.93	2.66	1.08	137.44	< .001
Subject. Import. Past	.06	1.08	.57	1.19	23.19	< .001
Forgiveness	4.95	.75	4.89	.94	.54	> .45

* Means significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (*p* < .05).

Structural Equation Model.

We tested a structural equation model using EQS (see Figure 3) to analyze the pattern of relations between all variables under study. The model included hypothesized paths from ingroup self-investment to the other predictor variables (i.e. exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions). Furthermore, we included paths between the predictor variables, the emotional measures (i.e. group-based compunction and group-based anger) and the outcome variables (i.e. compensation, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment). Paths from group-based compunction and group-based anger to compensation, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment were also included. Given the potential relationships amongst the predictor variables and amongst the emotional variables in the model, we allowed for associations between them.

The resulting model fits the data well. The χ^2 value is small and statistically not significant: χ^2 (18, *N* = 280) = 21.67, *p* > .10. The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .98, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .99,

Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .99, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .98, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .03, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .03. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 3.

Note: Standardized parameter estimates; *p < .05. Below are presented correlations between variables which are not represented in the Figure for reasons of simplification:
Correlation between predictor variables: Collectivism r Exonerating cognitions = -.06; Exonerating cognitions r Outgroup identification = -.21*; Outgroup identification r Meta-perceptions = .16*.
Correlation between emotions: Group-based anger r Group-based compunction = .62*. Correlation between outcome variables: Compensation r Forgiveness assignment = -.15*.

Figure 3. Structural equation model testing antecedents and consequences of group-based compunction and anger for the Portuguese sample.

To further assess our hypotheses and the validity of the theorized model, we tested several other models in which we explored the role of the different group-based emotions under study. We tested three different models: the first including only group-based guilt, the second one including only group-based anger and the third including both group-based guilt and shame separately (i.e. we subdivided the

items of group-based compunction into two measures: group-based guilt and group-based shame) and anger.

As it is visible from Table 6, except for the model containing only group-based guilt, no other model proved to have a better fit to the data than our hypothesized model. Even though the model in which we only include group-based guilt has a good fit, it does not provide an improvement regarding our hypothesized model, since the fit indices are very similar. Therefore, we can conclude that the results fit our theoretical model well.

Table 6

Fit Indexes of Hypothesized and Alternative Models for the Portuguese Sample

	Chi square	p	NNFI	CFI	IFI	GFI	SRMR	RMSEA	AIC
Hypothesized model	χ^2 (18, $N =$ 280) = 21.67	> .10	.98	.99	.99	.98	.03	.03	-14.33
Only Guilt	χ^2 (16, $N =$ 280) = 20.84	> .10	.97	.98	.99	.98	.04	.03	-11.16
Only Anger	χ^2 (16, $N =$ 280) = 32.47	< .01	.89	.95	.95	.97	.04	.06	.47
Guilt and shame separetely	χ^2 (29, $N =$ 280) = 335.24	< .01	.21	.58	.60	.82	.11	.20	277.24

As expected, ingroup self-investment is positively related to exonerating cognitions and collectivism. Furthermore, in the present study, ingroup self-investment is also positively related to outgroup identification and meta-perceptions.

Amongst the later variables, the only significant associations occur between exonerating cognitions and outgroup identification (negative relation) and between outgroup identification and meta-perceptions (positive relation) (see Figure 3). The

emotional items (i.e. group-based compunction and group-based anger) also present a significant correlation with each other (see Figure 3).

Corroborating Hypothesis 1, exonerating cognitions are negatively associated with group-based compunction and group-based anger. Exonerating cognitions are also negatively related to compensatory behavioral intentions and subjective importance of discussing the past. Finally, exonerating cognitions are positively associated with forgiveness assignment. These results suggest that exonerating cognitions, as a defensive mechanism against negative information about the ingroup's past history, prevent individuals from feeling group-based compunction and group-based anger.

In its turn, collectivism is positively associated both with group-based compunction and group-based anger, confirming Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, the first variable is negatively associated with subjective importance of discussing negative information about the colonial war.

Interestingly, exonerating cognitions and collectivism are negatively related to subjective importance of discussing the past. A higher sense of collectivism and the endorsement of more exonerating cognitions is associated with a more defensive analysis of the ingroup's past misdeeds and, thus, is related to a lower willingness to discuss the colonial past.

Outgroup identification positively predicts the experience of group-based compunction and group-based anger (Hypothesis 3), as well as compensation. Indeed, the more the Portuguese identify with the outgroup, the more they feel negative emotions and the more they think the outgroup should be compensated for the past misdeeds of the ingroup. Additionally, outgroup identification is negatively related to forgiveness assignment.

Hypothesis 4 was also confirmed: meta-perceptions are negatively associated with group-based compunction and group-based anger. When Portuguese participants believe the outgroup holds a positive view of them, then the experience of group-based compunction is reduced, perhaps because there is a sense of restored balance in the intergroup relations between both groups.

Furthermore, group-based compunction presents significant relations with compensation (positive relation) and with forgiveness assignment (negative relation). Given this, Hypothesis 5 was confirmed.

In regards to the more novel outcome variable included in this study, forgiveness assignment, the results show that the more individuals identify with the outgroup and experience more group-based compunction, the less they feel their ingroup should be forgiven for the past misdeeds. However, when individuals endorse more exonerating cognitions, the more they believe the ingroup should be forgiven for what has happened in the past. Although group-based anger did not predict forgiveness assignment, we can conclude that Hypothesis 6 was partially confirmed.

Study 2: The Netherlands

In the first study we analyzed group-based emotions in the context of the Portuguese colonial war. In this second study we aim to conduct a cross-national replication using a different setting, in order to assess the generalizability of the presented model. Therefore, we investigated the group-based emotions of the Dutch regarding the conflictual ending of the colonization of Indonesia, which occurred between 1945 and 1949. By using another historical conflict between groups, we intend to unravel the communalities and differences that may exist across different cultures and settings regarding the experience of group-based emotions, as well as their antecedents and consequences.

The hypotheses for this study are the same as in Study 1.

Method.

Participants.

One-hundred eighty four Dutch university students participated in this study, during a mass testing session. Of the total number of participants, 70.1% were women (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 4.71$; range 17-45).

Design and procedure.

The present study had a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Dutch colonial past were assessed using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire was administered during the "TestWeek" at the University of Amsterdam. During a session, students had to participate in several research

projects, for course credits. At the beginning of the questionnaire it was explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia. Demographical variables, such as age, gender and nationality of the participants and their parents were also covered in the questionnaire.

Measures.

All measures used in the present study were the same as used in Study 1 (of course, with the necessary adaptations for the different target groups) and the scales used all ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The Cronbach alpha values for predictor measures are: *ingroup self-investment:* α = .90; *exonerating cognitions*: α = .70; *collectivism*: α = .53; *outgroup identification*: α = .92*; meta-perceptions*: α = .87. For emotion variables the Cronbach alpha values are: *group-based compunction:* α = .89; *group-based anger*: α = .90. The Cronbach alpha values for the consequences of group-based emotions are: *compensatory behavioral intentions*: α = .79; *subjective importance of discussing the past*: α = .80; *forgiveness assignment*: α = .68.

Results and Discussion.

Differences between the Portuguese and Dutch samples.

To check for differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples regarding the average scores on the variables under analysis, we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), which showed that there are significant differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples: Wilks' Lambda = .58; $F(1, 461) = 62.45$, $p < .001$. For a detailed overview of the results, see Table 5.

Correlations and means.

The means (and standard deviations) of all the variables and the correlations between them are presented in Table 5 and Table 4, respectively.

Structural Equation Model.

The same structural equation model as in Study 1 was tested using EQS (see Figure 4).

The model fits the data well. The χ^2 value is small but statistically significant: χ^2 (19, $N = 184$) = 43.65, $p < .01$. Although this model presents a significant Chi-Square, when you divide the χ^2 by the number of degrees of freedom, the result is below 3, which represents a good fit index for medium sized samples (Kline, 1998). The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .89, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .95, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .96, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .96, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .06, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .08. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 4.

Using the same procedure as in Study 1, we tested three different models to further understand if our hypothesized model fits the data well. These models were the same as the ones tested in Study 1.

As it is visible from Table 7, except for the model containing only group-based guilt, no other model proved to have better fit indexes than our hypothesized mode and, therefore, we can conclude that the results fit our theoretical model well.

In the present sample, ingroup self-investment is only significantly related to collectivism and exonerating cognitions. In turn, the latter variables (i.e. collectivism and exonerating cognitions) are negatively and significantly correlated with each other, while outgroup identification and meta-perceptions are significantly and positively correlated with each other (see Figure 4). The emotional items (i.e. group-based compunction and group-based anger) also present a significant correlation with each other (see Figure 4).

For Dutch participants Hypothesis 1 was not confirmed. Exonerating cognitions are only significantly and negatively associated with subjective importance of discussing the past, while being positively associated with forgiveness assignment.

Note: Standardized parameter estimates; *$p < .05$. Below are presented correlations between variables which are not represented in the Figure for reasons of simplification:
Correlation between predictor variables: Collectivism r Exonerating cognitions = -.20*; Outgroup identification r Meta-perceptions = .30*. Correlation between emotions: Group-based anger r Group-based compunction = .85*. Correlation between outcome variables: Compensation r Forgiveness assignment = -.45*.

Figure 4. Structural equation model testing antecedents and consequences of group-based compunction and anger for the Dutch sample.

For the present sample, we were able to show that collectivism is positively associated with group-based compunction and anger (Hypothesis 2) and the same pattern holds for outgroup identification and the emotional variables (corroborating Hypothesis 3). Once again, we were able to show that the higher the bond with the outgroup, the higher is the experience of negative group-based emotions. In addition, outgroup identification is positively associated with compensation.

Hypothesis 4 is only partially confirmed: the lower the meta-perceptions of the Dutch are, the more they experience group-based anger.

Group-based compunction and group-based anger are negatively associated with forgiveness assignment, meaning that, for the Dutch sample, the higher the

levels of these negative group-based emotions, the less people feel that their ingroup should be forgiven for the negative events involving their national group.

Table 7

Fit Indexes of Hypothesized and Alternative Models for the Dutch Sample

	Chi square	p	NNFI	CFI	IFI	GFI	SRMR	RMSEA	AIC
Hypothesized model	χ^2 (19, $N =$ 184) = 43.65	< .01	.89	.95	.96	.96	.06	.08	5.65
Only Guilt	X^2 (17, $N =$ 184) = 38.26	< .01	.82	.92	.92	.96	.07	.08	4.26
Only Anger	χ^2 (17, $N =$ 184) = 63.64	< .01	.63	.83	.84	.94	.08	.12	29.64
Guilt and shame separetely	χ^2 (26, $N =$ 184) = 336.52	< .01	.09	.57	.59	.82	.15	.26	284.52

As expected, group-based compunction presents a positive and significant correlation with intentions of compensation and group-based anger is significantly and positively associated with subjective importance of discussing the past, thus confirming Hypotheses 5 and 6.

General Discussion

From the results of the two studies presented, we can affirm that, for most part, our hypotheses were confirmed. In both studies we found that ingroup self-investment is significantly related to exonerating cognitions and collectivism. Past research (Roccas et al., 2006) has shown that, indeed, individuals who identify more strongly with their ingroup are more defensive of the morality of the ingroup (see also Doosje et al., 1998), thus exculpating the ingroup for its past misdeeds, a pattern that we also obtained in our results.

Regarding the association between ingroup self-investment and collectivism, we propose that both variables can be conceptualized as membership relevance

factors and, thus, they are inherently associated. While self-investment is more focused on the positive aspects of feeling a bond with a group, collectivism represents a broader group orientation of individuals.

More interestingly, for the Portuguese sample, we found significant relations between ingroup self-investment and outgroup identification, a pattern we believe could be linked to *luso-tropicalism*.

Luso-tropicalism refers to a social representation of the Portuguese nation emphasizing the unique relationships Portugal had with its colonies and the special positive way with which Portuguese dealt with people from different cultures and the lack of prejudice among the Portuguese (Vala et al., 2008; Valentim, 2003, 2011). In this line, Portuguese individuals who feel they share a bond with the people from the former colonies, may feel that the ingroup is linked, to a higher extent, with the outgroup. Another result in line with the concept of *luso-tropicalism* refers to the average score for outgroup identification, which is significantly higher in the Portuguese sample than in the Dutch sample. However, the reverse happens with meta-perceptions. The latter seem to be more a general perception that individuals hold about the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup, without necessarily involving a sense of bonding with the outgroup, a pattern of results we assume is distinct from *luso-tropicalism*.

Further research should address the role *of luso-tropicalism* in the Portuguese sample. We believe this may be an important variable in understanding the perceptions of the relationship between the Portuguese and the people from its former colonies. More importantly, understanding if *luso-tropicalism* is a specificity of the Portuguese context or if it is a more general trend in intergroup relations may be a relevant research venue for the future.

Our first hypothesis, whereby we expected exonerating cognitions to be negatively associated with group-based compunction and group-based anger, was only partly confirmed, since we only found evidence for these links in Study 1.

Regarding the Portuguese sample, the pattern of correlations is consistent with the work done by Roccas and colleagues (2006) in relation to the links between ingroup identification, exonerating cognitions and group-based emotions. It can be argued that more defensive reactions to the ingroups' past history and a lower willingness to accept the misdeeds of the national group's past, will lead to decreased

levels of group-based compunction and group-based anger. Furthermore, for the Portuguese sample (but not for the Dutch sample), exonerating cognitions are significantly and negatively related to compensatory behavioral intentions. Perhaps, for the Portuguese sample, those who endorse more exonerating cognitions feel there is no need to compensate the outgroup. For the Dutch, where no significant link between these variables was found, we argue that participants think it is not important to compensate Indonesia, either because compensation has already happened or because the events under analysis are perceived to be too far away in time from the present day to still be compensating for them. This reasoning is also in line with the fact that the average score on compensatory behavioral intentions is higher for the Portuguese sample than for the Dutch sample.

We found evidence, in both studies, that exonerating cognitions are negatively related to the subjective importance of discussing the past and positively related to forgiveness assignment. We argue that individuals who use exonerating cognitions are not so open to negative information about their ingroups' history and, therefore, do not want to discuss these negative aspects of the past, while feeling the ingroup should be forgiven for the misdeeds that happened in the past. This pattern of results reflects a kind of moral disengagement from the ingroup's wrongdoings (Barkan, 2000; Kanyangara et al., 2007).

The results from the Portuguese and the Dutch studies show support for Hypothesis 2, being that collectivism is positively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger. We believe that a more collectivistic orientation may lead individuals to feel higher levels of group-based emotions, because this general group-focused orientation is relevant for the emotional processes involving their group membership and its associations with other groups. Also, as expected from previous research, Portugal presents higher levels of collectivism than the Netherlands (Hofstede, 1980).

Interestingly, collectivism is also negatively associated with subjective importance of discussing the past in the Portuguese sample. This double role of collectivism in the Portuguese sample may be related to the fact that, for the Portuguese participants, feeling negative emotions about the past does not necessarily mean there is a need to redress this negative past by discussing its negative consequences. Further research should explore this tentative explanation.

Regarding the third hypothesis we were able to show, in both studies, that outgroup identification is positively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger. The more individuals feel a bond with the outgroup, the higher are their levels of group-based emotions deriving from the ingroup's past misdeeds. This pattern of results is in line with the argument of Baumeister and colleagues (1994), stating that when the damaged relationship is with a relevant person or group, individuals will feel stronger emotions than when the other is not relevant to the person or group who committed the wrongful actions.

Therefore, outgroup identification appears to be a relevant variable for the improvement of intergroup relations, via its links with group-based compunction and anger, but also through its direct association with the desire to compensate the outgroup, which can be considered a more instrumental way of dealing with past conflictual intergroup relations.

As for Hypothesis 4, we found evidence that meta-perceptions are negatively related to group-based compunction (Study 1 only) and anger (in both studies). It thus seem that, in general, the more individuals believe the outgroup has a positive perception of the ingroup, the less they show negative emotions regarding past events involving the two groups, perhaps due to a feeling of restored balance in the intergroup relation at stake.

In both studies we found that group-based compunction predicts compensatory behavioral intentions and group-based anger is positively related to the subjective importance of discussing the past.

We believe that compensatory behavioral intentions are only predicted by group-based compunction, because this emotion is more focused on the ingroup's role in the events and the outgroup's suffering, when in comparison with group-based anger, which is more directed towards the ingroup's moral standing regarding the misdeeds of the past.

It is interesting to note that group-based anger is more relevant than group-based compunction when predicting how important people feel it is to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial past. This result is consistent with work done by Leach and colleagues (2006) in which they show that, due to the higher readiness for action derived from feelings of anger, this group-based emotion is related to actions towards changing intergroup imbalances and improving the outgroup situation. In

comparison, group-based compunction is an emotion with a lower level of action readiness and is, in general, more related to efforts of compensation, which are more passive in nature. We can argue that, in fact, subjective importance of discussing the past is a more direct way of improving intergroup relations in the present day, than are compensatory behavioral intentions, a variable that describes a general wish to compensate for the ingroup's past misdeeds.

Regarding the more novel theorized consequence of group-based emotions, our results show that for the Portuguese sample, group-based compunction relates negatively with forgiveness assignment and, for the Dutch sample, both group-based compunction and anger negatively predict this variable. We argue that the dynamics of group-based emotions might influence the ingroup's perceptions regarding whether they should or should not be forgiven for negative actions that occurred in the past. In this line, the more individuals feel negative group-based emotions, the less they feel the ingroup should be forgiven. This pattern of results reflects a willingness by ingroup members to deal with the negative past, discuss it and, in some circumstances, compensate the outgroup before they feel they deserve to be forgiven for these past actions. In this line, forgiveness assignment can be conceptualized as an important determinant of the quality of intergroup relations after a negative past.

Further research should shed light into the dynamics of forgiveness assignment from the ingroup's perspective. We believe this to be an important step in understanding when or why individuals feel their group has to do more before being forgiven or when the efforts (or lack of perceived need of them) made by the ingroup have been enough for them to feel the past should be forgiven.

It is important to acknowledge that, though many researchers have made efforts to disentangle the distinctive role of shame and guilt for improving intergroup relations (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2004), in the present research we used a measure that aggregates self-criticism/shame and guilt – group-based compunction. For example, in a study by Brown and Cehajic (2008), they were able to show that group-based shame and group-based guilt both predict reparation, though there are different mediators affecting the relationship between these emotions and compensation. Still, regarding the aforementioned study, our measure of compunction does not relate to the reputational aspects of shame as

measured by Brown and Cehajic (2008). Even in other studies where it was found that group-based shame and group-based guilt have different consequences for intergroup behavior (Branscombe et al., 2004; Lickel et al., 2004), there is usually a high correlation between shame and guilt (Iyer et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2008). Therefore, we believe our results do not contradict previous research. Additionally, we have also shown that an alternative model separating shame from guilt resulted in weaker fit indices than the theoretical model proposed. Nevertheless, further research could benefit from analyzing the subtleties between group-based shame, guilt and compunction.

It is important to acknowledge that, in our studies, group-based compunction and group-based anger were also strongly related to each other, though we showed they do have different consequences for intergroup relations. In the future, understanding in which ways the strong association between different negative group-based emotions might influence intergroup relations affected by a past or present conflict, should also be addressed.

We believe it is important that future research explores other variables that may affect the experience of negative group-based emotions, such as other outgroup-focused variables like perceived legitimacy of compensation claims by the outgroup or the influence of chronological and subjective time on the relations between the ingroup and the outgroup.

Conclusion

We have shown that group-based compunction and group-based anger are two distinct and important emotions involved in the dynamics of intergroup relations following a conflict between groups. The present research has shown that collectivism and outgroup identification are positively associated with group-based compunction and anger, while exonerating cognitions (in Study 1 only) and meta-perceptions are negatively associated with these emotions.

We have concentrated our efforts in understanding the (different) consequences of negative group-based emotions regarding compensatory behavioral intentions, perceived importance of information and a novel variable, forgiveness assignment. In the future it would be important to analyze other possible consequences of negative group-based emotions for the dynamics of intergroup relations.

Chapter 7. Is it too Long Ago to Compensate? The Role of Perceptions of Time and Emotions in Predicting Compensation for Past Colonial Conflicts[9]

_____

Abstract

In the present article we analyze the role of subjective time and group-based compunction and anger in the desire to compensate the outgroup in relation to historical colonial conflicts. Furthermore, we analyze the relationships between the aforementioned variables and perceptions of the past as being violent and perceptions that compensation has been enough. In two studies conducted in Portugal ($N = 170$) and the Netherlands ($N = 238$), we were able to show, by means of structural equation modeling, that perceptions of the time passed between the negative events and the present day, are negatively related to compensatory behavioral intentions. Furthermore, the belief that past compensation has been enough is negatively related to group-based anger and compunction. Anger (Study 1 only) and compunction are positively associated with intentions of compensation. The implications of our results for the field of intergroup relations are discussed.

Key-words: perceptions of time; group-based compunction; group-based anger; compensation; intergroup relations.

---

[9] This Chapter is based on an article by Figueiredo, Valentim and Doosje (2012b).

"Interpreting events may take time and distance." (Eyerman, 2004, p. 163)

History is an important source of identity for groups. In this sense, many nations acknowledge past events of their history by, for example, creating monuments, statues and museums to celebrate victories or remember victims of wars. With these physical demonstrations, nations are constructing a narrative of their history and a sense of identity among members of their national group that continues through time, but can also be changed or reinterpreted at different times (Barkan, 2000). Hence, we can argue that time is important for groups to create and reflect upon their identities and that time plays an important role in intergroup relations.

In the present article we focus on two historical contexts of intergroup conflict, namely the Portuguese and the Dutch colonization periods, which ended with violent conflicts over the independence of the colonies. The Portuguese colonial war occurred between 1961 and 1974 in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, in a period in which the country was under the New State dictatorship (1926-1974). The Indonesian war of independence with the Dutch, happened soon after World War II and it culminated in 1949, with the recognition of the independence of Indonesia. These are two negative events in the national history of both countries that could shed a negative vision of the colonizer groups' misdeeds against other groups, and in which perceptions of time may affect the intergroup relations.

For the purpose of our analysis, we conceptualize subjective time as people's perceptions of how long ago these events have happened and how these perceptions relate with the desire to compensate the victims. We assume that the subjects' perceptions of time and the real time elapsed between the events and the present day may overlap. However, our analysis focus on people's perceptions of time passed between then and now in our measurement of time, rather than on chronological time.

Furthermore, we intend to analyze the potential relationships between perceptions of the past as being violent, perceptions that compensation has already been enough, the experience of group-based compunction and anger, and the desire to compensate the victims of the past misdeeds committed during the colonial period.

Igartua and Paez (1997) argue that an important factor in the generational cycle of memory is the existence of the necessary psychological distance that remembering a collective or individual traumatic event requires.

In this line, we argue that the dynamics of subjective time will affect the desire or willingness to compensate the outgroup for the misdeeds committed in the past. However, we also consider that, although some psychological and time distancing is necessary, too much time may also influence the way groups deal with their negative past misdeeds and their intentions of compensation regarding this same past.

Therefore, an important empirical question pertains to the need of addressing how much subjective time is sufficient, but not too much, to remember, to feel, to compensate and make peace with the negative aspects of one's ingroup's past.

For example, Barkan (2000) argues that a generation must pass until individuals within a group are able to deal with their past misdeeds. In the Portuguese case, this dealing with the negative consequences of the colonial past may be occurring in the present day, since 36 years have passed since the end of the colonial past. As for the Dutch case, more time has passed (61 years), which could lead to differences regarding the desire to compensate the outgroup.

Furthermore, Peetz and colleagues (2010) have also shown that a greater subjective distance between the present day and the Holocaust leads German individuals to experience less collective guilt and less willingness to compensate the victims.

Other lines of research have also shown that time may affect the reconstruction of past events of a group's history, thus influencing its members' collective memories and national identities (Licata & Klein, 2010; Rensmann, 2004).

Therefore, we expect that the Dutch sample will perceive this elapsed time to be very long, thus feeling a lower desire of compensating the people from Indonesia, than the Portuguese sample, regarding the people from the African colonies. This hypothesis will be tested by assessing whether people feel too much time has passed (or not) between the negative past and nowadays and the relation of this variable with the desire to compensate the outgroup.

Regarding another aspect of intergroup relations - group-based emotions - social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and the theory of intergroup emotions

(Smith, 1993) combined, prove to be a fruitful way to understand when and why individuals feel emotions due to their group memberships and the relations their group holds with other groups. Indeed, individuals share social memberships and these carry with them an emotional involvement with the ingroup *vis a vis* other groups. For that reason, one can argue that if negative events of the past of a national group are brought to light, individuals may feel negative group-based emotions due to their group's moral transgressions (Doosje et al., 1998; Smith, 1993).

One of these emotions is group-based compunction, which is characterized by an intertwined experience of guilt and self-criticism/shame due to misdeeds committed by the ingroup (Devine et al., 1991; Zebel et al., 2007). Group-based compunction is an ingroup-directed emotion and relates to the involvement of this same ingroup in causing negative misdeeds against other groups. This emotion has been shown to be related to the desire to compensate victims of past misdeeds and with the desire to discuss the negative events of the past in the media and school curriculum (Figueiredo et al., 2012a), and therefore, we expect it, once again, to be related to the desire to compensate the outgroup.

Regarding group-based anger, an ingroup-focused emotion that involves a feeling that the ingroup has committed wrongful acts against another group, research has proven that its experience can help improve intergroup relations, via different mechanisms of compensation and affirmative action (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). In the present study we analyze group-based anger directed at the ingroup and we study its possible relations with intentions of compensation, although previous studies have shown that the relation between group-based anger and compensation is not consistent (Figueiredo, et al, 2012a; Leach et al., 2006).

The two group-based emotions under study generally present associations with each other, being that they coexist in many situations in which negative events provoked by the ingroup are under analysis. Nevertheless, previous research has also shown that, although they correlate with each other, they do present different consequences for intergroup relationships (Figueiredo et al., 2012a). With the two studies presented here, we intend to analyze their specific role in predicting the desire to compensate the outgroup for past misdeeds.

In another vein, throughout recent years, several authors have provided evidence for the existence of different antecedents of group-based emotions, such as

identification with the perpetrator group (Doosje et al., 1998; Leach et al., 2008), appraisals of responsibility for the harm committed (Branscombe et al., 2004), outgroup identification (Figueiredo et al., 2010), amongst many others. Still, one could ask whether there are other less studied antecedents of group-based emotions that should also be addressed, due to the implications they might have for the improvement of intergroup relations.

Consistent with this idea, we argue that perceptions about the past may also influence the experience of these negative group-based emotions and the way people deal with past misdeeds (Branscombe et al., 2002).

Therefore, we intend to analyze the way in which people perceive their national past as being violent. More specifically, we measure people's perceptions about how violent the colonial conflicts were and the way these perceptions about violence perpetrated in the past relate to group-based compunction and anger. The rationale is that individuals who perceive the past as being more violent, will experience more negative group-based emotions, due to the fact they perceive the ingroup as being the aggressive or fierce perpetrator of such violent actions towards other groups.

Furthermore, we argue that people's beliefs about what already has been done (or not) to improve the victimized outgroup's conditions will affect the experience of group-based compunction and anger. If, indeed, even when individuals think the colonial past was violent, they believe the ingroup has done enough to compensate the outgroup why would they feel negative emotions due to negative events?

In this line, we analyze whether beliefs about compensation for past misdeeds being enough affect the experience of group-based compunction and anger towards the ingroup and their consequential relations with compensatory behavioral intentions. We expect that, if individuals believe the misdeeds of the past have been corrected and compensated for, they will feel less group-based compunction and anger. For the present analysis, the fact that compensation has or not already happened is not as important as people's perceptions about the compensation they believe it has already happened. Indeed, as Doosje and colleagues (2004) note "(…) on other issues, such as slavery and the colonization of Indonesia, the Dutch government has never officially apologized or extended financial compensation, although the Dutch have paid large sums of 'development money'" (p.107), a

statement which also holds for Portugal and their efforts of compensation (or lack thereof) to the former colonies. To summarize, even though compensation has not occurred, people's perceptions about past compensation and their beliefs about it being enough will be under scrutiny, as well as the relations between these perceptions and group-based compunction and anger.

On the other hand, we argue that feeling group-based compunction and/or anger may signal that the group has committed wrongdoings in the past that are in need to be re-addressed. We expect group-based compunction and anger to be related to the willingness to compensate the outgroup for the moral transgressions of the past.

The hypotheses for our studies are as follows:

H1: The perceptions that too much time has passed between the negative past and the present day (i.e. perceptions of time) are negatively associated with intentions of compensation.

H2: Perceptions of the past as violent are associated positively with group-based compunction and anger.

H3: The belief that compensation in the past has been enough (i.e. perceptions of past compensation) is negatively associated with group-based compunction and anger.

H4: Group-based compunction and anger are positively associated with compensatory behavioral intentions.

Study 1: Portugal

In Study 1, we analyze how perceptions of time influence the desire to compensate the outgroup. We further study group-based compunction and anger of Portuguese people regarding the Portuguese colonial war and their relations with perceptions of the colonial past, perceptions of compensation as being enough and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Method.

Participants.

One hundred seventy Portuguese university students participated in this study on a voluntary basis. 92.4% of the participants were female (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 3.76$; range 17-51).

Design and procedure.

The present study had a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Portuguese colonial period were assessed using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire was administered at a University in Portugal at the beginning or at the end of classes and participants took about half an hour to complete it.

All items used in the present study were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

Measures.

Perceptions of time[10]. Two items were used to assess the degree to which people believe that the colonial past happened too long ago for Portugal to still compensate its former colonies (Pearson correlation $r = .75$). The items used are as follows: "There is no need for Portugal to continue compensating its former colonies for something that happened so long ago", "Portugal should not compensate more its former colonies for what happened in the past".

---

[10] Due to the similarity of the items used in the scales of perceptions of time and perceptions of past compensation, two confirmatory factor analyses were conducted. The model using a one factor solution for both scales produced good fit indexes: χ^2 (2, $N = 170$) = .49, $p > .50$, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.01, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.01, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .01, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .00. The solution presenting two factor (perceptions of time and perceptions of past compensation) presented even better fit indexes: χ^2 (1, $N = 170$) = .01, $p > .50$, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.02, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .00, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .00. Therefore, these scales are treated separately in the remaining of the analysis conducted.

Perceptions of the past. To measure perceptions of the colonial past as violent, one item derived from Valentim (2003) was used ("I believe the colonial past was violent and barbaric").

Perceptions of past compensation. The measure capturing the belief that compensation to the former colonies has been enough is comprised by 2 items (Pearson correlation $r = .55$). These items are "The Portuguese have compensated enough the former colonies for what happened during the colonial period" and "The efforts Portugal did to compensate its former colonies for what happened during the colonial period were enough and should stop".

Group-based compunction. To measure the level of group-based compunction, individuals indicated how much they experienced this emotion regarding the past misdeeds of their ingroup (Cronbach $\alpha = .65$). This scale was derived from Watson and colleagues (1988) and comprises 6 items ("I feel [guilty] [remorseful] [ashamed] [humiliated] [regretful] [disgraced] for the behavior of the Portuguese during the colonial war").

Group-based anger. To address the levels of group-based anger towards the ingroup, individuals indicated how much they experienced this emotion regarding the past misdeeds of their ingroup (Cronbach $\alpha = .84$). This measure consists of 3 items that were derived from Watson and colleagues (1988): "I feel [angry] [outraged] [furious] for the behavior of the Portuguese during the colonial war".

Compensatory behavioral intentions. To capture compensatory behavioral intentions, 4 items derived from Doosje and colleagues (1998) were used ($\alpha = .79$). Examples are "I think the Portuguese owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese have done" and "I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese have done".

Results and discussion.

Correlations and means.

The means (and standard deviations) of all the constructs under study and their correlations are presented in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively.

Table 8

Means, Standard Deviations and MANOVA Results for the Portuguese and the Dutch Samples

	Portuguese sample		Dutch sample			
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*F*(1, 406)	*p*
Perc. Time	3.69	.90	4.43	1.13	50.70	< .001
Perc. Past	4.13	1.01	4.61	1.22	17.56	< .001
Perc. Past Comp.	3.66	.83	4.18	.92	34.41	< .001
Compunction	3.52	1.07	3.63	1.54	.66	> .40
Anger	3.98	1.06	3.52	1.77	9.08	< .001
Compensation	3.78	.91	2.86	1.14	76.79	< .001

Structural Equation Model.

We tested a structural equation model using EQS (see Figure 5) to analyze the pattern of relations between all variables under study. The model included hypothesized paths from perceptions of the past as being violent to both group-based anger and compunction. Furthermore, we included paths from perceptions of enough compensation to the two group-based emotions under study. Paths from group-based compunction and group-based anger to compensation were included and, finally, a path from the belief that too much time has passed to intentions of compensation was included. Given the potential relationships between the predictors and the emotional variables in the model, we allowed for associations between these.

The resulting model fits the data well. The χ^2 value is small and statistically not significant: χ^2 (4, $N = 170$) = 1.02, $p > .50$. The other fit indices also indicate excellent fit: Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.03, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.01, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .01, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .00. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Structural equation model for the Portuguese sample.

To further support our results, we tested other structural equation models in which the effect of subjective time would also be mediated by the experience of group-based compunction and anger, and another model in which perceptions of compensation as being enough was a mediator of the relationship between the two group-based emotions and compensation, rather than being an antecedent of these emotions. In the first model[11], the paths from perceptions of too much time to both emotions are not significant (path with compunction .02; path with anger .05). Further, in the second model[12] we confirmed that the general fit indexes, although a bit lower, are still good in comparison with our theorized model. Perceptions of compensation as being enough is not a mediator between the emotions and compensation, given that only the path from perceptions of compensation as enough and group-based compunction is significant (-.14). Furthermore, the path with the first variable and anger (-.00) is not significant. Thus, we have further evidence that, indeed, perceptions of too much time have a direct negative association with the desire to compensate the outgroup, and that perceptions of compensation as being

---

[11] χ^2 (2, $N = 170$) = .85, $p > .50$, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.00, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .01, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .00.
[12] χ^2 (3, $N = 170$) = 5.15, $p > .15$, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .97, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .99, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .99, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .99, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .06, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .07.

enough are a negative antecedent of the emotions felt by individuals which, in turn, predict the desire to compensate the outgroup.

In Figure 5, we can see that Hypothesis 1 was corroborated. Indeed, the belief that too much time has passed for compensation to happen is negatively associated with intentions of compensation.

For the present sample, we were able to show partial support for Hypothesis 2. When people believe the past was violent they tend to feel more anger towards the ingroup, but they do not necessarily feel higher levels of group-based compunction. Furthermore, the belief that compensation has been enough is negatively associated with group-based compunction and anger, a pattern which confirms Hypothesis 3.

From the results presented, we can conclude that the experience of group-based anger (but not group-based compunction) is affected by the perceptions of the past as being violent and by the perception that compensation has been enough. In turn, these emotions are associated with the desire to compensate the outgroup.

Finally, our results show support for Hypothesis 4. Namely, the two emotions measured - group-based compunction and anger - are significantly and positively associated with the desire to compensate the outgroup.

Summarizing, it seems that there is a need for time to pass between a collective traumatic event and the timing of re-analyzing the ingroup's moral standing regarding these events. Nevertheless, too much subjective time may also lead individuals not to feel associated with these events, thus feeling less negative group-based emotions and having less desire to compensate the outgroup.

To analyze these ideas, we conducted a second empirical study in a different context of intergroup conflict.

Study 2: The Netherlands

In the second study, we investigate the same variables as the ones used in Study 1, using a Dutch sample. Hence, we analyze the conflictual ending of the colonization of Indonesia by the Dutch, which occurred between 1945 and 1949.

Previous research (Figueiredo et al., 2010, 2011) has shown that, in general, the Portuguese indicate the same or a higher willingness to compensate the outgroup for past misdeeds, in comparison to the Dutch. We argue that these differences may be due to the subjective time passed between the negative events and the present day.

Consequently, with this second study, we aim to test our theoretical model in a different setting of intergroup conflict that occurred longer ago and analyze the possible differences existent between both cases.

Method.

Participants.

Two hundred thirty eight Dutch university students participated in this study, during a mass testing session. Of the total number of participants, 74.4% were women (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 5.05$; range 17-54).

Design and procedure.

The present study had a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Dutch colonial past were assessed using a questionnaire.

The questionnaire was administered during the "TestWeek" at a large University in the Netherlands. During a session, students had to participate in several research projects, for course credits.

Measures.

All measures used in the present study were the same as used in Study 1 (of course, with the necessary adaptations for the different target groups) and the scales used all ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The measure regarding *perceptions of the past* was comprised of 1 item. The correlation values for: *perceptions of time* r^{13} = .66 and for *perceptions of* past *compensation*: $r = .66$. For the emotion variables the Cronbach alpha values are *group-based compunction:*

---

[13] The same confirmatory factor analyses were done to confirm the validity of using the two scales - perceptions of time and perceptions of past compensation - as distinct constructs. The solution using a one factor solution for both scales produced relatively poor fit indexes: χ^2 (2, $N = 237$) = 11.93, $p <$ .05, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .94, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .98, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .98, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .03 and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .15. The solution presenting two factor (perceptions of time and perceptions of past compensation) presented very good fit indexes: χ^2 (1, $N = 237$) = 2.28, $p > $ .50, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .98, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .01, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .07. Therefore, these scales are treated separately in the remaining of the analysis conducted.

α = .91; *group-based anger*: α = .94. The Cronbach alpha value for *compensatory behavioral intentions* is α = .86.

Results and discussion.

Differences between the Portuguese and Dutch samples.

To check for differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples regarding the average scores on the variables under analysis, we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), which showed that there are significant differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples: Wilks' Lambda = .71; F (6, 401) = 27.16, $p < .001$).

As can be seen in Table 8, the Dutch believe the colonial past was more violent and barbaric than the Portuguese, while at the same time the Portuguese have a lower average score regarding their belief that compensation has been enough.

Interestingly, the average score of group-based compunction does not differ significantly between samples, though the average score of group-based anger is higher in the Portuguese sample than in the Dutch sample.

Finally, intentions of compensation are higher for the Portuguese sample, when compared to the Dutch sample and the belief that too much time has passed is lower in the Portuguese sample than in the Dutch sample.

Correlations and means.

The means (and standard deviations) of all the constructs and the correlations between them are presented in Table 8 and Table 9, respectively.

Table 9

Correlations (r) Among the Variables in the Portuguese (Port.) and the Dutch Samples

	Perc. Time	Perc. Past	Perc. Past Comp.	Compunction	Anger	Compensation
Perc. Time	Port. / Dutch	-.28*	.76*	-.13	-.23*	-.45*
Perc. Past	-.08	--	-.31*	.13	.26*	.19*
Perc. Past Comp.	.72*	-.14*	--	-.18*	-.32*	-.37*
Compunction	-.27*	.36*	-.29*	--	.56*	.46*
Anger	-.24*	.36*	-.28*	.83*	--	.53*
Compensation	-.39*	.15*	-.37*	.34*	.31*	--

*p < .05

Structural Equation Model.

The same structural equation model as in Study 1 was tested using EQS (see Figure 6).

The model fits the data really well. The χ^2 value is small but statistically significant: χ^2 (4, N = 237) = 6.16, p > .10. The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .99, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .99, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .03, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .05. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Structural equation model for the Dutch sample.

Furthermore, we tested the same structural equation models as in Study 1. Although the general fit indexes of the first model[14] presents good results, the paths from perceptions of too much time to both emotions (path with compunction -.13; path with anger -.15) are non-significant. Further, in the second model[15] we confirmed that the general fit indexes are much lower in comparison with our theorized model. Perceptions of past compensation as being enough is not a mediator between the emotions and compensation, given that the paths from perceptions of compensation as enough and group-based compunction (-.08) and anger (-.01) are not significant. Thus, we have further evidence that, indeed, perceptions of too much time have a direct negative association with compensatory behavioral intentions, and that perceptions of past compensation as being enough are a negative antecedent of the emotions felt by individuals. Group-based compunction (but not group-based anger), in turn, predicts the desire to compensate the outgroup.

In the present study we found evidence to support Hypothesis 1: when people believe too much time has passed between the negative past and the present day, there is no need to continue compensating the victimized group. Hence, taking the

---

[14] χ^2 (2, N = 237) = 2.75, p > .20, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .99, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .02, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .04.

[15] χ^2 (3, N = 237) = 18.19, p < .05, Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .86, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .97, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .97, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .98, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) = .10, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .15.

subjective time perspective into consideration, when addressing negative events of the past, may be an important element of understanding how (and when) groups are willing to deal with these negative events and make amendments.

Moreover, the present results show that, for the Dutch, perceptions of the past as being violent have a positive link with group-based compunction and anger, giving support to Hypothesis 2.

Hypothesis 3 was also confirmed. The belief that past compensation has been enough is significantly and negatively associated with both group-based compunction and anger

As expected from Hypothesis 4, group-based compunction is positively related to the desire to compensate the outgroup, a well documented consequence of feeling negative emotions towards the ingroup's misdeeds (Doosje et al., 1998; Iyer et al., 2007). Nevertheless, group-based anger does not relate significantly with the willingness to compensate the outgroup. It thus seem that, for the Dutch sample, although group-based anger is negatively predicted by the perception that compensation has been enough, this emotion does not relate to compensation. This may be due to the fact that group-based anger is more related to the willingness for political action, rather than being associated with abstract goals of compensation (Leach et al., 2006).

Mediation analysis for the role of subjective time in compensation and group-based anger.

Given the results regarding the association between the belief that too much time has passed between the negative events and the present day, and the willingness to compensate the outgroup, we further used Baron and Kenny's (1986) regression procedure for testing a mediation analysis, regarding participants nationality, subjective time and compensation. Hence, compensation was regressed on the dummy variable nationality of participants (coded as 0 = Portuguese and 1 = Dutch), which showed that nationality indeed predicts the level of willingness to compensate the outgroup: $\beta = -.40$, $R^2 = .16$, $t(406) = -8.76$, $p < .001$. The next step was to assess whether the belief that too much time has passed was predicted by nationality, a step which proved to be statistically significant, $\beta = .33$, $R^2 = .11$, $t(406) = 7.12$, $p < .001$. When the two predictor variables were entered (nationality and belief that too much

time has passed), the equation regression accounted for substantial variance in compensation (R^2 = .30), F(1, 406) = 86.53, p < .001. Nationality still predicted significantly the willingness for compensation, β = -.27, t(406) = -6.04, p < .001, although this effect was weaker than in the first step of the mediation analysis. The belief that too much time has passed also predicted significantly compensation, β = -.40, t(406) = -9.01, p < .001. We then conducted a Sobel test to determine whether the indirect effect of nationality on compensation, through the belief that too much time has passed, was significantly different from zero. This test was significant (z = -5.54, p < .001). Therefore, we can argue that the effect of nationality on compensation is partially mediated by the belief that too much time has passed between the past events and the present day for compensation to occur.

Given that the Portuguese and the Dutch sample do not differ regarding their levels of group-based compunction, but they do differ regarding their levels of group-based anger (i.e. the Portuguese have higher levels of anger), a mediation analysis using Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure was performed to analyze whether the belief that too much time has passed plays a role in this difference regarding group-based anger. Our first step was to regress group-based anger on the dummy variable nationality of participants (coded as 0 = Portuguese and 1 = Dutch), which showed that nationality, indeed, predicts group-based anger: β = -.15, R^2 = .02, t(406) = -3.01, p < .01. The next step had been already assessed (i.e. the belief that too much time has passed was predicted by nationality). Finally, when the two predictor variables were entered (nationality and the belief that too much time has passed), the equation regression accounted for substantial variance in group-based anger (R^2 = .08), F(1, 406) = 19.37, p < .001. Nationality no longer significantly predicted group-based anger, β = -.06, t(406) = -1.14, p > .10. The belief that too much time has passed still predicted significantly group-based anger, β = -.27, t(406) = -5.39, p < .001. We then conducted a Sobel test to determine whether the indirect effect of nationality on group-based anger, through the belief that too much time has passed, was significantly different from zero and this test proved to be significant (z = -2.83, p < .003).

We were also able to show that, indeed, subjective time plays an important role in the desire to compensate outgroups for misdeeds of the past. Our mediation analyses lead us to conclude that, for the Portuguese, less subjective time has passed

between the past and the present day and, therefore, there is a bigger need for compensation, than in the Dutch case.

General Discussion

From the results of the two studies presented, we can affirm that perceptions of time do seem to play a role in intergroup relations. Although we find a theoretical model explaining the antecedents of group-based anger and compunction and these emotions' relation to intentions of compensation in both studies, there are some differences between the two samples. These differences may be attributable to the differences in the perceptions of time passed between the wrongdoings of the past and the present day, found between the two samples analyzed.

Hypothesis 1 was confirmed in both studies, meaning that when individuals think that too much time has passed since the negative events and the present day, they feel there is less need for compensation. This result leads us to believe that, when historical misdeeds are being redressed, perceptions of time are a key element in understanding how this may be done in way to create venues for better intergroup relations.

To further support our idea that, indeed, subjective time plays a role in the desire that ingroups have to compensate outgroups for past misdeeds, a mediation analysis revealed that there is a higher willingness to compensate the outgroup in the Portuguese case, when in comparison with the Dutch case. This difference is partially due to the fact that the subjective time average score is lower in the Portuguese sample, when compared to the Dutch sample. Hence, we can assume that when people perceive the negative events of the past to be closer in time, the more the ingroup is willing to compensate the outgroup.

We also found that if people believe the colonial past was violent and barbaric they tend to feel more group-based compunction (Study 2 only) and group-based anger (both studies). These results provide partial evidence for Hypothesis 2 and it appears that, for the Portuguese sample, the experience of group-based anger is higher when participants think the past was violent. In comparison to the aforementioned sample, for the Dutch sample it seems these perceptions about the past as being violent are more strongly associated with both group-based compunction and anger.

Regarding the association between perceptions of past compensation as being enough and group-based compunction and anger, the results of both studies show that, indeed, when people feel that the ingroup has already compensated enough, they tend to experience lower levels of both negative group-based emotions. This pattern of results may be related to the fact that individuals do not have the need to feel bad about past events for which the ingroup has already compensated for.

It is important to note that the items used to measure perceptions of time and perceptions of past compensation are very similar linguisticly. Therefore, we conducted confirmatory factor analyses to provide further support for our conceptualization of these constructs as two (interdependent) but separate scales. Our results present evidence for this distinction. However, further research should develop more comprehensive and distinctive measures of both variables, in way to provide more consistent proof of our conceptualization.

In line with our expectations, we found that group-based compunction (both studies) and anger (Study 1 only) relate positively to compensation. These results provide partial support for Hypothesis 4. When individuals feel negative group-based emotions, they are willing to compensate the outgroup as a way to correct for the wrongdoings of the past. The fact that group-based anger is not related to compensatory behavioral intentions in Study 2, may be related to the fact that some research has shown that this emotion is more directed at other means of improving the outgroup's conditions, via mechanisms of affirmative action or protest, and not so strongly with abstract intentions of compensation (Figueiredo et al., 2012a; Leach et al., 2006).

Regarding the differences between the average scores on both samples, it is interesting to note that the Portuguese sample, in comparison with the Dutch sample, has a lower average score on the belief that compensation has been enough. On the contrary, the Portuguese sample does hold a higher average score on compensation (i.e. the wish to compensate the outgroup for the misdeeds committed in the past).

We argue that the Portuguese, in comparison to the Dutch sample, may feel more group-based anger and a higher need to compensate the outgroup, due to the perceptions that lesser time has passed between the negative events under analysis and the present day. Concurring to our analysis of the results is the idea that the Portuguese have a lower average score in the belief that compensation has been

enough, meaning that, indeed, they think that the misdeeds of the past didn't occur so long ago and that Portugal should still do something to compensate the outgroup. As for the Dutch, they believe that it is too long ago already to still make efforts of compensation towards the outgroup for something that, subjectively, happened far away in the past.

These results combined, reflect the idea that the Portuguese, in comparison to the Dutch, feel a higher need to correct for the past and compensate for the negative things they have done to the people of the former colonies. We believe these differences between both samples are related to the subjective time distance between the events we are analyzing and the present day, an idea that was confirmed through a mediation analysis.

In the Dutch case, the conflict with Indonesia occurred between 1945 and 1949, just in the aftermath of the Second World War. Chronologically, this event is further away in time from the Dutch national group's recent history, than in the case of Portugal.

Perhaps due to this time frame between then and the present day, the Dutch perceive they have had more time to deal with this negative past and compensate Indonesians for what they did, thus feeling there is less need to compensate the outgroup nowadays. In the Portuguese case, the colonial war ended in 1974 and individuals may feel there are still efforts that must be done to improve the outgroup's conditions and, therefore, compensate the outgroup for the past misdeeds.

This overlap between chronological and subjective time may blur our interpretations of the findings. However, we do focus our analysis on the perceptions of time passed between the negative events and the present day and hence, we downplay the role of chronological time in our interpretations. Therefore, we argue that subjective time is an important indicator of when and how compensation should be done, in way to create better intergroup relations between perpetrator and victimized groups.

Nevertheless, we must be careful in assuming that all the differences between both samples are related to perceptions of time. In fact, other structural differences existent between the countries may also contribute to these differences. For example, the level of integration of the minorities at stake in Portugal and the Netherlands, the general welfare of these countries or even the cultural differences beyond the scope

of this analysis could influence the results found. Further research should analyze if other variables may contribute to the differences we found regarding the desire to compensate the outgroup for past negative misdeeds.

Regarding group-based compunction, there are no differences between the samples, while the Portuguese sample has a higher average score of group-based anger than the Dutch. By conducting a regression analysis to test for mediation, we concluded that the experience of group-based anger is affected by the belief that too much time has passed since the negative events occurred. In this way, the differences found between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples were qualified by a full mediation of the belief that too much time has passed. This means that the Portuguese feel more group-based anger than the Dutch, because they perceive that less time has passed between the negative misdeeds of the past and the present day. It thus seems that group-based anger is a more volatile emotion than group-based compunction, an emotion that seems to be less affected by the perception of the passage of time.

Summarizing, from the data presented above, we can conclude that group-based compunction and anger are positively predicted by perceiving the past as violent and barbaric (in Study 1 these perceptions are only associated with group-based anger) and negatively predicted by the notion that compensation to the outgroups has been enough. Further research should tap into the question of whether compensation is enough to improve intergroup relations after a past marked by conflict and violence, and whether there are other antecedents of compensatory behavioral intentions.

Our results further demonstrate that perceptions of time also affect the ingroup members' willingness to compensate the outgroup. Given that, in the present studies, chronological and subjective time overlap, further research should disentangle this possible net effect by, for example, manipulating perceptions of time versus chronological time. By doing so, our understanding of time in its multiple expressions (such as chronological time, framing of events and perceptions of how time passes by) will be improved and we will better comprehend how time may affect distinctively intergroup relations.

To conclude, the present studies demonstrate the importance of taking into account the subjective time perspective when investigating historical intergroup

conflicts. History is part of a group's identity. As such, it is associated with group-based concerns and with group-based emotions such as anger, compunction, but, perhaps, pride as well. Future research might fruitfully expand a historical perspective on intergroup relations.

Part III. Discussion

Discussion

_____

Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

In the present dissertation we elaborated the conceptualization of three group-based emotions, namely guilt, compunction and anger, within the context of two historical colonial conflicts - the Portuguese colonial war and the Indonesian war of independence. With our research we aimed to reach a better understanding of the experience of negative group-based emotions and their antecedents and consequences for intergroup relations marked by a negative past. The theoretical framework used encloses aspects of the social identity and self-categorization theories, while integrating insights from appraisal theories of emotions and the relative deprivation literature.

Drawing from social identity and self-categorization theories, we have assumed that, when individuals are associated with an ingroup who has committed negative actions against ougroups, the social identity derived from their national group will be perceived negatively and an ingroup-image threat may rise. The confrontation with such negative actions committed by other members of the ingroup may lead individuals to appraise these events in terms of the ingroup's responsibility and illegitimacy of such actions.

The degree to which individuals identify with their national group will further determinate secondary appraisals of such events and the ingroup's involvement in them. In turn, these appraisals may lead to the experience of negative group-based emotions, such as guilt, compunction and anger. Therefore, we conceptualize ingroup identification as a distal antecedent of more secondary and proximal antecedents (appraisals) of such emotional experiences. When a combination of

different (distal and proximal) antecedents of emotions is present, the experience of negative group-based emotions may become unavoidable.

The extent to which, then, individuals report higher or lower levels of such negative emotions, will lead to distinct consequences, associated with action tendencies aimed at resolving these emotional experiences. In this line, we propose that the experience of negative emotions may have positive consequences for intergroup relations. By signaling that a valued intergroup relation has been damaged and needs to be restored, group-based emotions may serve to strengthen such a desire to improve this relationship. Thus, negative group-based emotions, in spite of their aversive and unpleasant nature, may lead to pro-social action tendencies aimed at constructing better intergroup relations between the historical perpetrator group and the victimized outgroups.

By choosing two distinct contexts in which to conduct our research, we aimed to uncover the similarities and specificities of each context in the experience of negative group-based emotions, which are usually associated with appraisals of the ingroup has having perpetrated negative actions against outgroups. In this line, the data comparison across two settings of past intergroup conflicts would allow us to unravel socio-psychological processes, which may be generalizable across situations and to determine the distinct specificities of each context that may influence the existence of some differences in the processes analyzed.

Furthermore, because of our beliefs that certain representations of this violent past may still present consequences for the intergroup relations in the present day, the assessment of such a historical past would also allow us to understand some of the current day intergroup dynamics existent between formerly colonizer and colonized groups.

Our analysis proved very fruitful: we have found consistent evidence regarding individuals' experience of negative group-based emotions when confronted with the negative past misdeeds of their ingroup. Furthermore, the antecedents and consequences of these emotional experiences were analyzed and we believe we have come to a more refined understanding of how these emotions shape certain aspects of intergroup relations in the current state of affairs.

Through the use of more advanced statistical analysis, we were able to consider the joint effects of distinct variables within a framework encompassing

several of these variables. Although Chapter 4 reports a study using only correlational data, the remaining empirical chapters (cf. Chapter 5, Chapter 6, and Chapter 7) of this dissertation, present results obtained through structural equation modeling techniques. By means of structural equation modeling, which is now a widely used statistical technique within the social sciences domain, we were able to test our theoretical assumptions and models and to corroborate (sometimes partially) our research hypotheses. We believe that, by using structural equation modeling, our work has been much improved in comparison to other possibilities of data analysis, using less sophisticated techniques, such as correlations and regressions.

These techniques have been introduced in recent years in the field of social psychology because of their potential in explaining more complex theoretical models than the ones previously allowed by the means of regression and different analysis of variance.

Structural equation modeling allows for the consideration of variables' errors in the estimation of model fits, a parameter which was not considered within classical methods of statistical analysis and, thus, represented a significant limitation of such methods. Furthermore, this theory-driven technique also creates the possibility to test global fits and individual significance of parameters within a theoretical model which includes different types of linear models and allows for the differentiation of interaction and mediation effects[16] (Davidov, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2011; Kline, 1998).

New software developments over the past years have made possible the refinement of model assessment within this methodology. For example, it is now possible to analyze multilevel models, allowing for the possibility of relationships between constructs to vary across levels of analysis (for example, at the individual, within country and across countries levels).

Most important to our research would be the developments around multi-group structural equation modeling. This technique allows for the estimation and

---

[16] In the empirical Chapters of the present dissertation we have not used terminology such as mediation effects due to the fact that all of our analysis presuppose group-based emotions to have antecedents and consequences associated to these emotional experiences. Hence, in most of our models, emotions are indeed mediators of the relationships found between the other variables under study. However, given the focus of our work in the role of emotions in intergroup relations, we relegate the "mediation terminology" to a secondary level, aiming to highlight these same emotions instead.

evaluation of theoretical models in two (or more) samples simultaneously and to test whether any of the seemingly discrepant paths found in these samples are indeed significantly different from each other (Meuleman & Billiet, 2011). Although we believe our work would have benefited from such an analysis technique, this methodology was not used. Nevertheless, we do test our models comparatively to each other and, through the assessment of different fit indexes, we have tested potential differences between the two samples. By complementing this technique with other statistical methods of analysis, we attempt to overcome the limitation of not using multi-group structural equation modeling.

In the remaining sections of this Chapter, we provide a summary of the main findings of our work and propose some theoretical and empirical implications of our research, while highlighting some of its potential limitations. Finally, we conclude the present volume by recommending new avenues for further research within the field of intergroup relations and emotions.

Main Findings

Taken together, the results of the four empirical chapters of this dissertation, provide sufficient evidence for the role of negative group-based emotions in shaping present day intergroup relations amongst groups who have been historically involved in conflict with each other. By analyzing intergroup relations within the context of historical colonization and past colonial conflicts, we presented results attesting to several assumptions based on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and intergroup emotions theory (Mackie & Smith, 1998; Smith, 1993).

As previously stated in the literature, we found that different modes of identification with an ingroup may lead to differentiated reactions, when an individual is confronted with its ingroup's past misdeeds. For example, in Chapter 4 we found that glorifiers of the ingroup (individuals who perceive their group to be superior to others) act defensively when confronted with their ingroup's negative past, by adhering to justifications and excuses that alleviate the ingroup's responsibility in such actions. Furthermore, this glorified pattern of identification with the ingroup is also associated with a more right-wing political orientation. This right-wing political orientation is, in turn, associated with lower levels of group-based guilt and a desire to focus on the positive aspects of the colonial past.

In Chapter 6, we provided further evidence for the role of one mode of ingroup identification – self investment – as a distal antecedent of group-based compunction and anger, through its influence on more proximal antecedents of these emotions. This self-investment dimension of identification refers to the importance, satisfaction and salience of a given social identity and, thus, it is expected that, through its association with other variables, leads to lower levels of group-based guilt.

We therefore conclude that ingroup identification, *per se*, might not influence directly the experience of negative group-based emotions. However, its direct link with other proximal antecedents of such emotions, leads us to assume that the degree to which individuals attach importance to their self-categorization and identification in social groups does influence the way the past negative actions of these groups are appraised and evaluated and, subsequently, the way they are felt. A higher level of ingroup identification thus makes individuals more defensive and reactive to the negative history of their group, because they cannot handle such a negative ingroup image and evaluation. Thus, what better way to avoid such a negative and threatening image of the ingroup than by exculpating the ingroup's actions and minimizing the severe consequences of the negative historical past?

We propose this need for a positive social identity mitigates the experience of negative group-based emotions through the adherence to representations of the past as being less severe and negative and/or by blaming the other group involved in the conflict. Indeed, we found evidence for such a pattern of relations: when individuals identify more with their ingroup, they use more exonerating cognitions to absolve the ingroup's role in the negative events analyzed and these, in turn, lead to less feelings of group-based compunction and anger (see Chapter 6).

But ingroup self-investment was also found to be associated positively with collectivism. The latter variable, in turn, increased the likelihood of individuals reporting more group-based compunction and anger. So, why would a higher level of ingroup identification lead to more exonerating cognitions being reported but, at the same time, also lead to higher levels of collectivism, although these two variables are inversely related to the experience of negative group-based emotions?

We argue this dual role of ingroup identification may be related to the nature of collectivism itself. While ingroup identification is, of course, expected to be

positively related to exonerating cognitions, the first variable is also associated with collectivism, because both variables represent a sense of satisfaction and enjoyment derived from group life and spending time with ingroup members.

However, while ingroup identification is more connected with ingroup-image concerns, collectivism's conceptualization as a positive general orientation towards group life, may explain such a pattern of results. If one adheres to a worldview by which group life is important, negative group-based emotions may rise when individuals are confronted with their ingroup's misdeeds. Given that this variable does not reflect ingroup-image concerns (as ingroup identification does), then we may comprehend why it predicts positively group-based compunction and anger. This interpretation is further supported by the significant negative links between collectivism and exonerating cognitions in both our samples (see Chapter 6).

So far, we have revisited our findings regarding antecedents of group-based guilt, compunction and anger which are solely focused on the ingroup's role on the negative misdeeds, and the ingroup's experience of the emotions under study.

Nevertheless, we argue that one of the main strengths of the present work is reflected in our analysis of outgroup-focused and relational antecedents of negative group-based emotions. To our knowledge, little attempts have been made to conceptualize negative group-based emotions by focusing on aspects of the intergroup relationship and of the perceptions the ingroup holds about the outgroup, their possible identification with the outgroup or even their meta-perceptions (i.e. individuals' beliefs about what the outgroup thinks of the ingroup). Exception made to the work conducted on outgroup perspective taking (Zebel et al., 2009a, 2009b), and to the efforts made by Valentim (2003) and Cabecinha and Feijó (2010) to explore the consequences of outgroup identification within the context of the Portuguese colonization.

In different studies, we found evidence for the role of outgroup identification in the experience of group-based guilt, compunction and anger. While in Chapter 5 we only found an association between outgroup identification and group-based guilt for the Dutch sample, in the studies reported in Chapter 6 outgroup identification was consistently associated with both group-based compunction and anger, in both samples. Furthermore, as reported in Chapter 4 through Chapter 6, outgroup identification is also positively associated with compensatory behavioral intentions.

These results, taken together, lead us to conclude that outgroup identification is indeed a relevant variable when assessing emotions at the intergroup level and may also contribute substantially to the desire of compensating the victimized group.

But other outgroup-focused and relational variables may also play a role in the characterization and conceptualization of negative group-based emotions. As shown in Chapter 5, the perceptions the ingroup holds about outgroup members (as measured by paired characteristics such as unfriendly-friendly, lazy-hard worker, etc.) also relate significantly to the experience of group-based guilt.

Furthermore, our conceptualization of meta-perceptions has also proved successful, in the sense that we were able to find negative associations between this variable and group-based guilt, compunction and anger across different sets of studies. Our data consistently provides support for the idea that meta-perceptions are negatively associated with the experience of group-based guilt, compunction and anger. We argue that this is the case, because meta-perceptions can be conceptualized as a variable which reflects a positive view of the relationship between the historical perpetrator group and the victimized group. In this line, if ingroup members believe the outgroup holds positive evaluations of the ingroup, the quality of present day relationship between them is positive and, therefore, there is no need to feel bad or experience negative emotions about events that have occurred in the past.

In the same line, the experience of negative group-based emotions can also be alleviated through perceptions held by the individuals regarding the compensation efforts already accomplished by the ingroup. In fact, when individuals believe their ingroup has already compensated the outgroup for the negative actions committed against them in the past, little feelings of group-based compunction and anger are reported.

Furthermore, we also found evidence for the role of perceptions of the past as influencing the experience of group-based emotions. When individuals perceive the colonial past as being violent, they report higher levels of group-based compunction and anger.

Therefore, we believe we have strong evidence pointing to the need of considering several aspects of the intergroup relation and of other outgroup-focused

and relational variables when examining instances of intergroup conflict from the perspective of the perpetrator's group.

As Baumeister and colleagues (1994) argue, there is a very small likelihood that individuals will feel negative emotions because of their wrongdoings when they do not value the relationship with the other part involved in the negative actions. For this reason, we believe that we will never fully grasp certain aspects of intergroup relations following a conflict, if we do not consider the outgroup's side and its influence on the ingroup's perceptions, appraisals and emotions in the complete equation of such phenomena.

A close reading of the present volume will also highlight a concept we have dealt with in our work, but never really measured: *luso-tropicalism. Luso-tropicalist* ideas refer to a general social representation of the Portuguese as having a distinctive, racism free character which would potentiate and assert their right to colonize and miscigenize with the native poputions from their former colonies (Vala et al., 2008; Valentim, 2005, 2011). The ideas of Gilberto Freyre (the author of the *luso-tropicalism* theory), as a social representation of the Portuguese, were officially adapted and instrumentalized by the New State Regime dictatorship, which ruled Portugal during the colonial war. While nowadays several lines of research have refuted the validity of such ideas, it is also widely acknowledged that *luso-tropicalist* ideas still permeate Portuguese individuals' perceptions and representations of the colonial past and of their relationship with the native populations from the former colonies (Cabecinhas & Feijó, 2010; Vala et al., 2008; Valentim, 2003, 2005, 2011).

In Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, we derive some potential explanations for differences found between the Portuguese and the Ducth samples in the light of *luso-tropicalism* and its pervasive influence in Portuguese society, as a social representation of the Portuguese character. For example, we attribute the differences found between the Portuguese and the Dutch regarding their mean levels of exonerating cognitions and outgroup identification to such a social representation. Overall, the Portuguese tend to endorse more exonerating cognitions and report higher levels of outgroup identification than the Dutch. Given the *luso-tropicalist* assumptions about the unique, positive and peaceful colonization of the Portuguese in comparison to other European colonial powers, and of their unique bond with the colonies' native populations, these results are understandable. If Portuguese

individuals accept such a positive representation of their relationship with the outgroup, it comes as no surprise the fact that they believe this past was less violent (see Chapters 6 and 7) and that they feel a close bond with the ougroup.

Group-based emotions would prove irrelevant for intergroup relations if they were to be innocuous in their experience. However, we do know that the dedication of many researchers' hours of hard work and efforts to understand emotions is related to their awareness of the potential consequences of emotional processes for inter-individual and intergroup processes and dynamics. Consequently, in our work, we have analyzed several action tendencies regarded as outcomes of different emotional experiences.

In our studies, we analyzed the role of group-based guilt, compunction and anger in predicting compensatory behavioral intentions. Such compensatory behavioral intentions have been extensively researched within the domain of group-based emotions (Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje et al., 2006; Pennekamp et al., 2007; Schmitt et al., 2008; Zebel et al., 2008; amongst others). It is now extensively established that, when individuals are confronted with the negative misdeeds of their ingroup, they are predisposed to experience group-based emotions on behalf of such events and show a desire to compensate the outgroup. Our results provide further evidence for such a strong link between negative group-based emotions and the willingness to take action aimed at compensating the outgroup for their victimized past.

Beyond this well documented association between group-based emotions and compensatory behavioral intentions, we also analyzed the role of perceptions of time as a determinant of the ingroup's desire to repair the harm done. We argue that individuals' perceptions of the negative events as being too far in the past, will lead them to perceive compensation efforts as not relevant in the present day. However, when the perception of the events as being closer (but perhaps not too close) in time to the present day, ingroup members' willingness to compensate the outgroup will be higher. This is exactly the pattern of results found and explained in Chapter 7.

Furthermore, we also found evidence for the association of negative group-based emotions with the subjective importance attached to the discussion of the past. In Chapter 4, we showed that lower levels of group-based guilt influence individuals' desire to discuss the positive aspects of the colonization past.

In a similar vein, some of our studies demonstrate that feeling higher levels of group-based guilt (Chapter 5) or group-based anger (Chapter 6) leads individuals to subjectively attach more relevance to the discussion of the negative aspects of the colonization period.

Mainly in Chapter 6, we make a distinction between the likely different consequences of group-based compunction and anger. Given the distinct phenomenology of such emotions, we argue that compunction is associated with more passive means of compensation (as measured by compensatory behavioral intentions), whereas anger is linked to more active behavioral tendencies, aimed at questioning and reflecting upon the status quo of the intergroup relations (as measured by the subjective importance of discussing the negative aspects of the past within the social media and the school curriculum). From our results, we can conclude that, indeed, group-based compunction and anger, albeit related, do present divergent consequences for intergroup relations. These results are in line with previous research investigating the differential consequences of different group-based emotions (Iyer et al., 2003; Iyer et al., 2007).

Finally, another consequence of negative group-based emotions pertains to the desire of the ingroup to be forgiven by the outgroup for its past misdeeds. In line with our expectations, we found that ingroup members who report higher levels of group-based compunction and anger believe their ingroup should not be forgiven. While most research conducted on forgiveness in the aftermath of intergroup conflict has focused on the victimized group's perspective, we proposed a different stand by looking at a perpetrator's perceptions of whether or not their group should be alleviated from their negative group-image in the path of forgiveness. It thus seem that ingroup members' negative group-based emotions need to first be resolved, before they can perceive their ingroup as worth of being forgiven by the victimized outgroup.

In sum, we believe our empirical findings have provided support for the theoretical approach and conceptualization of the role of group-based emotions in influencing dynamics of intergroup relations marked by past conflicts.

Similarities and Differences Between the Portuguese and the Dutch Samples

In the previous section of this Chapter, we have made an overview of the main findings of our studies across the Portuguese and Dutch samples. However, there were also some similarities and differences between the national groups under analysis deserving of being referred to.

Regarding self-investment, the Portuguese sample shows a higher level of identification with the ingroup, than the Dutch sample. Furthermore, the first sample also presents higher levels of collectivism and adherence to exonerating cognitions (for a detailed description see Chapter 6). Such results indicate that the Portuguese sample may, indeed, value more its national group membership than the Dutch sample, thus leading these individuals to be more group-oriented and defensive about their ingroup's moral stand.

In the studies reported in Chapter 5, we found that the Dutch sample has more positive outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions than the Portuguese sample. In Chapter 6, the average score of meta-perceptions did not differ between both samples. Nevertheless, in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, outgroup identification has an average value significantly higher for the Portuguese sample in comparison to the Dutch sample. These findings, taken together, lead us to conclude that holding positive perceptions of the outgroup or, even, having positive meta-perceptions, does not necessarily mean that individuals will identify with this same outgroup. In other words, having a positive view of the outgroup, does not implicate a strong bond with its members, since these variables contribute significantly and independently for the prediction of group-based guilt and compunction. The differences found regarding the average score of outgroup identification were interpreted in terms of a general *luso-tropicalist* orientation of the Portuguese sample.

Furthermore, the Portuguese and Dutch samples did not differ regarding their experience of group-based guilt (Chapter 5) and group-based compunction (Chapter 6). On the other hand, Portuguese individuals report higher levels of group-based anger than Dutch participants (Chapter 6 and Chapter 7).

We found consistent evidence that the Portuguese are more willing to compensate the ingroup than are the Dutch, although the first group attaches less importance to the discussion of the negative past. It thus seem that the Portuguese, in comparison with the Dutch, feel they should make more efforts to compensate the

outgroup, but they feel less need to discuss the negative actions perpetrated by the ingroup in the past.

Given that group-based guilt and compunction are emotions characterized by a lower level of action readiness and that group-based anger is generally associated with a higher level of action readiness, Portuguese individuals seem to hold the ingroup more accountable for the negative misdeeds committed during the colonial war (since the experience of group-based anger is higher in this sample). In this line, the Portuguese may desire to take more action aimed at solving these negative actions, compared to the Dutch sample, not only by feeling more group-based anger, but also by desiring to compensate more the outgroup.

Finally, no differences were found between the two samples analyzed, regarding the participants' desire to be forgiven by the outgroup for the negative misdeeds committed during historical colonial conflicts.

Theoretical and Practical Implications

The findings presented above provide us some significant insights into the role of emotions, their antecedents and consequences within the field of intergroup relations.

Regarding the theoretical implications of our work, we argue that our results attest to the need for a continuous effort of constructing and developing an integrative framework which encompasses domains within social psychology which, at times, may be handled separately. Only through the incorporation of distinct phenomena and processes as interrelated aspects of the same matter under analysis, can we make sense of some of the results found in our research.

For example, when we found some differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples, only by the inclusion of a level of analysis considering specific aspects of the Portuguese identity could we understand them. *Luso-tropicalism*, as a social representation of the Portuguese national identity, provided us with some insights that could explain differences found between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples. If we had not included this "grass roots" explanation, based on certain assumptions of the development and maintenance of the Portuguese national identity, we could have not comprehended some of our findings and overlooked some aspects of these intergroup contexts.

Regarding the specificities of the Portuguese context, we can only understand some of our findings in the light of *luso-tropicalism* as a social representation of the Portuguese national identity. If the inclusion of such a specific level of analysis in our understanding of the results found had not been considered, we would potentially fall short in our comprehension and explanation of such findings. We believe researchers must analyze intergroup relations within a broad-spectrum framework encompassing cross-cultural theories of intergroup relations and social identity processes whilst considering the contextual specificities of the context in which the research is conducted.

Without this integration of a more general level of theorizing and a more detailed understanding of contextual processes and dynamics of intergroup relations within the setting in which they occur, many questions may be left unanswered. In this line, we propose the inclusion of some of the assumptions of social representations theory (Moscovici, 1984, 1988) within our conceptualization of intergroup relations, as embedded in the context in which they occur. By considering the possibility that some shared constructions of the social world and the relations between individuals within groups may influence the way individuals perceive this social world and relate to it, we will overcome some limitations of a more general framework which cannot handle certain aspects of such relationships which are shaped by the context in which they occur.

Furthermore, we argue that not only these social representations must be considered in our conceptualizations of intergroup relations. We must also be attentive to the political background and diplomatic relations existent between the groups in which we focus our research. At the moment, the relations between Portugal and its former African colonies and the Netherlands and Indonesia are considered positive in nature. However, if this was not the case, we could have found very distinct results from the ones we presented. Taking in consideration such background factors that may (or may not) lead to tensions between the groups or to a shift in the way they interrelate, must also be considered when conducting our research. Such political and even socio-economic factors may influence the results of our research and if we not consider them in our analysis of intergroup relations, once again, we may fall short in our attempts to understand such relations.

Another set of findings from our work attests to the need of considering intergroup relations within a subjective timeframe which helps individuals to perceive groups as dynamic entities moving through time. Most likely, these perceptions of time may influence the way individuals perceive, feel and act towards their ingroup's past and the outgroups involved in this past. Therefore, an integrative framework which assesses such time perceptions may elucidate us in our knowledge of intergroup relations.

The dynamics of intergroup relations over time have indeed been considered in past research (Jordan, 2005: Peetz et al., 2010; Wang & Ross, 2005; amongst others), but we argue for a more refined theoretical conceptualization regarding chronological time and subjective time in the explanation of intergroup relations. For some individuals, certain aspects of a chronologically distant past may be, subjectively, very close in mind, whereas for others may even seem further away. Without understanding how these subjective perceptions influence individuals' processing of their ingroup's negative actions we will not be able to distinguish some of the reasons why people would (or not) be willing to overcome this negative past together with the outgroup. In the same way as we would not understand some of the action tendencies individuals report after being confronted with their ingroup's negative past. Consequently, considering perceptions of time across situations of intergroup conflict may shed light into some of the dynamics existent between the perpetrator and the victimized groups in the present day.

In the same line, we argue that our analysis of intergroup relations marked by past (or even present day) conflict may gain from the inclusion of subjective aspects of such intergroup relations. By including explanations of intergroup dynamics as being influenced by processes of identification with a group and the differential appraisals of the events under analysis, we have increased our understanding of such phenomena.

Nonetheless, we go beyond this conceptualization by arguing that certain aspects of the perceptions of the outgroup and of the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup, increase our understanding of intergroup relations in the present day. Although ingroup-focused variables may be an important predictor of the emotional experiences and action tendencies of a historical perpetrator towards a victimized group, we propose that outgroup-focused and relational variables will be

many times interrelated with the first. Our results assert our belief that we must include these variables in the analysis of negative group-based emotions, their antecedents and consequences for intergroup relations.

Through Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, we showed that several distinct variables focusing on the ougroup, the perceptions the ingroup has towards its members, the way they perceive their present day and past relations, and the way they identify with this outgroup, indeed, influence significantly the emotions reported by individuals. Hence, we argue that one of the main strengths of our work is precisely the attention paid to such variables in predicting group-based guilt, compunction and anger and their associated behavioral tendencies.

"Two don't dance if one does not wish to". This Portuguese traditional saying demonstrates our rationale: intergroup relations do not occur in a vacuum and they always involve more than one side, otherwise they could not be called "intergroup" and "relations". Therefore, if we do not consider this "relational" nature within the domain of intergroup relations, we will not come to a full understanding of its processes and dynamics. Of course, the outgroup and the perceptions of the relation between the ingroup and the outgroup will influence the way a perpetrator ingroup will perceive and feel its negative past misdeeds.

Summarizing, our results support the need for including more variables focusing on the outgroup and the relevance the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup has for the individuals who identify with their national group. This comprehensive understanding of how intergroup relations develop and shape the present state of affairs between all groups involved in a conflict will provide us with further knowledge in this domain.

As previously stated, if it wasn't for the relevance that group-based emotions have in predicting certain action tendencies of distinct groups in relation to each other, possibly the fertile ground of such research would have never bloomed. Therefore, we argue that the study of negative group-based emotions may be extremely relevant for our ability to comprehend intergroup relations.

The distinction between different group-based emotions, in terms of their appraisals, phenomenology and, most importantly, their associated behavioral consequences is then, in our understanding, of the utmost importance for the field of intergroup relations. This is exactly what our results corroborate, especially in

Chapter 6, where we distinguish between action tendencies derived from the experience of group-based compunction and group-based anger.

Summarizing, the work presented in this dissertation proposes several theoretical advances within the domain of intergroup relations that may benefit our present and future work in such domain.

Of most relevance we propose: 1) an integration of several distinct theories of intergroup relations and social identity processes and dynamics; 2) the inclusion of more grass roots explanations of intergroup relations which take into consideration the context in which they develop and are expressed (social representations of identity and intergroup dynamics are of most importance here, plus an assessment of background factors that may influence these); 3) the consideration of perceptions of time in our analysis; 4) the insertion of more outgroup-focused and relational variables in our understanding of intergroup relations; and 5) a refinement of the conceptualization of different group-based emotions and their associated appraisals and potentially distinct action tendencies within the domain of intergroup relations.

Given the nature of our work, we further propose some practical implications of our findings for intergroup relations and the way perpetrator and victimized outgroups may relate to each other in real-life settings after a shared past of conflict.

First, we argue that some of our findings may be read in terms of possible interventions implemented in the aftermath of intergroup conflict. Although is it known that, in most instances of intergroup conflict, the parties involved rarely acknowledge their wrongdoings and usually blame the other side for the negative actions happening, we argue that efforts aimed at questioning this line of thought may potentially benefit intergroup relations. Nevertheless, several considerations must be made. If this awareness is not done within a considerate, adequate and reasonable timeframe and fashion, the potential consequences of confronting individuals with their ingroup's misdeeds may backfire and increase the antagonism and tension of such relations.

Conversely, by raising issues such as responsibility and legitimacy within the domain of intergroup relations in an appropriate way and timing, the appraisals of such negative events may lead individuals to acknowledge their ingroup's role in them and increase the desire of ingroup members to redeem such actions. In this line, we argue that intergroup tensions may be alleviated by the desire of an ingroup to

correct for its past misdeeds. And we believe group-based emotions will have a direct impact on such an aspiration.

As previously stated, the emotional processing of negative events involving an ingroup may take some time and psychological distancing until they provoke more pro-social action tendencies on behalf of a perpetrator group (Barkan, 2000; Igartua & Paez, 1997; Peetz et al., 2010). However, the fact that negative emotions may lead to action tendencies aimed at resolving the negative past may highlight the need of addressing such emotional experiences when striving to achieve reconciliation[17]. Therefore, we suggest that social workers, aid workers and psychologists working on the ground and directly involved with victims and perpetrators of a conflict, may address these emotions, trying to potentiate their pro-social tendencies aimed at repairing the damaged relation between both groups. If this effort is correctly operationalized, we may expect better perceptions of each group towards the other groups and thus, raise the possibility of all individuals involved overcoming this negative past.

Given our results regarding the role outgroup-focused and relational variables in the experience of negative group-based emotions, we argue that reconciliation efforts must consider the way with which they deal with perceptions of groups towards each other and perceptions of the relationship between these groups. By promoting positive perceptions of all groups in the aftermath of a conflict, the human side of intergroup relations may be brought back to life. In turn, the creation of positive perceptions and of the need for maintaining a positive relation between the groups, may guide individuals' behavior to become more understanding, acceptant and positive towards each other.

Furthermore, by considering distinct action tendencies of individuals in the aftermath of conflict, we may also unveil which strategies should interventions aim for. Of most importance, we argue that the ingroup, after recognizing its role as a perpetrator of misdeeds against another group, may need time to compensate and embrace a desire to do something for the outgroup, before desiring forgiveness.

---

[17] Once again, it is important to acknowledge there may be other stances regarding the role of compensation and restitution in intergroup relations marked by collective violence and conflict. Some individuals may argue that compensation should never occur after a conflict because it could "open a Pandora box" in relation to claims of compensation and financial restitution which could never end and, even, intensify tensions between groups who share a history marked by conflict.

Hence, when perpetrator groups acknowledge their negative misdeeds, they may not feel they should be forgiven by the victimized group until they have done something to deserve it. This rationale may shed light into the dynamics of compensation and why such efforts may be so important for the construction of better intergroup relations. Giving the perpetrator group some space and ways of restoring their moral ground, may in fact be an important step for their desire to be forgiven by the outgroup. But of course, the outgroup must also be willing to forgive the ingroup. When the ingroup's perceptions regarding the deservedness of being forgiven and the outgroup's willingness to forgive are not aligned, little success will be achieved in terms of reconciliation.

Therefore, although we have not included the victimized group's perspective in our work, we consider that any efforts of reconciliation and forgiveness must consider both perpetrator and victimized groups' perspectives, if they aim to succeed.

Limitations of the Present Research

Any piece of work trying to understand complex phenomena such as intergroup relations after a historical negative past, must consider its potential inadequacy in constructing a full picture of such multifaceted processes and dynamics. Thus, we must be humble and accept that our work does not go without certain constraints and limitations. Therefore, we will now present some of the limitations of our research.

First, all of the studies reported in this dissertation have used a quantitative methodology and our variables were all measured using scales assessing distinct concepts of interest. By using such a quantitative approach to our work, we may have overlooked some variables which were not examined by us. The use of more qualitative methodologies, such as interviews or focus groups, could have lead us to focus in other variables, which we assume to also be relevant for intergroup relations marked by a negative past. However, we did have some theoretical assumptions about the need to address certain aspects of the intergroup contexts at hand, and these fully guided our research hypotheses and conceptualizations. Most importantly, they proved to be relevant and, although other efforts could and should be done, we believe we have increased our understanding of the conceptualization of group-based emotions within intergroup relations.

Second, all of the variables studied and presented in this dissertation were measured rather than manipulated. Furthermore, we focus on a relatively small number of variables involved in the experience of emotions at the intergroup level. This leaves the door open for possible effects of other (external) variables influencing the associations and relations described here. The potential influence of other variables not included in our studies may offer alternative explanations for our findings. But we argue that, although the previous argument is valid, we have found consistent evidence for the role of the variables under analysis as influencing certain aspects of intergroup relations. Therefore, we propose that our work has opened up a bit more of the curtain hiding several aspects of intergroup relations, but this curtain must be endlessly opened, little by little, in future efforts.

Third, we have conceptualized compunction as an emotional experience encompassing feelings of guilt, regret and self-criticism, but our measure of this emotion is composed by items which are traditionally associated with the experience of shame. Furthermore, many researchers have made efforts to disentangle the distinctive role of shame and guilt for improving intergroup relations (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel et al., 2004). For example, in a study by Brown and Cehajic (2008), they were able to show that group-based shame and group-based guilt both predict reparation, via different mediatiors of the relationships between these emotions and compensation. Nevertheless, our measure of compunction does not relate to the reputational aspects of shame as explained by Brown and Cehajic (2008), and other research trying to distinguish between group-based guilt and shame (Branscombe et al., 2004; Lickel et al., 2004; amongst others) have provided inconsistent results. In this line, we argue that our results do not contradict previous research and that our data provides strong evidence for the conceptualization of group-based compunction (Chapter 6) as a relatively distinct emotional experience from group-based guilt and shame.

Given this brief explanation of the body of research on group-based guilt and shame, we still argue that our conceptualization of compunction is suitable for several reasons: 1) in our empirical studies, when we analyze the consequences of group-based compunction, we did not study them longitudinally, but rather as a snapshot of action tendencies that individuals self-report; 2) our measure of compunction did not refer to any reputational aspects of shame and thus, can be

conceptualized as ingroup-criticism based on a negative image of the ingroup; 3) much of the research conducted on group-based guilt and shame has reported very strong correlations between them. Our data actually concurs with these results and further shows (Chapter 6) that analyzing the items measuring guilt and self-criticism (conventionally called shame) provides a better understanding of the results obtained.

Fourth, we believe other group-based emotions may significantly influence intergroup relations. Although we have specifically focused solely our research on group-based guilt, compunction and anger, we believe it would be interesting and enriching to consider other emotions when studying intergroup relations. For example, given our results, we would expect sympathy to be a relevant emotional experience when considering outgroup-focused and relational variables. All the same, we believe we have provided insightful data regarding the aforementioned negative group-based emotions and their specific role in intergroup relations.

Fifth, we have explained some of the differences found between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples in terms of *luso-tropicalism* and this social representation's effect in the way Portuguese individuals perceive and feel their ingroup's negative past. However, we never assessed the veracity or validity of such interpretations by measuring the degree to which individuals endorse *luso-tropicalist* ideas in their way of addressing their ingroup's wrongdoings. Nevertheless, in several patterns of findings we found evidence for the role of *luso-tropicalism* as a very likely explanation of such results and differences across the samples studied.

Sixth, in our studies we have assessed different action tendencies deriving from the emotions analyzed, but we have never actually measured real behaviors. Given the widely documented discrepancy between action tendencies individuals usually report and the behaviors they carry out, we must limit the interpretation of our findings and accept the possibility that at times, these action tendencies will not be converted into real behaviors with real consequences for intergroup relations. Even so, these action tendencies may shed light into what may happen in real life contexts, when the circumstances allow for such behaviors to take place.

Seventh, we have only considered the perpetrator group's appraisals, emotions and action tendencies when analyzing instances of historical colonial conflicts. However, for a complete understanding of intergroup processes and

dynamics we must always consider the victimized outgroup's appraisals, emotions and action tendencies and how they may influence each other.

In a different vein, we must recognize that several aspects of intergroup relations were not analyzed here. For example, we have not studied any instances of institutional prevention of abuses and conflict. In our analysis, we have focused only in potential action tendencies deriving from negative group-based emotions. However, we believe that taking into consideration structural and institutional efforts aimed at preventing and resolving conflict in the domain of intergroup relations would increase our understanding of different paths leading to intergroup reconciliation and harmony.

Finally, our samples were fully composed by university students. This sampling group is, of course, very different from other subpopulations of each national group and we incur into the risk of not being able to generalize our results to the entire population composing the national groups examined. However, what we must keep in mind, then, is that across countries, using a similar kind of sample, we have found consistent evidence for the conceptualization of negative group-based emotions as influencing the dynamics of intergroup relations marked by a negative past.

Furthermore, we propose that we may find different results from the ones reported in the present dissertation, when analyzing other instances of conflict (such as genocides), which may be historical but have distinct features from colonial conflicts or, even, other conflicts occurring in the present day.

We have chosen to study two instances of colonial conflicts perpetrated by two past colonial powers towards the native populations of their former colonies. Our reliable results across samples, give us confidence in our results when considering colonial conflicts, and we may expect these results to be generalizable to other instances of colonial violence. However, the generalization of such findings to other instances of conflict cannot be done without considering the nature of the intergroup conflict at hand and the specificities of the context under analysis.

To summarize, we do not argue to have fully comprehended or analyzed all potential factors influencing intergroup relations after a historical conflict. Rather, we have corroborated certain theoretical assumptions, confirmed previous findings within the field, and we have proposed new aspects of the intergroup relations under

analysis, which might extend our existent knowledge in such a domain. Although our work is still the tip of the iceberg, we believe further research should analyze several of our findings and tap into several questions which remain unanswered within the present dissertation.

Recommendations for Future Research

As mentioned above, we believe our work has contributed to the state-of-the-art literature regarding negative group-based emotions, their antecedents and consequences for intergroup relations. Nonetheless, we believe further research is needed to provide us with more insights into such a complex and dynamic domain within social psychology.

One of our first recommendations refers to the analysis of more emotions within intergroup relations. We argue that not only negative emotions will influence the way individuals perceive the actions of their group towards other groups, but also that more positive emotions (such as empathy or pride) may play a role in building more positive intergroup relations following conflict. Furthermore, the inclusion of more levels of analysis within the realm of emotions and their effects on intergroup relations must be considered. Following Iyer and Leach (2008) conceptualization of emotions in intergroup relations, an analysis of, for example, individual emotions directed at outgroups or group-based emotions directed at individuals, will significantly contribute to our understanding of distinct appraisals and reactions to events involving social categorization and identification processes.

Related to the aforementioned suggestions, we also recommend a more refined analysis of distinct intergroup and group-based emotions in social life. For example, we think it would be very interesting to distinguish between group-based guilt, shame and compunction as potentially distinct emotional experiences. We further recommend researchers to refine and complement their analysis of emotions at the intergroup level, through the inclusion of more emotional experiences in their conceptualization of intergroup relations and different methodologies, such as interviews, focus groups, physiological measures and behavioral approaches. By doing so, we believe the field will be enriched by further insights into the full determinants of group-based emotions, their antecedents and distinct consequences.

Moreover, we advocate a more sophisticated analysis of the role of subjective time in intergroup relations. We have provided evidence for a potential effect of such a variable in the desire that ingroup members have to compensate the outgroup. Understanding the full range of possible consequences that perceptions of time may have for intergroup relations and action tendencies is, thus, of major relevance for our field.

Another important aspect of intergroup relations is to consider all the parties involved in a conflict, their appraisals of the events, the emotions experienced by individuals and their associated action tendencies. Although we have specifically focused our work on the perpetrator group's perspective, we argue that a comprehensive understanding of such settings can only be achieved through the inclusion of the victimized group's perspective[18]. Therefore, we argue that further research should tap into the appraisals, emotions and action tendencies elicited by events in which a group has been victimized. The puzzle may, then, become more complete.

Furthermore, we support the idea of selecting different samples from the ones used in our work. It is expectable that other subpopulations within the national group may perceive the events studied differently, and thus feel distinct group-based emotions and report action tendencies dissimilar to the ones analyzed.

Finally, we argue for the test of our predictions and findings in other settings of intergroup relations. For example, situations of intractable conflict may be a relevant setting in which to examine the validity of our findings, across different situations of intergroup relations and conflict.

We believe these suggestions underline the richness and usefulness of the theoretical conceptualizations and findings reported throughout this dissertation and that's why they should be considered in future endeavors within the domain of intergroup relations.

---

[18] This point is for us of the utmost importance. Most research conducted within the domain of intergroup relations focuses on majority groups and perpetrator groups and in the dynamics of intergroup conflict from the perspective of dominant groups. While we believe this research is essential and very fruitful, a closer analysis of the victimized groups' perspective (as well as minority groups in general) would significantly contribute to the field.

Final Remarks

The present research has elaborated on the antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt, compunction and anger for intergroup relations marked by colonial conflicts. By using two distinct contexts of colonial conflicts (the Portuguese colonial war and the Indonesian war of independence), we have shown the applicability of our theoretical conceptualizations across two contexts of historical conflict and we have attested for the importance of considering group-based emotions as relevant factors within intergroup relations.

We have shown that group-based guilt, compunction and anger, albeit similar in their antecedents, prove to have a rather distinct phenomenology and to be associated with different action tendencies. Furthermore, our conceptualization of outgroup-focused and relational variables, perceptions of time and forgiveness deservedness from the perpetrator ingroup's perspective, have provided us with further insights and proposals for further research. As such, we would like to reaffirm our conviction that the present work has contributed, both theoretically and empirically, to the domain of intergroup relations within social psychology.

References

_____

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. New York: Harper.

Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison Wesley.

Amâncio, L. (2002). Identidade social e relações intergrupais. In J. Vala & M. B. Monteiro (Coords), *Psicologia social [Social psychology]* (pp. 387-409) [5th Ed.]. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian.

Arnold, M. B. (1960). *Emotion and personality* (2 Vols). New York: Columbia University Press.

Averill, J. R. (2001). Studies on anger and aggression: Implications for theories of emotions. In W. G. Parrott (Ed.), *Emotions in social psychology: Essential readings* (pp. 337-352). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Bandura, A. (2002). Selective moral disengagement in the exercise of moral agency. *Journal of Moral Education*, *31*, 101-119. doi:10.180/0305724022014322

Barkan, E. (2000). *The guilt of nations: Restitution and negotiating historical injustices*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Barkan, E. (2004). Individual versus group rights in Western philosophy and the Law. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 309-319). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*, 1173-1182. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.61173

Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & Rivera, J. (2007). Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications. *Journal of Social Issues*, *63*(2), 441-460. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2007.00518.x

Baumeister, R., Stillwell, A., & Heatherton, T. (1994). Guilt: An interpersonal approach. *Psychological Bulletin*, *112*(2), 243-267. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.115.2.243

Berkowitz, L. (2001). On the formation and regulation of anger and aggression: A cognitive-neoassociationist analysis. In W. G. Parrott (Ed.), *Emotions in social psychology: Essential readings* (pp. 325-336). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Bidien, C. (1945). Independence the issue. *Far Eastern Survey*, *14*(24), 345–348. doi:10.1525/as.1945.14.24.01p17062

Bizman, A., & Yinon, Y. (2003). Social self-discrepancies and group-based emotional distress. In D. Mackie & E. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 13-30). Sussex: Psychology Press.

Branscombe N. (2004). A social psychological process perspective on collective guilt. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 320-332). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N., & Doosje, B. (2004). International perspectives on the experience of collective guilt. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 3-15). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N., Doosje, B., & McGarty, C. (2003). Antecedents and consequences of collective guilt. In D. Mackie & E. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 49-66). New York: Psychology Press.

Branscombe, N., & Miron, A. M. (2004). Interpreting the ingroup's negative actions towards another group: Emotional reactions to appraised harm. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *Studies in emotion and social interaction: The social life of emotions* (pp. 314-335). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Branscombe, N, Slugoski, B, & Kappen, D. (2004). The measurement of collective guilt: what it is and what it is not. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 16-34). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brendler, K. (1994). Die Holocaustrezeption der Enkelgeneration im Spannungsfeld von Abwehr und Traumatisierubgen [The reception of the Holocaust grandsons' generation and the conflicting priorities of defense and trauma]. *Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung*, *3*, 303-340.

Brown, R., & Čehajić, S. (2008). Dealing with the past and facing the future: Mediators of collective guilt and shame in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*, 669-684. doi:10.1002/ejsp.466

Brown, R., Gonzalez, R., Zagefka, H., Manzi, J., & Cehajic, S. (2008). Nuestra Culpa: Collective guilt and shame as predictors of reparation for historical wrongdoing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *94*(1), 75-90. doi:10.1037/022-3514.94.1.75

Brown, R. P., Wohl, M., & Exline, J. J. (2008). Taking up offenses: Secondhand forginevess and group identification. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *34*(10), 1406-1419. doi:10.1177/0146167208321538

Cabecinhas, R. (2007). *Preto e Branco: A naturalização da discriminação racial [Back and white: The naturalization of racial discrimination]*. Porto: Campo das Letras.

Cabecinhas, R., & Feijó, J. (2010). Collective memories of Portuguese colonial action in Africa: Representations of the colonial past among Mozambicans and Portuguese youths. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, *4*(1), 28-44. doi:0070-ijcv-010111

Castano, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2006). Not quite human: Infrahumanization in response to collective responsibility for intergroup killing. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *90*(5), 804-818. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.90.5.804

Čehajić, S., Brown, R., & Castano, E. (2008). Forgive and forget? Antecedents, mediators, and consequences of Intergroup Forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Political Psychology*, *29*(3), 351-367. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00634.x

Cialdini, R. B., Borden, R. J., Thorne, A., Walker, M. R., Freeman, S., & Sloan, L. R. (1976). Basking in reflected glory; Three (football) field studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *34*, 366-375. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.34.3.366

Clark, J. N. (2008). Collective guilt, collective responsibility and the serbs. *East European Politics and Societies*, *22*(3), 668-692. doi:10.1177/0888325408318533

Codol, J. P. (1975). On the so-called "Superior conformity of the self" behavior: Twenty experimental investigations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *5*, 457-501. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420050404

Cottrell, C. A., & Neuberg, S. L. (2005). Different emotional reactions to different groups: A sociofunctional threat-based approach to "prejudice". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(5), 770-789. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.5.770

Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Billiet, J. (Eds.). (2011). *Cross-cultural analysis: Methods and applications*. NY: Taylor and Francis Group.

Derks, B., Van Laar, C., & Ellemers, N. (2007). Social creativity strikes back: Improving motivated performance of low status group members by valuing ingroup dimensions. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *37*, 470-493. doi:10.1002/ejsp.375

Deschamps, J. C. (1982). Social identity and relations of power between groups. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Social identity and intergroup relations* (pp. 85-98). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Deschamps, J. C. (1984). Identité sociale et différenciations individuelles. *Cahiers de Psychologie Cognitif*, *4*, 449-474.

Devine, P. G. (1990). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *56*(1), 5-18. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.56.1.5

Devine, P. G., Monteith, M., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*, 817-830. doi:10.1037//0022-3514.60.6.817

Devos, T., Silver, L. A., Mackie, D. A., & Smith, E. R. (2003). Experiencing intergroup emotions. In D. Mackie & E. Smith (Eds.), *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups* (pp. 111-134). Sussex: Psychology Press.

Doise, W. (1976). *L'articulation psychosociologique et les relations entre groupes*. Bruxelles: De Boeck.

Doise, W. (1987). Pratiques scientifiques et representations sociales: Que faire la psychologie de Piaget? *Cahiers du Centre de Recherche Interdisciplinaire de Vaucresson*, *3*, 89-108.

Doise, W. (1988). Individual and social identities in intergroup relations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 99-111. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180202

Doosje, B. (1995). *Stereotyping in intergroup contexts* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Doosje, B., & Branscombe, N. (2003). Attributions for the negative historical actions of a group. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 235-248. doi:10.1002/ejsp.142

Doosje, B., Branscombe, N., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. (1998). Guilty by association: when one's group has a negative history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(4), pp. 872-886. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.872

Doosje, B., Branscombe, N., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. (2004). Consequences of national ingroup identification for responses to immoral historical events. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 95-111). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Doosje, B., Branscombe, N., Spears, R., & Manstead, A. (2006). Antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt: The effects of ingroup identification. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *9*(3), 325-338. doi:10.1177/1368430206064637

Durant, W., & Durant, A. (1997). *The lessons of history*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Ellemers, N. (1993). The influence of socio-structural variables on identity management strategies. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *4*, 22-57. doi:10.1080/14792779343000013

Eyerman, R. (2004). The past in the present: Culture and the transmission of memory. *Acta Sociologica*, *47*(2), 159-168. doi:10.1177/0001699304043853

Fehr, B., & Russell, J. A. (1984). Concept of emotion viewed from a prototype perspective. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *113*, 464-486. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.3.425

Figueiredo, A. M., Doosje, B., & Valentim, J. P. (2012a). *Group-based compunction and anger: Their antecedents and consequences in relation to colonial conflicts*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Figueiredo, A. M., Doosje, B., Valentim, J. P., & Zebel, S. (2010). Dealing with past colonial conflicts: How perceived characteristics of the victimized outgroup can influence the experience of group-based guilt. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, *4*(1), 89-105. doi:0070-ijcv-2010196

Figueiredo, A. M., Valentim, J. P., & Doosje, B. (2011). A shared past and a common future: The Portuguese colonial war and the dynamics of group-based guilt. *The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 14*(1), 163-172. doi:10.5209/rev_SJOP.2011.v14.n1.14

Figueiredo, A.M., Valentim, J. P., & Doosje, B. (2012b). *Is it too long ago to compensate? The role of subjective perceptions of time and emotions in predicting compensation for past colonial conflicts*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Fischer, A. H., & Roseman, I. J. (2007). Beat them or ban them: The characteristics and social functions of anger and contempt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*, 103-115. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.103

Frijda, N. H. (1986). *The emotions*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Frijda, N. H. (2001). The laws of emotions. In W. G. Parrott (Ed.), *Emotions in social psychology: Essential readings* (pp. 57-70). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Frijda, H. H., Kuipers, P., & Ter Schure, E. (1989). Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotional action readiness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*, 212-228. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.57.2.212

Gordijn, E. H., Wigboldus, D., & Yzerbyt, V. (2001). Emotional consequences of categorizing victims of negative outgroup behavior as ingroup or outgroup. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *4*, 317-326. doi:10.1177/1368430201004004002

Gordijn, E. H., Yzerbyt, V., Wigboldus, D., & Dumont, M. (2006). Emotional reactions to harmful intergroup behavior. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *36*, 15-30. doi:10.1002/ejsp.296

Halas, E. (2010). Time and memory: A cultural perspective. *Trames*, *4*, 307-322. doi:10.3176/tr.2010.4.02

Harvey, R. D., & Oswald, D. L. (2000). Collective guilt and shame as motivation for white support of black programs. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *30*(9), 1790-1811. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2000.tb02468.x

Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *10*, 252-264. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr1003_4

Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A., McLernon, F., Niens, U., & Noor, M. (2004). Intergroup forgiveness and guilt in Northern Ireland: Social psychological dimensions of 'The Troubles'. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 193-215). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hoffman, M. L. (2000). *Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, G., & Bond, M. H. (1988). The Confucius connection: from cultural roots to economic growth. *Organizational dynamics*, *16*(4): 4–21. doi:10.1016/0090-2616(88)90009-5

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (1988). *Social identifications: A social psychology of intergroup relations and intergroup processes*. London: Routledge.

Igartua, J., & Paez, D. (1997). Art and remembering traumatic collective events: The case of the Spanish Civil War. In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Paez, & B. Rimé (Eds.), *Collective memory of political events: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 79-101). New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Publishers.

Iyer, A., & Leach, C. (2008). Emotion in intergroup relations. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *19*, 86-125. doi:10.1080/10463280802079738

Iyer, A., Leach, C., & Crosby, F. (2003). White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*(1), 117-129. doi:10.1177/0146167202238377

Iyer, A., Leach, C., & Pedersen, A. (2004). Racial wrongs and restitutions: The role of guilt and other group-based emotions. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 262-283). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Iyer, A., Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2007). Why individuals protest the perceived transgressions of their country: The role of anger, shame, and guilt. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *33*, 572-587. doi:10.1177/0146167206297402

Janoff-Bulman, R., Sheikh, S., & Baldacci, K. G. (2008). Mapping moral motives: Approach, avoidance, and political orientation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *44*, 1091-1099. doi:10.1037/a0013779

Jetten, J., Postmes, T., & McAuliffe, B. J. (2002). "We're all individuals": Group norms of individualism and collectivism, levels of identification and identity threat. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *32*, 189-207. doi:10.1002/ejsp.65

Johnston, Tim. 2008. Australian Prime Minister asks Parliament to approve apology to Aborigines. *The New York Times*, February 12, World section, Online edition.

Jordan, J. A. (2005). A matter of time: Examining collective memory in historical perspective in postwar Berlin. *Journal of Historical Sociology*, *18*(1/2), 37-71. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6443.2005.00246.x

Kanyangara, P., Rimé, B., Philippot, P., & Yzerbyt, V. (2007). Collective rituals, emotional climate and intergroup perception: Participation in "Gacaca" tribunals and assimilation of the Rwandan genocide. *Journal of Social Issues*, *63*(2), 387-403. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2007.00515.x

Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (2001). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis. In W. G. Parrott (Ed.), *Emotions in social psychology: Essential readings* (pp. 175-184). Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Klein, O., & Azzi, A. E. (2001). The strategic confirmation of meta-stereotypes: How group members attempt to tailor an out-group's representation of themselves. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *40*, 279-293. doi:10.1348/014466601164759

Kline, R. B. (1998). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling*. New York: Guilford Press.

Krugler, K., & Jones, W. H. (1992). On conceptualizing and assessing guilt. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *62*(2), 318-327. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.318

Labourdette, J-F. (2003). *História de Portugal [History of Portugal]*. Lisboa: Publicações Dom Quixote.

Lastrego, S., & Licata, L. (2010). Should a country's leaders apologize for its past misdeeds? An analysis of the effects of both public apologies from a Belgian official and perception of Congolese victims' continued suffering on Belgians' representations of colonial action, support for reparation, and attitudes towards the Congolese. *Revista de Psicología Social*, *25*(1), 61-72. doi:10.1174/021347410790193432

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Leach, C. W., Iyer, A., & Pedersen, A. (2006). Anger and guilt about ingroup advantage explain the willingness for political action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *32*(9), 1232-1245. doi:10.1177/0146167206289729

Leach, C. W., Zimeren, M., Zebel, S., Vliek, M., Pennekamp, S., Doosje, B., ... Spears, R. (2008). Group-level self-definition and self-investment: A hierarchical (multicomponent) model of in-group identification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *95*(1), 144-165. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.14

Lerner, M. J. (1980). *Belief in a just world: A fundamental delusion*. New York: Plenum.

Licata, L., & Klein, O. (2010). Holocaust or benevolent paternalism? Intergenerational comparisons on collective memories and emotions about Belgium's colonial past. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, *4*(1), 45-57. doi:0070-ijcv-2010163

Lickel, B., Schmader, T., & Barquissau, M. (2004). The evocation of moral emotions in intergroup contexts: The distinction between collective guilt and collective shame. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp.35-55). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lorenzi-Cioldi, F. (1988). *Individus dominants et groupes dominés*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emotions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup context. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*, 602-616. doi:10.10371/0022-3514.79.4.60

Mackie, D., Silver, L., & Smith, E. (2004). Intergroup emotions: Emotion as an intergroup phenomenon. In L. Tiedens & C. Leach (Eds.), *Studies in emotion and social interaction: The social life of emotions* (pp. 227-245). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R. (1998). Intergroup relations: Insights from a theoretically integrative approach. *Psychological Review*, *105*, 499-529. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.105.3.499

Mackie,D. M., & Smith, E. R. (Eds.). (2003). *From prejudice to intergroup emotions: Differentiated reactions to social groups*. New York: Psychology Press.

Mallett, R., & Swim, J. K. (2004). Collective guilt in the United States: Predicting support for social policies that alleviate social injustice. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 56-74). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mallett, R. K., & Swim, J. K. (2007). The influence of inequality, responsibility, and justifiability on reports of group-based guilt for ingroup privilege. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *10*, 57-69. doi:10.1177/136843020707134

Manstead, A. S. R., & Hewstone, M. (Eds.). (1996). *The Blackwell encyclopedia of social psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Manzi, J., & González, R. (2007). Forgiveness and reparation in Chile: The role of cognitive and emotional intergroup antecedents. *Peace and conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology*, *13*(1), 71-91. doi:10.1037/h0094025

Marques, J. (1990). The black-sheep effect: Out-group homogeneity in social comparison settings. In D. Abrams & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances* (pp. 131-151). NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf.

Marques, J., & Paez, D. (1994). The "black sheep effect": Social categorization, rejection of ingroup deviates, and perception of group variability. *European Review of Social Psychology: Vol. V* (pp. 37-68). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

Marques, J., Paez, D., & Serra, A. F. (1997). Social sharing, emotional climate, and the transgenerational transmission of memories: The Portuguese colonial war. In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Paez, & B. Rime (Eds.), *Collective memory of political events* (pp. 253-275). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

McGarty, C., & Bliuc, A. (2004). Refining the meaning of the "collective" in collective guilt: Harm, guilt, and apology in Australia. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt – International perspectives* (pp. 112-129). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meuleman, B., & Billiet, J. (2011). Religious involvement: Its relation to values and social attitudes. In E. Davidov, P. Schmidt ,& J. Billiet (Eds.), Cross-cultural analysis: Methods and applications (pp. 173-206). NY: Routledge.

Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In R. Farr & S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Social Representations* (pp. 3–69). London: Academic Press.

Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of social representations. *Journal of European Social Psychology*, *18*(3), 211–250. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420180303.

Multicultural Netherlands. (2010). *The Indos*. Retrieved from http://dutch.berkeley.edu/mcnl/history/immigration/colonial/the-indos/

Nafstad, H. E., Carlisq, E., & Blakar, R. M. (2012). Towards a psychology for a humankind and a planet under multiple threats: A social psychology of ideology. In J. P. Valentim (Ed.), *Societal approaches in social psychology*. Switzerland: Peter Lang.

Oakes, P. J. (1987). The salience of social categories. In J. C. Turner, M. A. Hogg, P. J. Oakes, S. D. Reicher, & M. S. Wetherell (Eds.), *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

OECD. (2007). *The labour market integration of immigrants in Portugal*. Geneva: Employment Labour and Social Affairs Committee.

Oldenhuis, H. K. E. (2007). *I know what they think about us: Metaperceptions and intergroup relations* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Groningen, the Netherlands.

Oostindie, G. (Ed.). (2008). *Dutch colonialism, migration and cultural heritage*. Leiden: KITLV Press.

Park, B., & Judd, C. M. (1990). Measures and models of perceived group variability. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *59*, 173-191. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.59.2.173

Parrott, W. G. (Ed.). (2001). *Emotions in social psychology: Essential readings*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Peetz, J., Gunn, G., & Wilson, A. (2010). Crimes of the past: Defensive temporal distancing in the face of past in-group wrongdoing. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *36*(5), 598-611. doi:10.1177/0146167210364850

Pennekamp, S. F. (2008). *Dynamics of disadvantage: Uncovering the role of group-based anger* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Pennekamp, S. F., Doosje, B., Zebel, S., & Fischer, A. H. (2007). The past and the pending: The antecedents and consequences of group-based anger in historically and currently disadvantaged groups. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *10*(1), 41-55. doi:10.1177/1368430207071339

Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens. R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *25*, 57-75. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420250106

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 67*(4), 741-763. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(200001/02)30:1<41::AID-EJSP976>3.0.CO;2-O

Ramos, R., Vasconcelos e Sousa, B., & Monteiro, N. G. (2010). *História de Portugal [History of Portugal]*. Lisboa: A Esfera dos Livros.

Rensmann, L. (2004). Collective guilt, national identity and political processes in comtemporary Germany. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 169-190). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rhee, E., Uleman, J.S., & Lee, H.K. (1996). Variations in collectivism and individualism by ingroup and culture: Confirmatory factor analyses. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71,* 1037-1054. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.71.5.1037

Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2004). Exonerating cognitions, group identification, and personal values as predictors of collective guilt among jewish-israelis. In N.

Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 130-147). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-based guilt: Modes of national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the ingroup's moral violations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*(4), 698-711. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.91.4.698

Rokeach, M. (1960). *The open and closed mind*. New York: Basic Books.

Roseman, I. J. (2001). A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, research and applications. In L. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theories, methods, research* (pp. 68-91). New York: University Press.

Roseman, I. J., Wiest, C., & Schwartz, T. S. (1994). Phenomenology, behaviors and goals differentiate discrete emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*, 206-221. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.2.206

Scherer, K. R. (2001). The nature and study of appraisal: A review of the issues. IN K. R. Scherer, A. Schorr, & T. Johnstone (Eds.), *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theories, methods, research* (pp. 68-91). New York: University Press.

Scherer, K. R., Schorr, A., & Johnstone, T. (2001). *Appraisal processes in emotion: Theories, methods, research*. New York: University Press.

Schmader, T., & Lickel, B. (2006). The approach and avoidance function of guilt and shame emotions: Comparing reactions to self-caused and other-caused wrongdoing. *Motivation and Emotion*, *30*(1), 43-58. doi:10.1007/s11031-006-9006-0

Schmitt, M. T., Miller, D. A., Branscombe, N., & Brehm, J. W. (2008). The difficulty of making reparations affects the intensity of collective guilt. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *11*(3), 267-279. doi:10.1177/136843020809064

Scobie, E. D., & Scobie, E. W. (1998). Damaging events: The perceived need for forgiveness. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *28*(4), 373-401. doi:10.1111/1468-5914.00081

Sheldon, K. M., & Johnson, J. T. (1993). Forms of social awareness: Their frequency and correlates. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *19*, 320-330. doi:10.1177/0146167293193009

Sherif, M. (1962). *Intergroup relations and leadership*. New York: Willey.

Sherif, M. (1966). *In common predicament: Social psychology of intergroup conflict and cooperation*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). *Intergroup cooperation and conflict: The Robbers cave experiment*. Norman, OK; University Book Exchange.

Sidanius, J. (1985). Cognitive functioning and sociopolitical ideology revisited. *Political Psychology*, *6*, 637-661. doi:10.2307/3791021

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

Simon, B. (1992). The perception of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity: Reintroducing the social context. In M. Hewstone & W. Stroebe (Eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology* (Vol. 3, pp. 1-30). New York: Willey.

Smith, E. R. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualization of prejudice. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition and stereotyping* (pp. 297-315). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Smith, H. J., & Kessler, T. (2004). Group-based emotions and intergroup behavior: The case of relative deprivation. In L. Z. Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), *The social life of emotions* (pp. 292-313). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, H. J., Spears, R., & Hamstra, I. (1999). Social identity and the context of relative deprivation. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Social identity: Context, commitment, content* (pp. 205-229). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Spini, D., Elecheroth, G., & Fasel, R. (2008). The impact of group norms and generalization of risks across groups on judgements of war behavior. *Political Psychology*, *29*(6), 919-941. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00673.x

Stapley, J., & Havilan, J.. (1989). Gender differences in normal adolescents' emotional experiences. *Sex Roles*, *20*, 295-308.

Stephan, W. G., & Finlay, K. (1999). The role of empathy in improving intergroup relations. *Journal of Social Issues*, *55*(4), 729-743. doi:10.1111/0022-4537.00144

Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1996). *Intergroup relations*. USA: Westview Press.

Stouffer, S. A., Suchman, E. A., DeVinney, L.C., Star, S. A., & Williams, R. M. (1949). *The American soldier: Vol. 1. Adjustment during army life*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Swim, J. K., & Miller, D. L. (1999). White guilt: Its antecedents and consequences for attitudes towards affirmative action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *25*, 500-514. doi:10.1177/0146167299025004008

Tajfel, H. (1970). Experiments in intergroup discrimination. *Scientific American*, *223*(5), 96-102.

Tajfel, H. (1972a). Experiments in a vacuum. In J. Israel & H. Tajfel (Eds.), *The Context of Social Psychology: A critical assessment* (pp. 69-121). London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1972b). La categorization sociale. In S. Moscovici (Ed.), *Introduction à la psychologie sociale: Vol. I* (pp. 272-302). Paris: Larousse.

Tajfel, H. (1978). The achievement of inter-group differentiation. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between social groups* (pp. 77-100). London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H., Flament, C., Billig, M., & Bundy, R. P. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behavior. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *1*, 149-178. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of social conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp.33-47). Montery, CA: Brooks-Cole.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup conflict. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7-24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2001). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In M. A. Hogg, & D. Abrams (Eds). *Intergroup relations: Essential readings*. USA: Psychology Press.

Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Maio, G., & Kenworthy, J. (2007). The impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness in Northern Ireland. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *10*(1), 119-136. doi:10.1177/1368430207071345

Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J. B., Cairns, E., Marinetti, C., … Parkinson, B. (2008). Postconflict reconciliation: Intergroup forgiveness and implicit biases in Northern Ireland. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*(2), 303-320. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00563.x

Tangney, J. P., & Dearing, R. L. (2002). *Shame and guilt*. New York: Guilford Press.

Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and embarrassment distinct emotions? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *70*, 1256-1269. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1256

Tiedens, L. Z., Ellsworth, P. C., & Mesquita, B. (2000). Sentimental Stereotypes: Emotional Expectations for High-and Low-Status Group Members. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *26*(5), 560-575. doi:10.1177/0146167200267004

Triandis, H. C. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. *Psychological Review*, *96*, 506-520. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.96.3.506

Triandis, H. C., & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurements of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 118-128. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.1.118

Turner. J.C. (1981). The experimental social psychology of intergroup behavior. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles Eds.*), Inter-group behavior*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C. (1999). Some current issues in research on social identity and self-categorization theories. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Social identity: Context, commitment, content* (pp. 6-34). MA: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (Eds.). (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., & Reynolds, K. J. (2001). The social identity perspective in intergroup relations: Theories, themes, and controversies. In R. Brown & S. Gaertner (Eds.), *Blackwell Handbook of Social psychology: Intergroup processes*. MA: Blackwell.

Tutu, D. (1999). *No future without forgiveness*. NY: Doubleday.

United Nations. (1945). *Charter of the United Nations*. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/

Vala, J., Brito, R., & Lopes, D. (1999). *Expressões do racismo em Portugal [Expressions of racism in Portugal]*. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Vala, J., Lopes, D., & Lima, M. (2008). Black immigrants in Portugal: Luso-tropicalism and prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, *64*(2), 287-302. doi:10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00562.x

Valentim, J. P. (2003). *Identidade e lusofonia nas representações sociais de portugueses e de africanos [Identity and lusophony in the social representations of Portuguese and Africans]* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra.

Valentim, J. P. (2005). Luso-tropicalismo e lusofonia: uma perspectiva psicossocial [Luso-tropicalism and lusophony: a psychosocial perspective]. *Via Latina, 6*(2), 67-73.

Valentim, J. P. (2008). Identidade pessoal e social: entre a semelhança e a diferença [Personal and social identity: between similarity and difference]. *Psychologica, 47*, 109-123.

Valentim, J. P. (2011). Social psychology and colonialism. In J. P. Valentim (Ed.), *Societal approaches in social psychology* (pp.179-194). Berne: Peter Lang.

Valentim, J. P, & Doise, W. (2008). De um estado de facto a um estado de direito: elementos de psicologia social normativa [From a state of fact to a state of right: elements of normative social psychology]. In A. C. Fonseca (Ed.), *Psicologia e Justiça* (pp. 37-77). Coimbra: Nova Almedina.

Van Kleef, G., De Dreu, K., & Manstead, A. (2004). The interpersonal effects of anger and happiness in negotiations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*(1), 57–76. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.57

Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H., & Leach, C. W. (2004). Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *87*(5), 649-664. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.5.649

Vanneman, R. D., & Pettigrew, T. (1972). Race and relative deprivation in the urban United States, *Race*, *13*, 461-486. doi:10.1177/030639687201300404

Vigil, J.M. (2010). Political leanings vary with facial expression processing and psychosocial functioning. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *13*, 547-58. doi: 10.1177/136843020935693

Viki, , G. T.,Winchester, L., Titshall, L., Chisango, T., Pina, A., & Russell, R. (2006). Beyond secondary emotions: The infrahumanization of outgroups using human-related and animal-related words. *Social Cognition*, *24*, 753-775. doi:10.1521/soco.2006.24.6.753

Volpato, C., & Licata, L. (2010). Introduction: Collective memories of colonial violence. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, *4*(1), 4-10. doi:0070-ijcv-2010175

Vorauer, J., Hunter, A., Main, K. J., & Roy, S. A. (2000). Meta-stereotype activation: Evidence from indirect measures for specific evaluative concerns experienced by members of dominant groups in intergroup interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78*(4), 690-707. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.78.4.690

Vorauer, J., Main, K., & O'Connell, G. (1998). How do individuals expect to be viewed by members of lower status groups? Content and implications of meta-stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75*(4), 917-937. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.917

Walker, L., & Smith, H. J. (2002). *Relative deprivation: Specification, development and integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wang, Q. (2008). On the cultural constitution of collective memory. *Memory*, *16*(3), 305-317. doi:10.1080/09658210701801467

Wang, Q., & Ross, M. (2005). What we remember and what we tell: The effects of culture and self-priming on memory representations and narratives. *Memory*, *13*(6), 594-606. doi:10.1080/09658210444000223

Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of Positive and Negative Affect: The PANAS scales. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology, *54*, 1063-1070. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.54.6.1063

Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A. W. (1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *67*, 1049–1062. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.1049

Wohl, M., & Branscombe, N. (2004). Importance of social categorization for forgiveness and collective guilt assignment for the Holocaust. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 284-305). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wohl, M., & Branscombe, N. R. (2005). Forgiveness and collective guilt assignment to historical perpetrator groups depends on level of social category inclusiveness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*, 288-303. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.288

Wohl, M., Branscombe, N., & Klar,Y. (2006). Collective guilt: Emotional reactions when one's group has done wrong or been wronged. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *17*, 1-37. doi:10.1080/10463280600574815

Yzerbyt, V., Dumont, M., Wigboldus, D., & Gordijn, E. (2003). I feel for us: The impact of categorization and identification on emotions and action tendencies. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *42*, 533-549. doi:10.1348/014466603322595266

Zebel, S. (2005). *Negative associations: The role of identification in group-based guilt* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

Zebel, S., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (2004). It depends on your point of view: Implications of perspective-taking and national identification for Dutch collective guilt. In N. Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), *Collective Guilt: International perspectives* (pp. 148-168). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zebel, S., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (2009a). How Perspective-Taking Helps or Hinders Group-Based Guilt as a Function of Group Identification. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *12*, 61-78. doi:10.1177/1368430208098777

Zebel, S., Doosje, B., & Spears, R. (2009b). The threat of those who understand": ways in which out-groups induce guilt. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *39*, 154-162. doi:10.1002/ejsp.492

Zebel, S., Pennekamp, S. F., Van Zomeren, M., Doosje, B., Van Kleef, G. A., Vliek, M., & Van Der Schalk, J. (2007). Vessels with gold or guilt: Emotional reactions to family involvement associated with glorious or gloomy aspects of the past. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, *10*, 71-86. doi:10.1177/1368430207071342

Zebel, S., Zimmerman, A., Viki, G. T., & Doosje, B. (2008). Dehumanization and guilt as distinct but related predictors of support for reparation policies. *Political Psychology*, *29*(2), 193-219. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00623.x

Appendix

Appendix. Measures and scales used in the studies reported in the present dissertation.

Glorification[19]

In today's world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.

Given the dimension of the country, the Portuguese Armed Forces are competent.

One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our nation.

Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.

It is disloyal for Portuguese to criticize Portugal.

In general, Portugal is better than other nations.

There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national authorities.

Attachment[20]

Other nations can learn a lot from us.

I love Portugal.

Being Portuguese is an important part of my identity.

It is important to me to contribute to my nation.

It is important to me to view myself as Portuguese.

I am strongly committed to my nation.

It is important to me that everyone will see me as Portuguese.

It is important for me to serve my country.

When I talk about the Portuguese I usually say "we" rather than "they."

---

[19] This scale was used in the study reported in Chapter 4.
[20] This scale was used in in the study reported in Chapter 4.

Ingroup self-investment[21]

Solidarity

I feel a bond with [Portugal/the Netherlands].

I feel solidarity with [Portugal/the Netherlands].

I feel committed to [Portugal/the Netherlands].

Satisfaction

I am glad to be [Portuguese/Dutch].

I think that [Portuguese/Dutch] have a lot to be proud of.

It is pleasant to be [Portuguese/Dutch].

Being [Portuguese/Dutch] gives me a good feeling.

Centrality

I often think about the fact that I am [Portuguese/Dutch].

The fact that I am [Portuguese/Dutch] is an important part of my identity.

Being [Portuguese/Dutch] is an important part of how I see myself.

Political orientation[22]

My political orientation is:

[1 – extreme left-wing; 2 – left-wing: 3 – center left-wing; 4 – none; 5 - center right-wing; 6 - right-wing; 7 – extreme right-wing]

Exonerating cognitions[23]

The Portuguese were victims of the colonial war.

The descriptions of the colonial war are too negative in relation to the role of the Portuguese.

The descriptions of the colonial war are too negative in relation to the role of the Portuguese military.

The people from the former Portuguese colonies were responsible for the colonial war.

---

[21] The present scale was used in the two studies reported in Chapter 6.
[22] This scale was used in in the study reported in Chapter 4.
[23] This scale was used on the study reported in Chapter 4.

Even though the colonial war was really painful to all parties involved, the suffering that the people from the former Portuguese colonies inflicted upon the Portuguese does not compare to the rest.

Exonerating cognitions[24]

The [Africans from the former Portuguese colonies/Indonesians] are guilty of the negative consequences of the colonial war with [Portugal/the Netherlands].

The effort made by the [Portuguese/Dutch] to maintain [their colonies in Africa/Indonesia] was justified.

During the colonial war, not all [Africans/Indonesians] wanted the independence of their countries in relation to [Portugal/the Netherlands].

[The Africans from the former colonies/Indonesians] are responsible for the negative consequences of the colonial war.

Although [Africans/Indonesian] suffered during the colonial war, we cannot deny that the [Portuguese/Dutch] suffered as much as they did.

[Portugal/the Netherlands] had the right to maintain [its colonies in Africa/Indonesia].

The [Portuguese/Dutch] are not all the same, they differ considerably from each other, such as the [Portuguese/Dutch] who lived the colonial war.

Almost all European colonial powers had conflicts with their colonies; therefore the [Portuguese/Dutch] should not be especially condemned for the negative consequences of its colonial war.

I think that, besides bad things, the [Portuguese/Dutch] also did good things for [the Africans of their former colonies/Indonesians].

The [Portuguese/Dutch] colonial war should always be analyzed in the context in which it occurred and this is the reason why, in the present, the [Portuguese/Dutch] should not be considered responsible for what happened at that time.

The people from [the former Portuguese colonies in Africa/Indonesia] must take responsibility for what happened in their countries.

---

[24] The present scale was used on the studies reported in Chapter 6.

Collectivism

If a coworker gets a prize, I would feel proud.

The well-being of my co-workers is important to me.

To me, pleasure is spending time with others.

I feel good when I cooperate with others.

Parents and children must stay together as much as possible.

It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want.

Family members should stick together, no matter what sacrifices are required.

It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups.

Outgroup identification[25]

I identify with [Africans from the former colonies/Indonesians].

I feel a bond with [Africans from the former colonies/Indonesians].

I feel strong ties with natives/individuals from [the former colonies/Indonesia].

I am similar to the natives of [the former colonies/Indonesia].

I feel solidarity with [the natives from the former colonies/Indonesians].

Outgroup perceptions

In general, I think the [Portuguese/Dutch] think the [Africans/Indonesians] are:

Really bad - Really good;

Really negative - Really positive;

Very unfriendly -Very friendly;

Very unkind - Very kind;

Not intelligent at al l- Very intelligent;

Not interesting at all - Very interesting;

Not thoughtful at all - Very thoughtful;

Very narrow-minded - Very open-minded;

Very lazy - Very hardworking.

---

[25] Only the first item of this scale was used in the studies reported in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. All the items were used in the studies reported in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

Meta-perceptions

In general, I think the [Africans/Indonesians] think the [Portuguese/Dutch] are:

Really bad - Really good;

Really negative - Really positive;

Very unfriendly -Very friendly;

Very unkind - Very kind;

Not intelligent at al l- Very intelligent;

Not interesting at all - Very interesting;

Not thoughtful at all - Very thoughtful;

Very narrow-minded - Very open-minded;

Very lazy - Very hardworking.

Perceptions of past compensation

The [Portuguese/Dutch] have compensated enough [the former colonies/Indonesia] for what happened during the colonial period.

The efforts [Portugal/the Netherlands] did to compensate [its former colonies/Indonesia] for what happened during the colonial period were enough and should stop.

Perceptions of the past

I believe the colonial past was violent and barbaric.

Group-based guilt[26]

I feel guilty for the negative actions that the [Portuguese/Dutch] people had against other groups during the colonial war.

I feel guilty for the negative things the [Portuguese/Dutch] did to the people from [their former African colonies/Indonesia].

I feel guilty for the bad acts committed by the [Portuguese/Dutch] during the colonial war.

We should feel guilt for the harm that the [Portuguese/Dutch] caused to other people during the colonial war.

---

[26] The present scale was used in the study reported in Chapter 4.

I feel regret for some of the things the [Portuguese/Dutch] did to other groups during the colonial war.

I feel regret for the harmful actions that the [Portuguese/Dutch] had against other groups during the colonial war.

I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the people of [the former African colonies/Indonesia] that were brought about by the [Portuguese/Dutch].

Group-based guilt[27]

I feel guilty for the negative actions that the [Portuguese/Dutch] people had against other groups during the colonial war.

I can easily feel guilty about bad outcomes received by the people from [the former African colonies/Indonesia] that were brought about by the [Portuguese/Dutch].

I feel regret for some of the things the [Portuguese/Dutch] did to other groups during the colonial war.

I regret the harmful actions that the [Portuguese/Dutch] had against other groups during the colonial war.

Group-based compunction

I feel [guilty] [remorseful] [ashamed] [humiliated] [regretful] [disgraced] for the behavior of the [Portuguese/Dutch] during the colonial war.

Group-based anger

I feel [angry] [outraged] [furious] for the behavior of the [Portuguese/Dutch] during the colonial war.

Compensatory behavioral intentions

I think the [Portuguese/Dutch] government owes something to the people they colonized and fought against.[28] / I think the [Portuguese/Dutch] owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese did.[29]

---

[27] The present scale was used in the studies reported in Chapter 5.
[28] The present item was used in the studies reported in Chapter 4.
[29] The present item was used in the studies reported in Chapter 5, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7.

I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of people from [the former colonies/Indonesia] because of the negative things the [Portuguese/Dutch] have done.

I believe we should repair the damage caused by the [Portuguese/Dutch] during the colonial war.

Personally, I believe I should repair the damage caused by the [Portuguese/Dutch] during the colonial war.

Perceptions of time

There is no need for [Portugal/the Netherlands] to continue compensating [its former colonies/Indonesia] for something that happened so long ago.

[Portugal/the Netherlands] should not compensate more [its former colonies/Indonesia] for what happened in the past.

Subjective importance of discussing the past.

How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the positive aspects of the colonial war in [the former Portuguese colonies in Africa/Indonesia]?

How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the negative aspects of the colonial war in [the former Portuguese colonies in Africa/Indonesia]?

How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the positive aspects of the colonial war in [the former Portuguese colonies in Africa/Indonesia]?

How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the negative aspects of the colonial war in [the former Portuguese colonies in Africa/Indonesia]?

Forgiveness assignment

[The Africans/Indonesians] should move past their negative feelings towards the [Portuguese/Dutch] for the harm they inflicted to them during the colonial war.

[Portuguese/Dutch] today cannot be held accountable for what their ancestors have done to [Africans/Indonesians] during the colonial war.

[The people from the former African colonies/Indonesians] should not blame the [Portuguese/Dutch] anymore for the negative consequences of the conflict over the independence of their country.

[Africans/Indonesians] should not forgive the [Portuguese/Dutch] for the harmful actions the latter group perpetrated in the past.

There is no reason for [Africans/Indonesians] in the present to hold the [Portuguese/Dutch] responsible for the negative things that happened in the past.

Today, my body was a TV'd massacre.

Today, my body was a TV'd massacre that had to fit into sound-bites and word limits.

Today, my body was a TV'd massacre that had to fit into sound-bites and word limits filled enough with statistics to counter measured response.

And I perfected my English and I learned my UN resolutions. But still, he asked me, Ms. Ziadah, don't you think that everything would be resolved if you would just stop teaching so much hatred to your children?

Pause.

I look inside of me for strength to be patient but patience is not at the tip of my tongue as the bombs drop over ▓▓▓▓ Patience has just escaped me.

Pause. Smile. We teach life, sir. Rafeef, remember to smile. Pause.

We teach life, sir. We ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ teach life after they have occupied the last sky. We teach life after they have built their settlements and apartheid walls, after the last skies. We teach life, sir.

But today, my body was a TV'd massacre made to fit into sound-bites and word limits.

Give us a human story. Don't mention that word "apartheid" and "occupation".

This is not political. You have to help me as a journalist to help you tell your story which is not a political story.

Today, my body was a TV'd massacre.

How about you give us a story of a woman in ▓▓▓▓▓▓ who needs medication? How about you? Do you have enough bone-broken limbs to cover the sun? Hand me your dead and give me the list of their names in one thousand two hundred word limits.

Today, my body was a TV'd massacre that had to fit into sound-bites and word limits and move those that are desensitized to terrorist blood.

But they felt sorry. They felt sorry for the cattle over ▓▓▓▓ Gaza. So, I give them UN resolutions and statistics and we condemn and we deplore and we reject. And these are not two equal sides: occupier and occupied. And a hundred dead, two hundred dead, and a thousand dead. And between that, war crime and massacre, I vent out words and smile "not exotic", "not terrorist".

And I recount, I recount a hundred dead, a thousand dead. Is anyone out there? Will anyone listen?

I wish I could wail over their bodies. I wish I could just run barefoot in every refugee camp and hold every child, cover their ears so they wouldn't have to hear the sound of bombing for the rest of their life the way I do.

Today, my body was a TV'd massacre.

And let me just tell you, there's nothing your UN resolutions have ever done about this. And no sound-bite, no sound-bite I come up with, no matter how good my English gets, no sound-bite, no sound-bite, no sound-bite, no sound-bite will bring them back to life. No sound-bite will fix this.

We teach life, sir. We teach life, sir.

We ▓▓▓▓▓▓▓ wake up every morning to teach the rest of the world life, sir.